COMMUNITY RELATIONS STRATEGIES AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE NIGER DELTA: A STUDY OF THREE MAJOR OIL COMPANIES by Amodu, L. O.
i 
 
COMMUNITY RELATIONS STRATEGIES AND 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE NIGER DELTA: A 
STUDY OF THREE MAJOR OIL COMPANIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AMODU, LANRE OLAOLU  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A THESIS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF MASS COMMUNICATION SUBMITTED TO THE 
COLLEGE OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE 
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE, DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY, OF 
COVENANT UNIVERSITY, OTA, OGUN STATE, NIGERIA. 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
DEDICATION 
 
This thesis is dedicated first of all to the Almighty God for His favour and grace. I also dedicate 
this to the best parents in the world, Mr. and Dcns. E.O. Amodu, and to my darling wife, Taiwo 
Amodu… you are simply the best. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I am forever indebted to the Almighty God, my dear Father, for being the Beginning and the End 
of this work. The knowledge that this work has already been completed before the foundation of 
the world (Heb. 4:3) gave me rest during the most stressful periods of the work. I also wish to 
express my appreciation to the Chancellor of Covenant University, Bishop David Oyedepo, for 
creating the platform for this Ph.D programme and for his interest in my work. I am grateful to 
the Vice-Chancellor, Prof. Aize Obayan, for her interest, constant encouragement and confidence 
that I can complete the degree in record time. I also appreciate Pastor Yemi Nathaniel for his 
encouragement and interest in my work.  I cannot but appreciate the interest and assistance of the 
Dean of the School of Postgraduate, Prof. Awonuga. Thanks you sir. 
 
My profound appreciation goes to my supervisor, Prof. Idowu Sobowale, for his invaluable 
contribution to this work. I must be one of the most blessed people in the world to have his name 
associated with my work. I also appreciate his patience, fatherly concern and stern rebuke when 
necessary. Thanks for teaching me to be thorough and to aim for excellence at all times. I am a 
proud beneficiary of your wealth of experience. My deep gratitude also goes to my second 
supervisor, Dr. Alex Asakitikpi, for his help in shaping this work to the success that it is today. 
He has been interested in this work from the very beginning and gave me the initial solid 
platform on which it was built. Thanks for serving as my catalyst and for also teaching me 
critical thinking. I also thank you for linking me up with contacts in the oil industry. I am proud 
to be associated with you. God has blessed me with the two greatest supervisors anyone can pray 
for.   
 
I wish to appreciate the contributions of Prof. Salawu who was my initial supervisor until he 
relocated to South Africa. Thanks for your invaluable contribution to the work. My thanks also 
go to Dr. Taiwo Abioye for reading drafts of this work both officially and unofficially. Thanks 
for being there throughout the entire work and for your motherly care and concern. I appreciate 
Prof. Kwofie who also read this work from the first draft of the proposal up till the final draft. 
Thanks for your meticulous corrections. I appreciate Prof. Fadayomi for reading this work and 
for making valuable corrections. I am privileged to have the input of a seasoned academic as you 
in my work. I acknowledge Dr. Rotimi Olatunji for the brainstorming session we had at the 
iv 
 
formative stage of the work. I also acknowledge the Late Prof. Segun Odukomaiya for his 
suggestions. I appreciate Prof. Daniel Omoweh for critiquing the work. 
 
My thanks also go to members of staff of the Department of Mass Communication. I deeply 
appreciate Dr. Stella Aririguzoh for her encouragements, suggestions and prayer. Thanks for 
always being there and for being a good sister. I appreciate my brother and friend, Dr. Olusola 
Oyero for his contributions to this work. Thanks for being ever ready to offer assistance 
whenever such was needed and thanks for making your printer available to me. I also wish to 
appreciate Dr. Ekeanyanwu, Dr. Omojola, Dr. Aretha Asakitikpi and Dr. Obono for their 
consistent interest in this work, for making materials available to me and for offering valuable 
suggestions. I also thank Dr. Stanley Ngoa for his keen interest in my work. I appreciate Nelson 
Okorie for his assistance during all my presentations; thanks for designing, printing and pasting 
my posters and thanks for assisting me with the public address system. I thank Suleiman Useini, 
Tunji Oyedepo, Ada Obanua, Angela Igbinoba and Toyin Bisiriyu for their contributions in one 
way or the other. 
 
To all my senior colleagues and friends in other departments who have made invaluable 
contributions to this work, I say thank you. Dr. Adekeye was always there anytime I had 
challenges with my analysis. Dr. Adejumo assisted me during the preparation of my 
questionnaire. Mrs Adewusi, Dr. Ovia and Mrs Ajayi were constantly supportive during this 
work. Mr. Jegede and Mr Ahmadu also assisted with materials and were supportive. Dr. George 
too was full of encouragements. I deeply appreciate all of you because God used your various 
contributions to make this work a success.  
 
I thank God for the people he provided to assist me within the oil industry. I appreciate Prof. 
Ogunkoya of SPDC for going out of his way to make sure that I conducted my interviews. He 
was also helpful in providing supporting materials for the study. I appreciate Dr. Jide Biobaku 
for his eagerness to assist me and also link me up with relevant Chevron personnel without even 
meeting me in person. I appreciate Prof. Fawehinmi of Chevron for granting my interview and 
for also providing supporting materials.  
 
v 
 
I cannot but appreciate the people the Lord used to assist me during my field work. I appreciate 
Mr. Okiti for calling ahead and for providing me with an escort throughout my work in 
Eruemukohwarien, his home town. I will forever be grateful to Late Dcn. Awolowo for 
sheltering me throughout my stay in Warri. Not only did he provide assistance, he also provided 
me with a police escort when he felt I needed one. I appreciate Mummy Awolowo and the entire 
family for accepting and treating me as a member of the family throughout my protracted stay in 
their home.  
 
I appreciate bro. Tunde Ajiboye and his family for accepting me into their home at Port-
Harcourt. Thanks for your great effort to follow up my Agip appointment, which eventually did 
not work out. I also appreciate bro Jenyo who sheltered and took good care of me during my 
second visit. I wish to appreciate Aldulfus, an ex-student of the Department of Sociology in 
Covenant University for abandoning his schedule to take me to Omoku and Obrikom. Belema, 
Adolphus’ friend, sheltered me during my stay in Omoku and left his schedule to escort me 
everywhere, even to Obrikom. I appreciate the Eze-Ogba Nwadei Ogbuehi in Omoku for 
granting my interview and for making arrangements for my visit to Obrikom. The Living Faith 
Church, Omoku, also assisted in this work and I thank God for the pastor and congregation.  
 
The transcription of my interviews and coding of my questionnaire were facilitated by some of 
my students in the Department of Mass Communication and I deeply appreciate them. I also 
appreciate my 2009/2010 set of supervisees for their assistance. I appreciate Amara Chucks-
Eboka and Blessing Etidiakaba for assisting me in getting valuable information about the oil 
companies and communities used for this study. I cannot but acknowledge my Pastor, Rev. Taiye 
Adeola, the Associate Pastor of Emmanuel Baptist Church, Ilorin, for his prayer and interest in 
this work. He has been there for me since my undergraduate days. May God bless him and his 
family. 
 
My heart goes out in deep appreciation to my wonderful parents, Mr. and Dcn. E.O. Amodu. 
You are the greatest parents in the whole wide world and I bless God that I have you. Thanks for 
your prayer, encouragements, calls…. There is no way I can possibly mention all your 
contributions to my life. I thank my siblings; Rev. & Mrs. Jide Amodu and family, Arch. & Mrs. 
vi 
 
Rotimi Amodu and family, Mr. & Mrs Olumide Oniyanda and Olajumoke Amodu. You guys are 
simply the best. This is your success because you were with me all the way. I love you all. I 
appreciate the wonderful Olutekunbi family. You are such great in-laws. Thanks for your 
prayers.  
 
Finally, my deep appreciation and love goes to my darling wife, Taiyelolu Adenike Precious 
Amodu. Thanks for giving me the love, support and rest I need to do this work. Thanks for 
staying up with me late at night while I was working. You had been calling me Dr. long before 
we got married. I am the most blessed man to have you. This is your success.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii 
 
CERTIFICATION 
 
We certify that Amodu Lanre Olaolu carried out this project under our supervision in the 
Department of Mass Communication, Covenant University, Ota, Nigeria. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ----------------------------------                                                                 -------------------------------- 
             SUPERVISOR                                                                              CO-SUPERVISOR 
     Prof. Idowu Sobowale (OON)                                                            Dr. Alex Asakitikpi 
          Head of Department,                                                                    Department of Sociology 
Department of Mass Communication                                                         Covenant University, 
         Covenant University,                                                                              Ota, Nigeria 
              Ota, Nigeria. 
 
viii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
                                                                                                                                         Page 
Title Page                                                                                                                                i 
Dedication                                                                                                                              ii 
Acknowledgements                                                                                                                iii                                       
Certification                                                                                                                           vii 
Table of Contents                                                                                                                  viii 
List of Tables                                                                                                                         xi 
List of Figures                                                                                                                       xii 
Abstract                                                                                                                                xiii 
 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction                                                                                                                     1 
1.2 Background to the Study                                                                                                  1 
1.3 Statement of the Problem                                                                                                 7 
1.4 Objectives                                                                                                                        8 
1.5 Research Questions                                                                                                          8 
1.6 Scope of the Study                                                                                                           9 
1.7 Justification of the Study                                                                                                  9 
1.8 Limitation of the Study                                                                                                    10 
1.9 Operational Definition of Terms                                                                                      10 
 
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction                                                                                                                     14 
2.2 Conceptualization of Conflict                                                                                          14 
2.3 The History of Crises in Niger Delta                                                                                18 
    2.3.1 The Political Dimension of the Niger Delta Crisis                                                      21 
    2.3.2 Oil dimension of the Crisis                                                                                        24 
    2.3.3 Critical Issues on the Niger Delta Crises                                                                     27 
    2.3.4 Amnesty in the Niger Delta                                                                                        28 
2.4 Multinational Corporations                                                                                                29 
ix 
 
          2.4.1 Major Multinational Oil Corporations in the Niger Delta                                  33 
              2.4.1.1 Shell Nigeria (SPDC)                                                                                 33 
             2.4.1.2 Nigerian Agip Oil Company (NAOC)                                                         34 
             2.4.1.3 Chevron Nigeria Limited (CNL)                                                                  35 
         2.4.2 Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility                                           35 
2.5 Public Relations and Relationship Building                                                                    37 
2.6 Conflict Resolution and Public Relations                                                                       43 
       2.6.1 What is an Issue?                                                                                           43 
       2.6.2 Issue Management                                                                                                43 
       2.6.3 Managing a Crisis                                                                                            44 
       2.6.4 Community Relations and the Niger Delta Crises                                                  45 
2.7 Gap in the Literature                                                                                                       47 
2.8 Theoretical Framework                                                                                                   49 
      2.8.1 Conflict Theory                                                                                                     50 
      2.8.2 Situational Theory                                                                                                 52 
      2.8.3 Stakeholder Theory                                                                                               53 
 
CHAPTER THREE: METHOD OF RESEARCH 
3.1 Introduction                                                                                                                   62 
3.2 Study Design                                                                                                                  62 
3.3 Study Population                                                                                                            63 
3.4 Sample size                                                                                                                    64 
3.5 Sampling Technique                                                                                                       65 
3.6 Instrument of Data Collection                                                                                         66 
3.7 Measurable Variables                                                                                                      67 
3.8 Data Management and Analysis                                                                                       68 
3.8 Reliability                                                                                                                        68 
3.9 Validity                                                                                                                           69 
 
CHAPTER FOUR: DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Introduction                                                                                                                    70 
x 
 
4.2 Quantitative Data Analysis                                                                                            70 
4.3 Qualitative Data Analysis                                                                                              88 
   4.3.1 The Community Relations Structure of the Oil Companies                                      88 
   4. 3.2 The Internal Structures of the Companies                                                               96 
       4.3.2.1 Leadership Problems in the Communities                                                         103 
   4.3.3 Communities’ Perception of the Direction of their Relationship with the Oil Companies                     
                                                                                                                                             108 
   4.3.4 Factors Responsible for Crises or Non-Crises in the Communities                           126 
   4.3.5 Effects of Crises on Host Communities and Oil Companies                                     132 
       4.3.5.1 Effects of Crises on Communities                                                                     132 
       4.3.5.2 The Perceived Effects of Crises on the Oil Companies                                      138 
   4.3.6 Oil Companies’ Community Relations Strategies for Conflict Resolution                 140 
   4.3.7 Assessment of the Effectiveness of the Oil Companies’ Community Relations Strategies  
                                                                                                                                                    156 
4.3.8 Communities’ Preference for Community Relations Strategies                                  161 
4.4 Discussion of Results                                                                                                      174 
  4.4.1 Introduction                                                                                                               174 
  4.4.2 Discussion                                                                                                                  174 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUTION AND RECOMMENDATION 
5.1 Introduction                                                                                                                     208 
 
5.2 Summary                                                                                                                         209 
5.3 Conclusion                                                                                                                      212 
5.4 Recommendations                                                                                                           212 
5.5 Suggestions for Further Studies                                                                                            215 
 
5.6 Contribution to Knowledge                                                                                                   216 
 
RERENCES  
APPENDIX 1 
APPENDIX 2 
APPENDIX 3 
xi 
 
APPENDIX 4 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
TABLE 4.1: COMMUNITY DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS                                                                       71 
 
TABLE 4.2: AGE AND GENDER DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS                                                             71 
TABLE 4.3: AGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY COMMUNITIES                                                    72 
 
TABLE 4.4: GENDER DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS ACCORDING TO THE COMMUNITIES  
                                                                                                                                                                                     73 
 
TABLE 4.5: EDUCATIONAL STATUS OF RESPONDENTS                                                                                73 
 
TABLE 4.6: OIL COMPANIES’ CHANNELS FOR RELATING WITH COMMUNITIES                                  74 
 
TABLE 4.7: RESPONDENTS’ ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF CONFLICTS OCCURRENCES IN THEIR 
COMMUNITIES                                                                                                                                          74 
 
TABLE 4.8: RESPONDENTS’ ASSESSMENT OF THE FREQUENCY OF CONFLICTS IN THEIR 
COMMUNITIES                                                                                                                                         75 
 
TABLE 4.9: RESPONDENTS’ ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF CONFLICTS IN THEIR COMMUNITIES AND 
THE OIL COMPANIES INVOLVED                                                                                                         76 
 
TABLE 4.10: OIL COMPANIES’ CHANNELS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION                                                  77 
 
TABLE 4.11: RESPONDENTS’ PERCEPTION OF THEIR COMMUNITIES’ RELATIONSHIP WITH THE OIL 
COMPANIES                                                                                                                                               77 
 
TABLE 4.12: RESPONDENTS’ PERCEPTION OF THE FREQUENCY OF OIL COMPANIES’ 
COMMUNICATION WITH COMMUNITIES                                                                                           78 
 
TABLE 4.13: RESPONDENTS’ PERCEPTION OF OIL COMPANIES’ CONTRIBUTIONS TO COMMUNITY 
DEVELOPMENT                                                                                                                                          79 
 
TABLE 4.14: RESPONDENTS’ PERCEPTION OF OIL COMPANIES’ CONSULTATION WITH THE 
COMMUNITIES BEFORE EMBARKING ON DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS                                         82 
 
TABLE 4.15: RESPONDENTS’ PERCEPTION OF THE OIL COMPANIES’ POSITIVE INFLUENCE ON 
THEIR COMMUNITIES                                                                                                                               83 
 
TABLE 4.16: RESPONDENTS’ PERCEPTION OF THE OIL COMPANIES’ EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION 
WITH THEIR COMMUNITIES                                                                                                                    84 
 
 
TABLE 4.17: RESPONDENTS’ SATISFACTION WITH OIL COMPANIES’ CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
STRATEGIES                                                                                                                                               84 
 
TABLE 4.18: RESPONDENTS’ PERCEPTION OF OIL COMPANIES’ READINESS TO NEGOTIATE DURING 
CONFLICTS                                                                                                                                                 85 
 
 
xii 
 
TABLE 4.19: RESPONDENTS’ PERCEPTION OF THE REDUCTION OF CRISES FREQUENCY THROUGH 
OIL COMPANIES’ COMMUNICATION                                                                                                   86 
 
TABLE 4.20: RESPONDENTS’ PERCEPTION OF THE OIL COMPANIES’ FULFILMENT OF PROMISES   87 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Fig. 4.1: AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE OIL COMPANIES’ STRUCTURES FOR COMMUNITY RELATIONS   
                                                                                                                                                                                       88 
 
Fig 4.2: AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE UNIQUE COMMUNITY RELATIONS STRATEGIES OF SHELL AND 
CHEVRON                                                                                                                                                 91 
 
Fig 4.3: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE OF TISUN AND KOLOKOLO COMMUNITIES                     96 
 
Fig 4.4: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE OF OMOKU AND OBRIKOM COMMUNITIES                    98 
 
Fig 4.5: THE FUNCTIONAL STRUCTURE OF OMOKU AND OBRIKOM COMMUNITIES                              98 
 
Fig 4.6: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE OF ERUEMUKOHWARIEN        
                                                                                                                                                                                     100 
Fig. 4.7: AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE CAUSES OF LEADERSHIP PROBLEMS IN THE COMMUNITIES  
                                                                                                                                                                                     102 
 
 
Fig. 4.8: AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE COMMUNITIES’ PERCEPTION OF THE DIRECTION OF THEIR 
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE OIL COMPANIES                                                                                    108 
 
Fig 4.9: AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE FACTORS INFLUENCING THE PRESENCE OR ABSENCE OF CRISES 
IN THE COMMUNITIES                                                                                                                          126 
 
Fig 4.10: OIL COMPANIES’ COMMUNITY RELATIONS STRATEGIES ADOPTED FOR CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION                                                                                                                                             140 
 
Fig 4.11: THE COMMUNITY RELATIONS STRATEGIES IDENTIFIED WITH THE OIL COMPANIES BY 
THE COMMUNITES DURING CONFLICT AND THE COMMUNITIES’ RESPONSES              145 
 
 
Fig. 4.12: OIL COMPANIES’ PERCEIVED COMMUNITY PREFERENCE FOR DEALING WITH THEM     161 
 
Fig. 4.13: COMMUNITIES’ ACTUAL PREFERENCE OF STRATEGIES                                                            164 
 
Fig 5.1: GMoU MONITORING SCHEME                                                                                                              216 
 
 
 
xiii 
 
ABSTRACT 
The degree of violence in Nigeria’s Niger Delta has become endemic, characterized by 33 cases 
of kidnapping recorded between January 2006 and February 2007, with over 200 victims being 
mostly expatriate oil workers (Africa Masterweb, 2007). There were also about 12, 770 cases of 
vandalism, particularly of oil pipelines and installations, recorded in Nigeria between 2000 and 
2007 with most of them occurring in the Niger Delta (Nwankwo and Ezeobi, 2008).  
 
The implications of the Niger Delta crises are too far-reaching to be ignored: for the inhabitants 
of this area, there are constant environmental hazards and security threat, while for the Nigerian 
government, over N150.5bn in revenue was lost in eight years (Nwankwo and Ezeobi, 2008); 
there was also a drop of more than 20% in oil exports between April 2006 and October 2007 
(BBC News, 2007). The concern of the research was why the escalation of conflicts rather than 
abatement between host communities and oil companies while the companies had in place 
community relations strategies to manage the conflicts in the communities?  
 
The study, therefore, examined the community relations strategies used by oil companies in 
managing the crises in the Niger Delta. The study population comprised the community relations 
units of oil companies in the Niger Delta (among which Shell, Chevron and Agip were selected) 
and the indigenes of Omoku and Obrikom communities in Rivers State and Eruemukohwarien, 
Tisun and Kolokolo communities in Delta State. Though the communities studied were 
somewhat peripheral to the crisis, they still reflected the true situation of things in the Niger 
Delta. 
 
Both quantitative (survey) and qualitative (key informant interview and focus group discussion) 
methods of data collection were employed. The respondents for the survey were randomly 
selected while those for the interviews and focus groups were purposively selected. The study 
established that conflicts between oil companies and host communities had serious implications 
for the two parties and that the community relations strategies adopted by the selected oil 
companies were not adequate in preventing and resolving conflicts in the Niger Delta. That was 
because there was a lacuna between the strategies the oil companies believed host communities 
preferred for conflict resolution and the ones actually preferred by those communities.  
xiv 
 
 
The research, therefore, suggested that to reduce conflict between oil companies and host 
communities in the Niger Delta, companies should be mindful of conflict propelling factors 
identified by the respondents and stated in the work, they should improve on their community 
relations strategies in order to impress the community and most importantly, they should 
introduce grassroots approach to the implementation of their strategies, particularly the Global 
Memorandum of Understanding (GMoU), for optimum results.   
 
Keywords: Niger Delta, conflict, community relations, oil companies and host communities 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The “Niger Delta” in Nigeria has attracted a great deal of attention over the years. Among 
the major reasons for this is the rich natural endowment of the region. The Niger Delta is 
reputed to be one of the world’s largest wetlands, having ecosystems comparable to the 
Sundarbans in Bangladesh, Malaysia, and India (Osagie, Ibaba & Watts, 2009, p. 13). 
More importantly, it is also rich in crude oil, which has become the mainstay of Nigeria’s 
economy.  
 
Another major reason for the popularity of the Niger Delta, unfortunately, is the frequent 
conflicts associated with oil production in the region. Osagie, Ibaba & Watts (2009, p. 9) 
observe that though it is rare for Nigeria to be emblazoned on the front page of the Wall 
Street Journal, the 9th September 2009 issue featured a story titled “Delta Farce: Nigeria’s 
oil mess.” This chapter, therefore, provides a background to this study and also 
conceptualises the research problem. Research objectives and questions are also 
presented to define the focus of the study.    
 
1.2 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
 
There have been several attempts to define the characteristics of the Niger Delta over the 
years. Asakitikpi & Oyelaran (1999) observe that it is a densely populated area in 
Nigeria. Its boundaries, as defined by the Nigerian government, extend over 70,000 km. 
The area makes up 7.5% of Nigeria’s land mass. It stretches in an East-West direction 
and extends from South-West Cameroun to the Okitipupa ridge, forming an apex at the 
South-East of the Rivers Niger and Benue confluence.  
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According to the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), the Niger Delta 
includes all the nine oil producing States of Nigeria: Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross 
River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo, and Rivers States (NDDC, 2000). The UNDP (2006) 
agrees with this definition of the area.  The reasons for this grouping were largely 
political and they include administrative convenience, political expedience, and 
development objectives (UNDP, 2006). Ibaba (2005), however, observes that the 
inclusion of Abia, Imo, and Ondo States in the definition is wrong because the scope of 
the region should be defined not by politics, but by geography.  
 
Ibaba (2005) goes on to say that the definition given by the defunct Oil Minerals 
Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) and the Willink Commission 
Report, which states that there are only 6 Niger Delta States, better captures the make-up 
of the area. He, nevertheless, notes that with states creation, it is probable that some 
Niger Delta communities may have now been placed in States other than the six widely 
accepted Niger Delta States. This current study adopts Ibaba’s description of the Niger 
Delta because the focus is on communities with resident oil activities and shared 
geographical characteristics.  
 
The communities in the Niger Delta have settled in the area for several centuries (Alagoa, 
2005). It is inhabited by over 7 million Nigerians from 20 ethnic groups in about 800 
communities (Ibaba, 2005). According to Atakiti (2004) (as cited in Saiyou, 2006), the 
Niger Delta consisted mostly of agrarian communities before the 15th century. Those 
communities produced commodities such as oil palm, rubber, sugarcane and fruit trees 
like mango, banana, plantain, and pawpaw. They also engaged in fishing, handicraft and 
trading. 
 
Oil exploration started in Nigeria between 1908 and 1914. The process was initiated 
when the German Nigerian Bitumen Corporation and the British Colonial Petroleum 
Company began drilling from the heavy oil seeps in the cretaceous Abeokuta formation 
(Nwaobi, 1980; Saiyou, 2006). Consequent on the discovery of only dry holes and 
particularly the break-out of World War I, the venture was abandoned. However, interest 
  3 
in oil exploration was resuscitated from 1937 to 1940 when preliminary investigation was 
undertaken by Shell D’Arcy Petroleum Development Company. This effort also was 
aborted due to the Second World War.   
 
In 1946, the Royal Dutch Shell Group and British Company replaced Shell D’Arcy, and 
jointly financed the Shell-BP Development Company of Nigeria. Exploration continued 
in the northern part of the Niger Delta. In 1953, the first evidence of oil was found at 
Shell D’Arcy’s Atata-1 well; however, oil was not discovered in commercial quantity 
until late 1955 when Shell-BP made a find in the Tertiary Agbada formation at Oloibiri. 
More discoveries were made at Ughelli (Nwaobi, 1980). The first oil cargo from Nigeria 
was exported from Oloibiri oilfield in 1958 at the initial rate of 5,100 barrels a day.  
 
Nwaobi (1980) notes that the Nigerian government, in 1961, granted 10 oil exploration 
licences to these five companies: Shell-BP, Mobil Exploration Nigeria Incorporated, 
Amosea, Texaco and Nigerian Gulf Oil. The government also commenced discussions 
that same year with the Royal Dutch Shell Group and Shell-BP on the establishment of 
Nigeria’s first oil refinery. The refinery was commissioned in 1965 and was located at 
Port Harcourt. It is interesting to note that before the civil war of 1967, Nigeria’s oil 
production had already exceeded 152 million barrels a year. 
 
The Nigerian National Oil Corporation (NNOC) was set up in May 1971 to be involved 
in all the phases of the oil industry ranging from exploration to marketing. Nigeria 
became the 11th member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
in July 1971. In 1977, the NNOC and the Ministry of Petroleum were merged after the 
role of the government in oil management was rationalized and the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) was formed.   
 
Owing to the demands of the oil industry in Nigeria, NNPC was re-organized in 1985 
into six sectors. This was done to encourage innovation, efficiency and positive 
aggressiveness. It is noteworthy, however, that 25 years after the re-organization, the 
objectives are yet to be achieved since oil refineries in Nigeria are in poor state and the 
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price of the refined product constantly increases.  In 1988, the Nigerian oil exploration 
and exploitation business was opened to private entrepreneurs by the Federal 
Government.                 
 
Saiyou (2006) notes that the initial disposition of the host communities to the advent of 
oil companies in the Niger Delta was positive.  The discovery of oil in the region and the 
influx of transnational oil corporations raised the hopes of the indigenes in respect of the 
long awaited development that suddenly seemed apparent. The author further points out 
that the discovery of oil was a welcome development. This was consequent on the 
general impression of most Nigerians that the Niger Delta, particularly the Ijaw territory, 
was one of the world’s vast wasted wetlands. Hence, the host communities readily 
accepted the oil companies, seeing them as an opportunity to address long overdue 
developmental issues.  
 
The oil exploration and exploitation processes have, however, brought with them the 
degradation of the environment, thereby impoverishing the host communities and 
endangering lives. Asakitikpi & Oyelaran (1999) observe that tapping into the oil 
reserves requires the construction of rigs, industrial facilities and power plants; it also 
involves prospecting, exploring and drilling of crude mineral oil. They state that all these 
result in the degradation and destruction of life-supporting ecological systems and natural 
resources.  
 
Apart from the destruction of vegetation during the exploration and production phases, 
the flaring of associated gas in the process of extracting the crude oil poses a threat to 
human life (Asakitikpi & Oyelaran, 1999). Unburned carbon is often transported into the 
homes and working areas of the Niger Delta inhabitants. Also, whenever it rains, thick 
soot is washed off roofs and other surfaces, causing water pollution, which is believed to 
contain harmful chemicals that affect the fertility of the soil. According to Alao (2005), 
some gas flaring sites in the Niger Delta have been in existence for more than 30 years 
running 24 hours a day. Hence, about 35 million tons of carbon dioxide and 12 million 
tons of methane are released in a year (Alao, 2005). 
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About 52 years after oil was first discovered at Oloibiri, the Niger Delta communities 
have declared war on the oil companies they once so readily welcomed. This 
development is due to the extent of damage suffered by those communities as a result of 
the oil exploration processes. They also consider there to be inadequate compensation by 
the oil companies and/or gross neglect of the region by successive Nigerian governments.  
 
In 2005, the Niger Delta communities sued NNPC, Shell, Exxon, Chevron, Total and 
Agip joint venture companies for failure to stop gas flaring. According to Environmental 
Rights Action (ERA), though gas flaring had been prohibited under environmental 
regulations since 1984, Nigeria still has more gas flared than anywhere else in the world 
(F.O.E., 2005). According to Rizvi (2005), environmentalists estimated the amount of gas 
associated with crude oil that is wasted daily at about two million cubic feet. They stress 
that the wasted gas contains a mix of toxins that pose severe health risks to human 
populations. The author further notes that child respiratory diseases, asthma, cancer, and 
premature deaths are increasingly becoming the lot of a vast majority of Niger Delta 
residents, due to the massive gas flaring. 
 
Hinman (2008), based on the case of the Oil Spill Intelligence Report commissioned by 
Greenpeace, an international organization for environmental conservation and the 
preservation of endangered species, states that Shell’s major spills in Nigeria total 7.4 
million litres. It was also revealed in the 10-year spill record that of the major spills from 
Shell’s operations in over 100 countries worldwide, 40% occurred in Nigeria. Hinman 
also explains that since the Niger Delta is a catchment area for over 20 river systems, six 
million people depend on its fertile fishing grounds and agricultural land. Consequently, 
the spills constantly flow into nearby streams costing communities their farmland and 
water supply. 
 
In 1999, the Shell Company was accused of allegedly injecting a million litres of waste 
into an abandoned oil well in Erovies. According to Ofehe (2008), investigations later 
revealed that several people who consumed crops or drank water obtained from swamps 
in the area displayed symptoms such as stomach ache, cough, vomiting and dizziness. 
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Ninety-three people died from the illness within two months. The results of independent 
researches conducted by three laboratories and two Nigerian universities a year after the 
health problem was detected revealed a poisonous concentration of lead, zinc and 
mercury in the dumped substance (Ofehe, 2008).    
 
Consequent on the complex nature of the problems in the Niger Delta, members of the 
community have embraced violence as a means of curbing the excesses of oil companies, 
getting at the government and attracting international attention amongst others. 
According to Ogbogbo (2004), the various joint venture agreements entered into by the 
Federal Government and transnational oil companies indicate an increase in the parties 
involved in the crises. The government is perceived to have abandoned its responsibility 
to its citizens while the oil companies are believed to have failed to demonstrate 
corporate commitment to the welfare of their host communities.  
 
Hence, the oil companies have been categorized as foes, thereby increasing the number of 
parties to the conflicts. This view was corroborated by Ron Van den Berg, the Chairman 
and MD of Anglo Dutch Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria when he 
remarked that since the communities could not attack the government, they attacked the 
oil companies instead (“Niger Delta Situation,” 1999). In 2002, an international 
observation team declared the Niger Delta as one of the most volatile regions in the world 
(Alao, 2005). Since a higher percentage of the violence in the area is against the oil 
companies, it becomes imperative for the companies to re-evaluate their relationships 
with their host communities, that is, re-engineer their community relations strategies. 
 
Basking, Aronoff and Lattimore (1997) explain that the community relations of an 
organization may be affected by a variety of factors, ranging from recruitment methods to 
waste disposal and energy use. This means that an organization’s community relations is 
a function, not only of those things it does to compensate and placate the community, but 
also of its ethical execution of business. For instance, why spend lots of money building 
health centers for communities while still poisoning their air and water?  
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According to Peak (1991, p. 117), “Today, no matter how large, small, or important an 
institution may be, it can be undermined if its community relations are haphazard”. In an 
empirical study carried out by Rim-Rukeh, Ogbemi and Imide (2008, p. 645-657) in 10 
Niger Delta communities, it was discovered that the community in which there was the 
highest record of crises, also had 95% vote that the resident oil company was a bad 
corporate organization, owing to environmental degradation occasioned by incessant oil 
spillages and poor community relations.   
 
This appears to establish a clear relationship between the community relations practice of 
an organization and its level of exposure to crises. Ironically, huge sums of money are 
usually quoted to have been spent on such communities by oil companies in the Niger 
Delta. The study also revealed that some communities with infrastructure provided by oil 
companies still had some degree of crises. This, therefore, brings to the fore the question 
of how community relations is practised, rather than whether or not it is practised at all.  
 
 
1.3 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
 
The degree of violence in the Niger Delta has become endemic, characterized by 33 cases 
of kidnapping recorded between January 2006 and February 2007, with over 200 victims 
being mostly expatriate oil workers (Africa Masterweb, 2007). There were also about 12, 
770 cases of vandalism, particularly of oil pipelines and installations, recorded in Nigeria 
between 2000 and 2007 with most of them occurring in the Niger Delta (Nwankwo & 
Ezeobi, 2008). 
 
The implications of the Niger Delta crises are too far-reaching to be ignored: for the 
inhabitants of this area, there are constant environmental hazards and security threat, 
while for the Nigerian government, over N150.5bn in revenue was lost in eight years 
(Nwankwo & Ezeobi, 2008); there was also a drop of more than 20% in oil exports 
between April 2006 and October 2007 (BBC News, 2007). The global community is not 
excluded from the effect of the crises; the crude oil price on the world market was raised 
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to $100 per barrel in January 2008 (Arowolo, 2008 as cited in Alabi, 2008) and later to 
about $120 a barrel in April 2008.  
 
The worst hit of all the victims of vandalism and kidnapping, however, are the oil 
companies.  More than 95% of the kidnap cases mentioned above involved oil workers, 
and the installations of oil companies were the target of most of the vandalism. It is 
noteworthy, however, that the degree of these occurrences varies across different oil 
companies (Aaron & Patrick, 2008). Onua (2007) describes it as a sort of revenge on the 
multinational oil companies.  
 
While the oil companies claim to be practising community relations and to have invested 
a lot in the development of their host communities, the communities, on the other hand, 
either claim that enough has not been done, or that the efforts have been made without 
due consultations with them. The concern of this study is why the escalation of conflicts 
rather than abatement between host communities and oil companies while the companies 
have in place community relations strategies to manage the conflicts in the communities? 
This question forms the basis for this study. 
 
  
1.4 OBJECTIVES 
The purpose of this study is to examine the community relations strategies used by oil 
companies in managing the crises in the Niger Delta. Considering that most attacks are 
carried out by community members, it is plausible that a proper community relations 
scheme should be able to nip any conflict in the bud. This study, therefore, investigates 
the efforts by oil companies to use community relations in crises management in the 
Niger Delta. It also considers the perception of the communities concerning such efforts. 
The specific objectives of this study are therefore to: 
 
1) Examine the extent to which conflict has occurred in selected Niger Delta 
communities in relation to oil exploration by Shell, Agip and Chevron and the 
causes. 
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2) Assess the consequences of the conflicts in the Niger Delta on the communities 
and the oil companies.  
3) Identify the community relations strategies used by the oil companies in conflict 
resolution in the selected communities. 
4) Compare the form of community relations strategies adopted by the selected oil 
companies. 
5) Evaluate the host communities’ perceptions of the community relations strategies 
adopted by the oil companies. 
6) Investigate the community relations strategies preference by the host communities 
for conflict resolution. 
 
 
1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In the light of the above, the following research questions were raised: 
 
1) How often have conflicts occurred in the Niger Delta involving Shell, Agip and 
Chevron and what are the causes? 
2) What are the consequences of the conflicts in the Niger Delta on host 
communities and oil companies? 
3) What are the community relations strategies employed by oil companies to 
avoid/resolve conflicts with host communities? 
4) What structural differences are inherent in the community relations strategies 
adopted by the selected oil companies in the Niger Delta? 
5) How do the host communities perceive oil companies’ community relations 
strategies? 
6) What community relations strategies would host communities prefer in their 
relationship with oil companies?  
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1.6 SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
This study is on community relations strategies used by oil companies to resolve crises in 
the Niger Delta. It focuses on the specific techniques involved in building a good 
relationship with host communities. The oil companies under consideration in this study 
are Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC), Chevron and Agip. The study 
population is restricted to Omoku and Obrikom communities in Rivers State and 
Eruemukohwarien, Tisun and Kolokolo communities in Delta State. 
 
1.7 JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY 
Although several studies have been carried out on Niger Delta conflicts and the roles of 
the oil companies, there is inadequate information on the specific community relations 
strategies employed by oil companies and the preference of host communities. 
Community relations is germane to the peaceful coexistence of the companies and the 
communities. Failure to give it its due attention engenders consequences such as the 
following: 
1. Distrust: one of the major causes of conflicts in the Niger Delta is host 
communities’ distrust for oil companies. Consequent on the poor relationship 
between the two parties, host communities believe that oil companies exploit 
them by extracting oil from their environment thereby destroying their natural 
habitat; but the companies fail to adequately compensate them.  Hence, any 
advance from the companies is seen as placating the communities instead of 
dealing with the developmental challenges of the people. 
2. Restiveness: among the causes of the restiveness being witnessed in the Niger 
Delta is the ineffective community relations of oil companies. The youths who 
attack the installations of oil companies and abduct their staff are members of the 
communities. A favourable relationship with host communities would have 
forestalled this undesirable situation. This further underscores the importance of 
community relations.  
3. Revenue loss: it cannot be overemphasized that oil companies and the Federal 
Government have lost a great amount of revenue as a result of the Niger Delta 
conflicts. While most of the communities remain inhabitable because of clashes 
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between the youths and military forces, business also becomes impossible for 
multinational companies for fear of attacks. 
 
From the foregoing, it becomes pertinent to conduct a study that provides a clear analysis 
of the community relations strategies engaged by oil companies and how they can be 
effectively employed for conflict resolution. Hence, it is hoped that this study will expand 
the frontiers of knowledge in respect to community relations strategies and also serve as a 
launching pad for other researchers in public relations.  
 
1.8 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
In the course of this study, some challenges were encountered that imposed some 
limitations on this study. One of the major challenges encountered was the population of 
Tisun and Kolokolo communities. A crisis occurred in the communities in 2004, which 
led to the death of several indigenes and the displacement of others. The entire villages 
were razed down and deserted; and up to the time of conducting this study, only a few of 
the natives had returned home. Hence, only a small sample could be used in the 
communities. This problem was, however, managed by using about 80% of the available 
population to arrive at a considerable sample and to ensure a formidable representation of 
their perception.  
 
Also, the study was to include the comparison of the community relations strategies of 
Shell, Agip and Chevron. While Shell and Chevron granted interviews for the sake of this 
study, Agip declined. All efforts made to secure an appointment with the company’s 
representative, including a letter of introduction from the Department of Petroleum 
Resources, NNPC, were stonewalled. Hence, the analyses made on the strategies of the 
oil companies excluded Agip.  Considering that the information on Agip’s website was 
inadequate for the in-depth investigation required for this study, only the survey data 
were used to avoid presenting misleading information. 
 
Consequent on the volatility of the Niger Delta at the time this study was conducted, 
some initially selected communities (Ogulaha, Ashaka-Ashimoke and Okpai 
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communities in Delta State) had to be substituted. This was after due consultation with 
both supervisors of this work and advice from some resident Niger Delta indigenes. The 
substitution was done systematically by randomly selecting replacements for the affected 
communities to preserve the integrity of the study.  
 
Due to the tensed situation and the air of suspicion it created, some of the respondents 
were reluctant to fill the questionnaire. Some also insisted on being paid before 
responding because they were under the impression that the study was sponsored by the 
government or the oil companies. In Tisun and Kolokolo communities, the women were 
reluctant to participate in the Focus group discussions (FGDs) and also to give their 
names for the record. This was because they claimed that several people, governments, 
agencies, and even their leaders had come to interview them and to collect their names 
without any benefit resulting from such contacts. This problem was resolved by 
presenting proper identification to prove that the study was unconnected with any of the 
suspected sources. The help of indigenous research assistants was also enlisted to help 
enlighten the participants on the purpose of the study. Consequent on the systematic 
approach adopted in managing the limitations of this study, it is believed that the overall 
quality of the study would not be undermined.  
 
 
1.9 OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF TERMS 
Agip: it is an Italian company with the original Italian name Azienda Generale Italiana 
Petroli, which means General Italian Oil Agency.  It operates in Nigeria as the Nigerian 
Agip Oil Company Limited (NAOC). The NAOC is a joint venture operated by Agip in 
which NNPC has the larger share (60%).   
 
CDB: the Cluster Development Board is the administrative body representing each 
cluster under Shell’s design of the GMoU. A cluster is a group of communities that have 
been categorized based on specific shared characteristics, and which can jointly decide on 
their preferred development direction. 
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Chevron: it is an American company which operates in Nigeria under the joint venture 
name, Chevron Nigeria Limited (CNL). In this case also, NNPC has the larger share of 
the venture. 
 
Communication: in this study, communication refers to the exchange of relevant 
information between the oil companies and the host communities. 
  
Community Relations: it is a specialized arm of public relations that focuses on building 
mutual and profitable relationships between an organization and its host communities. 
 
Conflict: it is a situation that occurs when the goals, objectives or values of competing 
groups- in this case oil companies and host communities in the Niger Delta- clash and 
result in aggression, which may not necessarily be violent (Cunningham, 1998). 
 
Cordial Relationship: this is a polite display of friendliness towards another party. It is 
based on mutual respect. Cordial relationship is not one that is necessarily void of 
conflict, but one in which provision is made for proper settlement that is acceptable to all 
the parties involved.  
 
Crisis: it is a situation that has degenerated into a critical stage in which extraordinary 
intervention is needed to remedy. 
 
GMoU: the Global Memorandum of Understanding (GMoU) was originated by Chevron 
in 2005 and was adopted by Shell in 2006. It is an agreement that allows the communities 
to determine their own development priorities while the oil companies provide the 
funding. 
 
IRDC: the Itsekiri Rural Development Council represents the clusters in relating with 
Chevron in accordance with the company’s GMoU.  
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Issue: It is a matter or an event that has the potential of far reaching consequences for a 
public or the publics of an organization or institution (Folarin, 1998). 
 
Niger Delta: in this study, Niger Delta refers to the part of Nigeria’s land mass that 
stretches in an East-West direction and extends from South West Cameroon to the 
Okitipupa ridge, forming an apex at the South East of the Rivers Niger and Benue 
confluence (Asakitikpi and Oyelaran, 2000). It includes states such as Akwa Ibom, 
Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo and Rivers. 
 
Oil Producing States: this refers to all the states in which oil is produced in Nigeria. 
They include the six states that are known as the Niger Delta states with the inclusion of 
Abia, Imo and Ondo States, making nine states in all. 
 
 Public Relations: The British Institute of Public Relations’ (BIPR) definition was 
adopted for this work which says that public relations is the “deliberate, planned and 
sustained effort to establish and maintain mutual understanding between an organization 
and its publics,” (Daramola, 2003). 
  
Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC): it is the subsidiary of Royal Dutch 
Shell, a British/Dutch company, and it operates in Nigeria. The company is simply 
known as Shell Nigeria and is in joint venture with the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC) and other oil companies.  
 
Strategies: in this study, they refer to elaborate and systematic plans that are put in place 
by the oil companies to resolve conflicts with their host communities.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Several studies have been carried out on Nigeria’s Niger Delta and the nature of conflicts 
devastating the region. The activities of multinational oil companies have also been 
examined with special consideration given to the underdevelopment of Niger Delta 
communities (Omoweh, 2005; Omoweh, 2010; Akinola, 2008; Watts, 2009). This 
chapter presents a review of relevant literature and the theoretical framework that are 
germane to this study. The literature and theories presented here form the bases for the 
discussion of findings later in this work.  
 
2.2 CONCEPTUALISATION OF CONFLICT 
Conflict may be seen as a result of a dynamic relationship between interested parties, 
struggling to gain control of valuable resources. According to Otite (2001), conflict arises 
when individuals or groups in a defined environment pursue divergent goals, interests 
and ambitions.  When there is a change in the social environment, for instance, the 
discovery of new resources from development in the physical environment, a fertile 
ground for conflict is created. The ensuing conflict usually involves individuals and 
groups who are interested in using the new resources to achieve their goals.   He further 
observes that conflict is a conscious act in which personal or group contact and 
communication are involved. 
 
The term conflict has been variously defined over the years. Among the most common 
definitions is the one proposed by Coser (1956, p. 8), which views the term as “A 
struggle over values or claims to status, power, and scarce resources, in which the aims of 
the opponents are to neutralize, injure, or eliminate their rivals”. Schelling (1960) also 
states that “Conflict occurs when competing groups, goals, objectives, need, or value 
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clash, and aggression, although not necessarily violence, is a result” (as cited in 
Cunningham, 1998, p. 5). Whereas, Zartman (1991, p. 370) conceives conflict as “An 
unavoidable concomitant of choices and decisions and an expression of the basic fact of 
human interdependence.”  
  
Park & Burgess (1921) argue that conflict is devised to resolve divergent dualism, and to 
achieve some sort of unity, notwithstanding its propensity to eliminate one of the 
conflicting parties. However, conflict should not be perceived as being only a negative, 
dysfunctional, or disjunctive process, and a communication breakdown, as some scholars 
tend to suggest. Folarin (1998) agrees with the above by stating that conflict is not 
necessarily a bad thing; rather, it can be both functional and dysfunctional. According to 
him, there is general agreement among scholars that development is hardly conceivable 
in the absence of some form and measure of conflict. He submits by noting that what 
matters is the way and manner in which the conflict is handled. 
 
Though conflict is distinct from competition, struggle, and contest, it is similar to them in 
that it is a normal process of interaction, more so in complex societies in which essential 
resources are scarce. Donohue & Kolt (1992) explain that when interdependent people 
express their differences in the process of achieving their needs and goals, conflict may 
arise. The co-existence of the differences becomes impossible without some adjustment, 
yet, neither of the parties may want to shift ground.  
 
Sandole (1993) identifies the stages of conflict as initiation, escalation, controlled 
maintenance, abatement and termination/resolution. He explains that the stages together 
form a process, and in that process, peace is the ultimate target of conflict or perhaps 
violence. However, the individuals or groups may not necessarily achieve the initial 
objective; the conflict may subdue it through negotiated settlement. It is noteworthy, 
here, that Sandole’s view of conflict seems to be influenced by functionalism. 
Functionalists believe that all the parties in a society are interdependent, therefore, in the 
case of conflict, the society evolves a means to resolve it (Wallace & Wolf, 2006). This 
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is, however, not always true as can be seen in the case of the Niger Delta. The conflict 
seems to be taking the communities farther from peace. 
 
Folarin (1998, p. 49) also identifies the following as sources of conflict: 
1) Competition over goals and interests that cannot be shared. In this context, conflict 
arises when individuals or groups compete for interests that are indivisible. For 
instance, the struggle to gain control of power may lead to conflict. Nigeria operates 
a multi-party political system and the various parties contest for positions that are 
indivisible. Major crises arise when one or more of the parties engage in malpractices 
or when they refuse to accept another party as the winner of an election. 
2) Usurpation or attempt to usurp the goals of one component by another component of 
a society. Here, the stronger or more privileged component violates or denies the 
rights of the other component in a bid to achieve its own aim. When this happens, the 
deprived party usually attempts to re-establish its position either forcefully or 
otherwise. A good example of this is the series of military coup in Nigeria. From the 
first coup in 1966, which installed Major-General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi as the Head 
of State, to the last official one in 1985, which brought in Major-General Ibrahim 
Babangida, the military used its superior power to usurp the goals of the civilian 
government. Nigerians agitated for a return to civilian government and that led to 
varying degrees of conflicts. 
3) Inconsistencies in goals. While allowance may be made for pockets of 
indeterminacies in all human goals, too many unjustifiable inconsistencies in the 
goals set by individuals or groups in a society may become a source of conflict. One 
of the major dimensions of the crises in the Niger Delta is the failure of the 
government and multinationals to remain committed to their various promises of 
development in the area.  
4) Increasing desire for autonomy or authority by the different individuals or groups in 
the community. Conflict ensues when a former subordinate individual or group 
attempts to secede or exert authority over a wider range of issues. Any effort by the 
erstwhile dominant party to maintain the status quo may lead to conflict. In Nigeria 
for instance, this cannot be better exemplified than by referring to the civil war. In 
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1967, the Southeastern province of Nigeria attempted secession by declaring the 
Republic of Biafra. The Federal Government resisted this attempt and this led to the 
war that lasted till 1970.  
5) Scarcity or inadequacy of resources to meet the needs of the various components. 
Conflict evolves when the resources that are required to meet specific needs are 
scarce, and more importantly, when the few available are not evenly distributed. For 
instance, the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) of Nigerian universities 
has, on several occasions, embarked on strike actions to protest that the educational 
sector in Nigeria has been allocated too little money in recent years. The above 
scenario describes a conflict based on scarcity of resources. 
6) Various kinds of communication breakdown. Conflict can evolve when there is 
hoarding of information, inefficient dissemination of information, or even the use of 
inappropriate channels of communication within a society. When a few individuals 
or groups benefit from available information at the expense of others, there is bound 
to be a conflict.  On May 21, 1994, some angry youths reportedly killed four Ogoni 
leaders in Rivers State, for alleged communication with the oil companies to the 
detriment of the rest of the community. This triggered a series of other events, 
including the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and his comrades.    
  
Folarin (1998) further observes that scholars of sociology and management have 
proposed several categories of conflict. He considers his own four-fold categorization to 
be the simplest.  According to him, conflict can be divergent, symmetrical, 
complementary, and parallel (Folarin, 1998, p. 50). 
1) Divergent Conflict: a divergent conflict occurs when every member or group 
within a society is practically pursuing individual goals that are different from the 
corporate goal of the society, and which are difficult to reconcile with the extant 
goals. Consequent on the failure to agree, the society ends up with not just two 
factions, but several.  In recent Niger Delta crises, not all the abductors are 
nationalists. Several groups have been responsible for kidnapping that is 
motivated by the possible payment of ransom than with the struggle for 
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development. In this case, the area ends up with several factions who may not 
even be interested in the resolution of the crises. 
2) Symmetrical Conflict: this type of conflict arises when co-operation is hindered 
by the pursuance of the same goal by two or more separate entities or groups. Due 
to the indivisibility of the goal, there ensues a breakdown in the existing 
relationship. In April 2006, former Vice-President Atiku Abubakar, who was also 
a co-founder of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), publicly split with former 
President Obasanjo. Atiku claimed that his action was based on his disagreement 
with Obasanjo’s bid for a third term. Considering that Atiku later contested for the 
presidency, it can safely be assumed that his action may have also been based on 
the third term agenda’s potential threat to his ambition.  
3) Complementary Conflict: this type of conflict is a product of a misinterpretation 
of the goals or intentions of one party by another. Though the goals of one group 
complement those of the other, they are mistakenly perceived as being 
contradictory or opposed to one another. There have been several clashes between 
the Nigerian Army and the Police Force. Though the goals of these forces are 
complementary, the forces erroneously perceive each other as antagonists.  
4) Parallel Conflict: in this type of conflict, each party reserves the right to make its 
decision and execute it. For instance, while labour unions reserve the right to call 
for a strike action and manage it, the management of an organization also has the 
legitimate right to take all lawful steps to ensure the security of its property. The 
extent to which such rights and powers are exercised, however, depends on 
several factors, such as the personality of each participant and the historical 
perspective of the existing relationships among the parties. Parallel conflicts are 
relatively harmless, in so far as each of the parties recognises the limits of its 
rights and powers and does not go beyond them. 
 
2.3 THE HISTORY OF CRISES IN NIGER DELTA  
The struggle for relevance in the Niger Delta dates back to the pre-colonial era. 
According to Ikalama (2006), the Niger Delta struggle did not start with the discovery of 
oil in 1957; but rather due to the region’s difficult terrain. Ibaba (2005) observes that 
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almost three quarters of the area are submerged under water made of lagoons, creeks, 
rivers and lakes. What is left is largely swampy land, which is flooded for about four 
months in the year as a result of lower Niger overflow.  
 
The Niger Delta crisis, therefore, dates back to the early 19th century when the people 
agitated for trade terms fair to their communities. It is noteworthy, however, that the last 
quarter of that century was characterized by aggressive European imperialist economic 
philosophy of free trade (Alao, 2005). That led to several conflicts between the Niger 
Delta people and the Europeans on the coasts of the region because of the communities’ 
determination to maintain their middlemen status. Prominent among those crises were the 
Jaja of Opobo’s clash with the British, leading to his eventual exile in 1886; King Koko 
of Nembe’s famous Akassa  raid on the depot of the Royal Niger Company in 1895; and 
the crisis between Nana Olomu, the then Itsekiri Governor of Benin River and the British 
in 1895.   
 
According to Alao (2005), during the colonial era, virtually all the resources of the 
colonized people were controlled by the colonial state. The agitation of the Niger Delta 
people was principally focused on drawing attention to their environmental peculiarities 
and their requirement for basic infrastructural amenities. Colonialism, however, curtailed 
the initial dominance of the Niger Delta on the Nigerian economic scene by abolishing 
the middleman advantage hitherto enjoyed by the region.  
 
Moreover, cash crops emerged in other parts of the country, such as the groundnut 
pyramids in the Northern Region, and cocoa in the Western Region, further reducing 
Niger Delta’s economic relevance. According to Sir Willinki (as cited in Alao, 2005), due 
to its ecological make-up, the Eastern Region is the poorest of the three regions, and this 
has engendered the lackadaisical attitude of both the federal and regional governments 
towards the lack of development in the Niger Delta. 
 
Ikalama (2006) explains that in 1914, after the amalgamation of the Northern and 
Southern protectorates, Southern Nigeria was administered on the basis of provinces. 
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Hence, the Niger Delta people were divided among various provinces. Davis (2005) (as 
cited in Ikalama, 2006) adjudges that the amalgamation was like a forced marriage that 
entrapped the Niger Delta people. For colonial administrative convenience, the western 
Ijaws were in Delta Province and the eastern Ijaws were in Owerri and Calabar 
Provinces.   
 
This classification was, however, not acceptable to the Ijaws of the Niger Delta who 
began to request the creation of a separate province for themselves. In order to put up a 
formidable front, The People’s League was established in 1942. The League later 
metamorphosed into a full-fledged association which spearheaded the struggle. The 
efforts of the association were rewarded when a Rivers Province was created in 1947. In 
1957, the struggle was taken to the constitutional conference in London. According to 
Alao (2005), the people demanded for a separate state within the federation, arguing that 
there was:  
 
No other area in the whole of West Africa with a physical 
configuration like that of Rivers area. It was unfair that 
such an area should not have its own separate 
government to harness the energies of the Rivers and 
develop its unique resources in the interest of the people 
who live there (p. 57). 
 
The people further argued that the administrative headquarters of various regions to 
which the Niger Delta belonged could not appreciate their peculiarities and needs because 
they were too distant. The request was, however, denied.  
 
A fresh dimension to the crises emerged after Nigeria’s independence. On February 23, 
1966, Isaac Adaka Boro, in a bid to protest the injustice against the Niger Delta people, 
led one hundred and fifty one comrades to Tontouban, in the present Bayelsa State. From 
that location, he launched a guerrilla war against the then federal military government 
(Ikalama, 2006). Boro had earlier, in January 1966, declared the Niger Delta People’s 
Republic, with himself as the Head of State. The Nigerian Police was engaged and 
humiliated in a bloody confrontation.  
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The Armed Forces of Nigeria, however, went into the war, and after being held up for a 
while, defeated Boro and his men on the 12th day. Today, the rebellion is known in 
Nigeria’s political history as “The 12 Day Revolution” (Watts, 2009). Nwajiaku (2006) 
notes that Boro was succeeded, in the struggle for self-determination and resource 
control, by Ken Saro-Wiwa and the Ogoni people. Though the federation’s revenue 
allocation has been continually revised since 1967, the increase has been far below the 
demand of the Niger Delta (Mustapha, 2000). 
 
2.3.1 The Political Dimension of the Niger Delta Crisis 
According to Omoweh (2010), the Niger Delta crisis is the crisis of the Nigeria state, that 
is, its policy in respect to natural resources and the mode of surplus extraction from the 
mining sector. He explains that the crisis is a political one and its origin can be traced to 
“the path the state took to development inclusive of its type of capitalist development in 
the mining sector” (p. 12).  
 
Omoweh (2010) describes the Nigerian state as the political leadership of the country. He 
considers it ironic that the tiny fraction of the hegemonic political class, which lead the 
nation’s development and controls the state political power, is naturally interested in 
perpetuating itself and reproducing its class rather than thinking of the people and their 
wellbeing. Consequent on the need for the state to survive before pursing development, it 
devised some strategies to protect itself, which includes the adoption of defensive radical 
posture that is driven by pretence to be interested in the wellbeing of the people, whereas, 
it is to side with capital to exploit them. 
 
The crisis ensued as a result of the contention between the dominant class, which 
struggled for power and resources to survive, and the subordinate groups in the society 
who also claimed their right to survival. Omoweh says that the crisis is made more 
pronounced by the state’s mode of extraction of surplus from the mining sector. He 
explains that the state uses its political power “to amass wealth, because of its weak 
productive base” (Omoweh, 2010, p. 14). The individuals entrusted with the management 
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of the state use the political office to accumulate profit, rather than to invest in 
entrepreneurship and development. 
 
The author also observes that the first task of the state, after the independence of a nation, 
is usually to establish its political control over the country and its natural resources. After 
this, it formulates and enacts legislations that would permit its model of capitalism in the 
natural resources sector, as well as establish public institutions to administer the surplus 
extraction. This crystallizes the state’s ultimate aim of dominating the economy of the 
nation.  
 
The unrestricted manner through which the Nigerian state acquire land and exploit its 
content betray its failure to recognise that the land and its resources constitute common 
resources. According to Omoweh (2010, p. 17), the resources: 
 
are not characterized territorially or an ad hoc aggregation of 
people or group as an entity, but by crucial ontological factors, 
notably its availability across generations past, present and future, 
and that, they help create and re-create the social production and 
reproduction of people. 
 
The disposition of the state towards the land and it resources such as forestry, wetlands 
and wildlife led to the depravation of the people in the Niger Delta. Omoweh (2010, p. 
17) notes that though the legislations of the state provided the people in the Niger Delta 
with a usufruct rights over their land (which was only the right to use it), just like people 
in other parts of the country, the right was automatically revoked whenever oil was 
explored from the land.  
 
Considering that the mining blocks were residential areas, farmland, communal fish 
farms and wetlands and also sacred bushes amongst others, the communities were not 
only deprived of their means of sustenance, but also of their sociocultural heritage. 
Omoweh opines that the state, in joint venture with foreign oil/mining capitals, regard the 
acreages mainly as minefields, where the sole interest is to extract the minerals with little 
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or no consideration for the wellbeing of the environment and the people (Orubu, Odusola, 
& Ehwarieme, 2004). In the words of Omoweh (2010, p19): 
 
In effect, it is a misnomer to talk of environmental degradation in 
the oil-producing communities. For, the entire oil-producing 
communities in the Niger Delta have been turned into a minefield 
as evident in the continuous flaring of gas for 24 hours in the past 
50 years. Yet, the inhabitants of the oil-producing areas are 
deemed to have no legal basis to protest the relatively reckless 
manner with which the state, SPDC and other operating oil 
companies are ‘shelling’ their environment and lives. This has 
fired the aggression of the people against the state and oil 
companies.  
 
Akinola (2008) agrees with the above assessment by saying that the Nigerian state relies 
on oil as the main stay of its economy, whereas, the communities where it is extracted 
generally suffer poverty, neglect, environmental degradation and even the denial of their 
fundamental human rights (Naanen, 1995; Akinola, 2009).  
 
Nafzinger (2009, p. 69) enumerates the Niger Delta environmental problems as a result of 
the oil industry as follows: 
 
1. Damage to the mangrove ecosystem: this engendered the loss of fuel wood, fish 
and other aquatic host organisms. This also led to the reduction of control and 
protection against floods, storms, and erosion. 
2. Destruction of lowlands, wetlands and other environmentally sensitive areas: 
natural water courses were blocked and there was disruption of seabed and river 
channels as a result of dredging for pipeline installations and the construction of 
oil wells. 
3. Pollution of air, surface water and groundwater: these include the destruction of 
forest and farm land as well as vegetation and human settlement due to the oil 
companies’ wells, fields, pipelines, flow stations, refineries and destructive 
practices, such as gas flaring and increase in leaded vehicle exhaust emission. 
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4. Decreased water from safe sources: less than half of the communities have access 
to safe drinking water due to the increase in polluted rivers, lakes, ponds and other 
untreated surface water, including unprotected wells and boreholes. 
5. The effects of pollution on the diversion to marginal farms, fishing waters and 
also the cutting down of forests. 
6. Oil spills and blown pipelines: these include the accidental and deliberate 
incidences that have led to the degradation of the forests, contamination of food, 
killing of fish and vegetation and the destruction of natural resources necessary 
for local livelihoods. 
7. Water organisms and the atmosphere are affected by natural gas flare, which are 
75% waste, and leaks that emit hydrocarbons, thereby causing subsidence and 
sediment, and also contribute to acid rain. 
8. Saltwater is diverted into freshwater as a result of the construction of some canals; 
thereby leading to the destruction of the latter’s ecology. 
9. Public facilities, houses and economic assets are threatened by erosion in the 
coastal communities.  
10. Shortage of dry and relatively well-drained land. 
11. Water degradation causing harm to human health as a result of waste discharge 
from oil operations into the land and sea (UNDP, 2006). 
 
2.3.2 Oil Dimension of the Crisis 
In February 2007, Nigeria celebrated fifty years of oil exploration, but Agagu and Adu 
(2008) note that observers have opined that in spite of Nigeria’s oil wealth, the 
performance of the sector has not been impressive. Aiyetan (2008) cited Rilwan Lukman, 
the former Minister of Petroleum in Nigeria and the former President of OPEC, to have 
said that oil is both a blessing and a curse in Nigeria.  
 
In the same vein, Ezeobi (2008) describes Nigeria’s years of oil exploration as 50 
depressing years of oil. Agagu & Adu (2008) observe that only few individuals and 
companies have benefited from oil so far, while several other communities and millions 
of people have been underdeveloped and impoverished. They further argue that there has 
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been unprecedented development in several communities due to the activities of the oil 
industry.  
 
The oil industry has in no small measure helped to propel other industries since the time 
oil assumed great ascendency in industrialization. Among the countries that have 
benefited from the oil industry are Dubai, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Britain and 
Singapore, among others. Although Nigeria has also benefited from the industry through 
oil boom in the global market, the Niger Delta, which forms the bedrock of the country’s 
oil exploration and exploration, has no semblance of development which can be linked 
with the oil industry.  
 
In 1969, Nigeria’s military government under the leadership of General Gowon abrogated 
the 1914 Colonial Minerals Ordinance, thereby opening a fresh chapter in the state-oil 
bond by formally transferring the control and ownership of oil to the state. Nigeria 
proceeded to join OPEC in 1971 and in the same year established its own oil industry, 
acquiring up to 60 per cent equity ownership in all operating oil companies.  
 
According to Olorode (1998), more than 90 per cent of Nigeria’s export earnings 
accumulated from the sales of crude oil, yet the Niger Delta is neglected. He states that 
most roads in Ogoni land, for instance, where they are available are in deplorable shape. 
He considers it ironic that the same oil that made a positive impact on the Nigerian State, 
also made a negative impact on the Niger Delta, its source, due to the indelible marks of 
the adverse consequences of oil exploration. 
 
The effect of oil exploration on the Niger Delta environment was not realized until years 
later. According to Soremekun & Obadare (1998), although the commercial shipment of 
oil from the Nigerian coast started since 1958, the havoc being wreaked on the 
environment by the oil companies was not realized until about thirty years after. They 
further explain that massive environmental pollution has been engendered by the oil 
companies in their petroleum operations. For instance, there have been several pipeline 
leakages, well blow-outs and spillages, having severe effects on land, water and other 
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ecological elements. One can say that the extent to which oil is explored and taken away 
from the Niger Delta is commensurate with the devastation left in its wake. 
 
Due to the negative effects of the operations of oil companies in the Niger Delta, the 
erstwhile crises in the region took up a new dimension. According to Oloruntimilehin & 
Ayoade (2002, p. 16): 
 
Most of the conflicts have arisen from complex environmental 
problems, and a long history of neglect and social development of 
peoples who have seemed helpless watching their land and water 
resources continually devastated by the intense exploitation for 
petroleum and gases without deriving any appreciable benefits by 
way of investment in their own development.  
 
 
The Niger Delta communities decidedly began to attack oil companies and their 
installations in order to attract attention to the plight of the region. Ikalama (2006) 
identifies four phases of the Niger Delta struggle: 
 
Phase 1: Between the late 1970s and the mid-1980s, the communities, still confident in 
the state and its judiciary, sought redress through the courts. They demanded 
adequate compensation and also appealed to the state and Federal Governments 
to mediate between them and the oil companies. Desired results were not 
achieved through this approach because the oil companies ignored the court 
rulings that were in favour of the communities. When compensations were paid 
by the companies, they were petty compared to the efforts invested and the 
harm caused; besides, such compensations were delayed for several years. 
These led to frustration in the communities. 
Phase 2: This phase extended from the mid-1980s to the 1990s and it was characterized 
by a more action-oriented approach. In addition to lawsuits, the people also 
engaged in peaceful demonstrations, occupation of flow stations, and prevention 
of workers from working, among others. This approach, also, was not effective 
as the companies turned the law enforcement agents against the people.  
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Phase 3: From the mid-1990s to 1998, the actions of the Niger Delta communities began 
to evolve into violent protests. This is possibly connected to the move by the 
Nigerian government to engage military force in restraining the communities. 
During this era, late Ken Saro-Wiwa championed the cause of the Niger Delta 
people, particularly the Ogoni community, until he and his comrades were 
executed in 1995 by the late Gen. Sanni Abacha’s regime. 
Phase 4: From 1998 till date, the Niger Delta has become an endemic, fully fledged 
crises-infested region. There have arisen several militant groups that resort to 
kidnapping, vandalism, extortion, etc. 
 
Watts (2009) recounts that a pipeline explosion in 2005 ushered in the Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta’s (MEND) call for the international community to 
evacuate from the Niger Delta. MEND issued an ultimatum that was to expire by 
February 12th, after which violators would face violent attacks. Two weeks after, nine 
workers employed by Willbros, an oil servicing company, were kidnapped, with the 
group claiming responsibility. The action was allegedly carried out to retaliate an attack 
by the Nigerian military on a community in the Western Delta. More than fifteen 
Nigerian soldiers were reportedly killed, while between May and August 2006, there was 
an average of three kidnappings per month. 
 
Citing the Centre for Strategic and International Studies’ (CSIS) report, Watts (2009, 
p.31) confirms that 123 hostages were taken and 42 attacks were carried out on oil 
installations between January 2006 and March 2007. He also makes reference to the 
Nigerian National Petroleum Company’s (NNPC) 2003 reports, which estimated 400 
vandalisms on company facilities each year between 1998 and 2003. The report also 
claimed that the number increased to 581 between January and September 2004, with 
over $1 billion oil losses annually.  
 
There were nineteen attacks on foreign oil operations in the first six months of 2006, 
costing over $2.187 billion lost in oil revenues, which the Department of Petroleum 
Resources (DPR) claimed represented 32% of the entire revenue generated by the country 
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that year.  While the Nigerian government claimed that $6.8 billion oil revenue loss was 
recorded between 1999 and 2005, the managing director of Shell Nigeria further claimed 
in November 2006 that the loss of revenue, consequent on the unrest and violence in the 
Niger Delta, was $61 million per day, making a total of $9 billion since January 2006. 
The author sums up that the estimated loss of revenue by the Nigerian government 
between 2006 and 2008, as a result of insurgency, was $45.5 billion (Watts 2009, p.31).  
 
2.3.3 Critical Issues on the Niger Delta Crises 
Mbembe (2001) raises the question as to why oil is so frequently the epicenter of 
violence. Watts (2009), in an attempt to answer this question, says that in states in which 
oil is a national resource, the states’ geography and the centralization of oil revenue 
through the state joint venture usually combine to create new sorts of governable spaces. 
These spaces are characterized by a ferocious struggle of access and control of rent.  
 
Ako, Okonmah & Ogunleye (2009, pp. 111-112) critically analyse two conflict eras in 
the Niger Delta; the oil palm era and the crude oil era. They draw four parallels between 
the two eras as follows: 
1. Both palm oil and crude oil are significant to the global industrial process. 
Following the industrial revolution in Europe, palm oil became highly sought 
after because it was required to process the lubricant for the maintenance of 
industrial machinery. It was also used in the production of domestic products such 
as soaps and margarine.  On the other hand, the crude oil is the major energy 
source in the contemporary world. Its uses include the fuel for airplanes, cars, 
home heating and lubricants for home and industrial uses. 
2. There is similarity between the parties to the conflict in both periods. The parties 
to the trade during the palm oil era included the local communities that 
established themselves as middlemen in the trade, European interests, as 
represented by international capital, and the Federal Government of Nigeria. Also, 
in the crude oil era, the stakeholders include the host communities, foreign capital 
and the Federal Government. Another similarity is that the government and the 
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foreign capital in both eras cooperated to protect their economic interests through 
the exploitation of the region. 
3. There is a similarity between the causes of conflict in both eras. The underlying 
factors to the conflict in the palm oil and crude oil eras were issues related to 
indigenous recognition and participation of the people in the Niger Delta (Okonta, 
2000).  
4. In both eras, the state used repressive means to suppress the restiveness of Niger 
Delta inhabitants. During the palm oil era, the government used its controlled 
security agencies, which included the military, to continually protect the interests 
of the foreign capital. For instance, the British naval forces, under the instruction 
of Royal Niger Company, attacked and leveled the trading city of Brass, to 
maintain the company’s monopoly over the palm oil trade, which the town was 
known for (Bassey, 2006). Again, the Human Rights Watch (1999) presents a 
catalogue of similar examples in which the Nigerian security forces and oil 
companies collaborated to suppress the resistance of the local communities. 
 
2.3.4 Amnesty in the Niger Delta 
On the 25th of June, 2009, the President of Nigeria, late Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, 
announced the Federal Government’s plan to grant amnesty to Niger Delta militants 
(“Will Amnesty Bring Peace,” 2009). The plan was to help restore peace to the region, 
which had been volatile with militancy since 2006. It was a 60-day plan, lasting from 
June 25th to October 4th 2009, and it was to see the militants disarm and accept 
presidential pardon.  
 
At the initial stage, the militants did not seem to trust the government. In fact, some 
groups argued that amnesties were only offered to convicted criminals and their members 
could not be described as such. There were also some internal contentions among the 
militants as to who would accept the government’s offer and why. Gradually, the 
militants started to respond to the offer; first the commanders and then their loyalists. 
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The amnesty period expired on October 4th without an extension of time, even though the 
militant pressed for this. If the reports of the government and media were anything to go 
by, the programme was a success. In fact, the Nigerian government had already started to 
count the dividends of the amnesty programme. For instance, militant attacks in the 
region since 2006 reduced oil production from Nigeria’s OPEC quota of 2 million barrels 
per day to 1.3 million. But Nigeria’s Defence Minister between 2009 and 2010, Godwin 
Abbe, reported that barely a month after the amnesty programme, production rose to 1.8 
million barrels per day. Zimbio (2010) reports that as at October 4, 2010, more than 
5,000 former militants, who had embraced the Federal Government’s amnesty in 2009, 
had been rehabilitated.  
 
Also, Timi Alaibe, the then adviser to the President of Nigeria on the Niger Delta, 
claimed that 5,292 ex-militants, who were retrained at the July camp, were certified to 
have imbibed the principles of non-violence. Hence, they had been sent to undergo 
vocational training both in Nigeria and abroad. The number of the former militants that 
were granted amnesty by Former President Yar’Adua was above 20, 000 (Zimbio, 2010). 
 
 
2.4 MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
Multinational Corporations (MNCs) are also known as Trans-National Co-operations 
(TNCs) and Multinational Enterprises (MNCs). For the sake of this study, however, we 
will adopt MNC. Pease (2003) describes MNCs as private, for-profit organizations 
having commercial operations and subsidiaries in two or more countries. A further 
description was given by Bennett (1999, p. 162), who says MNC is a business having 
“Significant investments in several foreign nations, which derives a substantial part of its 
income from foreign operations, and which maximizes its profits on the global rather than 
national level,” (Wall & Rees, 2004; Bertlett & Ghoshal, 2000).  
 
Rugman (2006), however, observes that it is sometimes difficult to determine whether or 
not a firm is an MNC because multinationals often downplay the fact that they are 
foreign owned. This observation is also valid in the Nigerian context, because the 
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subsidiaries of major oil multinationals, like Royal Dutch Shell, Agip and Chevron, 
adopted names such as Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) or simply Shell 
Nigeria, Nigerian Agip Oil Company Limited (NAOC) and Chevron Nigeria Limited 
(CNL) respectively. The latter set of names shows both the multinationals’ desire to 
identify with Nigeria and the need to reflect their joint venture with the Nigerian 
government through the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC).  
 
Bennett (1999, p. 162), considering how elusive the definition of MNCs can be, 
enumerates the various benchmarks that can be used to identify MNCs. According to 
him, the company must: 
 
1. Produce its products abroad as well as in the headquarters country. This is in 
contrast with merely distributing the products abroad.  
2. Operate in a certain minimum number of nations, for instance six.  
3. At least a minimum percentage of its income (eg 25%) must be derived from 
foreign operations. 
4. Possess a certain minimum ratio of foreign to total number of employees. 
5. Have a management team who possess geocentric orientation. 
6. Directly control foreign investment, instead of merely holding shares in foreign 
companies. 
 
By the above criteria, it is needless to say that Shell, Agip and Chevron, the oil 
companies under study, are multinational corporations. Rugman (2006) reports the 
United Nations’ revelation that there are over 60, 000 MNCs in the world, with only the 
largest 500 accounting for 80% of the world’s foreign direct investments. In spite of the 
overwhelming influence of the MNCs on world economy, there have been contentions 
between their advocates and their critics. 
 
 The advocates of the MNCs have argued that they are agents of change as well as 
progress, and they help in creating a new world; a world of wide economy based on 
“Rationality, efficiency and optimal use of resources,” (Bennett, 1999). They insisted that 
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among the benefits of the host countries are plants and equipments, which they otherwise 
would not have owned, equipments they would not have had access to and skills as well 
as know-how necessary for the operation, which would have, otherwise, been out of 
reach.  
 
Another benefit that was identified is the local recruitment of junior managers, which 
helps to create a pool of managerial experience in local communities that can be 
transferred across a wide range of industries. Considering the argument above, it can be 
admitted that the Niger Delta has benefitted, to some extent, from the presence of the oil 
companies. 
 
On the other hand, critics of multinational corporations also present a strong argument to 
support their position. First, they argue that influence of MNCs on the political sphere of 
the host country has a destabilizing effect. They identify five major activities of the 
companies that can jeopardize the nation, they are: 
 
1.   Supporting regressive regimes: the oil companies in Nigeria have been accused 
of collaborating with the government to suppress the communities in the Niger 
Delta (Akinola, 2008; Ogbogbo, 2004). One of the major incidents in Nigeria that 
boosted this accusation was the execution of Ken Saro-wiwa and his other Ogoni 
comrades. There was a popular opinion that Shell was instrumental to, or at least 
supportive of the military government of late Gen. Abacha in the execution. The 
assumption was further reinforced by Shell’s swift announcement to continue 
with its $4.3 billion LNG project, just three days after the execution (Adefemi, 
1998).   
2. Paying bribes to secure political influence: in the Niger Delta, it is believed that 
the oil companies pay off the individuals they either identify as threats, or has 
major influence on the rest of the communities. Adefemi (1998) reports an 
interview with an individual who admitted he became a “small millionaire” by 
establishing the Council for Concerned Indigenes (CCI) specifically to secure 
personal gratification from the oil companies. Edafejirhaye & Edafejirhaye (2008) 
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also cite an investigation which revealed that oil companies connive with some 
individuals in the oil industry and security outfits to promote illegal bunkering 
activities. 
3. No respect for human rights: the Civil Liberty Organization (2002) narrates an 
incident that occurred in 1999 in one of the communities in the Niger Delta. The 
youths in the community shut down Agip’s operation due to alleged high level of 
pollution and degradation of the environment. The company reportedly dispatched 
a combined team of navy and army personnel to the community, resulting in the 
disappearance of 15 people, and the arrest of the traditional ruler. Another 
example of the abuse of human rights was given by Adefemi (1998). According to 
him, Shell headquarters in London decided in 1993, as documented by a memo, to 
monitor the activities of Ken Saro-wiwa in respect of his Ogoini struggle to 
“avoid unpleasant surprises;” Ken was arrested 16 days later. This exemplifies the 
human rights challenges in the Niger Delta.  
4. Paying protection money to terrorist groups. 
5. Destabilizing national governments of which they don’t approve. 
 
The critics of MNCs also argue from the environmental perspective. Among the 
accusations leveled against them are:  
1. Depletion of natural resources too quickly 
2. Pollution of the environment 
3. Failure to pay compensations for environmental damages 
4. Causing harmful changes in local living conditions 
5. Having little regard to the risks of accidents causing environmental catastrophe. 
 
The above represent some of the major issues that the oil communities are contending 
with, and the bases for some of their company-community struggles. 
 
2.4.1 Major Multinational Oil Corporations in the Niger Delta 
There are several multinational oil companies in Nigeria, however, for the purpose of this 
study, we shall only focus on Shell, Agip, and Chevron. 
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2.4.1.1 Shell Nigeria (SPDC) 
Shell Nigeria is a subsidiary of the Royal Dutch Shell plc, which has its headquarters in 
The Hague, Netherlands, and its registered office at the Shell Centre in London, United 
Kingdom. According to the Global 500 list, Shell is the largest energy company and the 
second company in the world as measured by revenues.  The Royal Dutch Shell Group 
was created as a result of the merger between the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company and 
Shell Transport and Trading Company Ltd of the United Kingdom in February 1907. The 
merger was necessitated by the need to compete globally with John D. Rockefeller’s 
Standard Oil, which was then the predominant US petroleum company. According to the 
terms of the merger, 60% of the new group was given to the Dutch partner while the 
remaining 40% went to the British. 
 
Prior to the merger, the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company was a Dutch company that was 
founded by Jean Baptise August Kessler and Henri Deterding in 1890, at the time King 
William III of the Netherlands granted it a royal charter for Working of Petroleum in the 
Dutch Indies. Shell, on the other hand, was a British transport and trading company 
founded in 1897 by two brothers, Marcus Samuel and Samuel Samuel. The initial 
commission of the company was eight oil tankers for the purpose of transporting oil. 
 
Shell took control of the Mexican Eagle Petroleum Company in 1919, while in 1921, 
Shell-Mex Limited was formed, which marketed products using the “Shell” and “Eagle” 
brands in the UK. As a result of economic difficulties, among other reasons, Shell-Mex 
merged its UK marketing operations with the operations of British Petroleum in 1932, 
resulting in the creation of Shell-Mex and BP Ltd. The new company traded for 43 years 
before the brands separated in 1975. 
 
In 1936, the Royal Dutch Shell Group founded Shell D’Arcy, which was the first Shell 
Company to operate in Nigeria, hence, the company started business in Nigeria in 1937. 
The company was granted Exploration Licence in November 1938, which allowed it to 
prospect oil throughout Nigeria. Not until January 1956 did the company drill its first 
successful well at Oloibiri, in the present Bayelsa State, in the Niger Delta, where oil was 
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discovered at commercial quantity. The first oil shipment from Nigeria was moved in 
February 1958, and by April 1961, Shell’s Bonny Terminal was commissioned, which 
was followed by the commissioning of Shell’s Focados Terminal in September 1971. 
 
Other historic landmarks of Shell Nigeria include the first Participation Agreement that 
was signed in April 1973, through which the Federal Government of Nigeria acquired 
35% shares in the oil companies; second Participation Agreement signed in April 1974, 
through which the government increased its equity to 55%; third Participation Agreement 
signed in 1979, that saw the government, under the auspices of NNPC, increase its equity 
to 60%; and also the August 1979 Participation Agreement in which BP’s share holding 
was nationalized and NNPC acquired 80% of the equity, leaving Shell with 20% ( Shell, 
n.d.).   
  
2.4.1.2 Nigerian Agip Oil Company (NAOC) 
Agip is an Italian company with the original Italian name Azienda Generale Italiana 
Petroli, which means General Italian Oil Agency.  It is an automotive gasoline and diesel 
retailer that was established in 1926. The process that birthed the company started in 
1924, when there was the famous affair Sinclair Scandal. A US oil company, Sinclair 
Oil, entered into a 50 year long agreement with the Italian Ministry of National Economy 
that led to it being issued a permit to conduct oil research in the country.  
 
Had the agreement been upheld, Sinclair and the Italian State would have entered into a 
joint venture with 40% of the capital coming from the State’s property, Sinclair Oil 
incurring the entire expenditure, and 25% of the profits going to the Italian State. The 
agreement was, however, controversial because the opposition suspected the government 
of corruption. 
 
Consequent on the turn of events, the Government of the Kingdom of Italy issued a royal 
decree on April 3, 1929, which ordered the establishment of Azienda Generale Italiana 
Petroli (Agip, n.d.). The company was created to conduct all activities involving industry 
and the commerce of petroleum, also created in form of joint stock companies. 
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2.4.1.3 Chevron Nigeria Limited (CNL) 
Chevron Corporation is an American multinational energy corporation with its 
headquarters in San Ramon, California, and has active operations in more than 180 
countries. The company engages in every aspect of the oil, gas and geothermal energy 
industries, which also includes exploration and production. Traditionally, Chevron traces 
its roots to the oil discovery in Pico Canyon, north of Los Angeles. As a result of the 
discovery, there was a formation of the Pacific Coast Oil Company in 1879, which was 
Chevron Corporation’s oldest predecessor.  
 
Initially, Chevron was known as Standard Oil of California, or SoCal, which was formed 
in the midst of the antitrust breakup of John D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil Company in 
1911. Saudi Arabia granted SoCal a concession in 1933 to find oil, and it was found in 
1938. SoCal discovered the world’s largest oil field in Saudi Arabia in the early 1950s. In 
1984, Standard Oil of California merged with Gulf Oil, which was the largest merger in 
history as at the time. SoCal divested many of Gulf Oil’s operating subsidiaries under the 
antitrust regulation and sold some Gulf subsidiaries as well as a refinery located in 
eastern US.  
 
Afterwards, Standard Oil of Californian changed the name to Chevron Corporation. 
Chevron merged with Texaco in 2001 to form ChevronTexaco. The label was changed 
back in May 2005 to simply Chevron, after which it merged again with Unocal 
Corporation in August 9, 2005. Consequent on Unocal Corporation’s extensive South 
East Asian geothermal facilities, Chevron became the biggest supplier of geothermal 
energy in the planet (Chevron, n.d.).  
 
2.4.2 Multinationals and Corporate Social Responsibility 
 Seitel (2007) observes that more and more organizations are beginning to acknowledge 
their responsibilities to the community.  Those responsibilities include helping to prevent 
pollution, providing jobs for minorities, enforcing policies that are in the interest of all 
employees and generally enhancing everyone’s quality of life. Hence, social 
responsibility can be defined as a concept whereby organizations consider the interests of 
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society by taking responsibility for the impact of their activities on stakeholders such as 
customers, employees, shareholders, communities, and the environment.  
 
An aspect of corporate social responsibility that has, in recent times, gained attention in 
academic discuss is community involvement. Bronn (2006) explains that community 
involvement is all about building a relationship between an organization and its 
immediate environment. 
 
 There are two general descriptions of community, and they are the narrow and the broad 
descriptions. Carroll & Buchholtz (2000) describe community in terms of the immediate 
locale of the organization, which includes the town, city or state in which it operates. 
Cannon (1994), on the other hand, not only equate the state with the community, but also 
acknowledges that the community of an organization has been broadened, sometimes to 
include the region, nation, and even the world. This current study will, however, associate 
with Carroll and Buchholtz’s description of community, since the major focus is the host 
communities of the oil companies. 
 
Carroll and Buchholtz (2000) opine that firms have positive impact on the community in 
two major ways. First, they donate the time and talents of their managers and employees 
for community service, and second, they contribute to the communities financially. 
Grunig and Hunt (1984), in their early work, define a firm’s community activities as 
either expressive, used to promote itself and show goodwill, or instrumental, used to 
improve the community or to make working there easier. 
 
Bronn (2006, p. 310) states that the community is often the headquarters of the firm and it 
“Provides the labour force, suppliers of other raw materials, utilities, and infrastructure, 
and regulates the activities of the organization.” He further explains that the appearance 
of community involvement in corporate reputation rankings instruments, such as the 
Reputation Quotient, is an evidence of its recognition as a tool for reputation building. He 
also observes that some large organizations also have special communication 
departments, with the specific responsibility of dealing with community relations.  
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According to the reports of a Conference Board on senior communications executives (as 
cited in Argenti & Forman, 2002), over 60% of hundreds of America’s largest firms list 
community relations as part of their responsibilities. Adkins (2000) also reports a study 
conducted by Business in the Community/Research International (UK) Ltd, in which it 
was discovered that 3/4 of marketing and community affairs directors dedicate at least a 
segment of their budget to cause marketing. This involves forming alliances with 
typically non-profit agencies to market a service, product, or an image for mutual benefit. 
 
McIntosh et al. (1998) (as cited in Bronn, 2006) observes that once a company bases its 
headquarters in a single city or town, it usually concentrates its community involvement 
exclusively in that location. He also observes that many contemporary firms have 
multiple headquarters, and this, therefore, raises the question as to whether community 
involvement activities accepted in one country would be accepted in others. Considering 
that this specifically applies to multinationals, it is suggested that, while practicing their 
corporate social responsibility in the form of community involvement, they should also 
consider the implication of doing the same things in all countries in which they operate or 
make sales, as well as consider accommodating local norms and practices.  
 
Consequently, Gardberg & Fombrum (2006) advice firms that operate in diverse foreign 
contexts to adopt models of corporate citizenship that would acknowledge their 
peculiarities. They explain further that the appropriateness of the activities to the local 
context would determine the effectiveness of the corporate social responsibility 
initiatives.   
 
2.5 PUBLIC RELATIONS AND RELATIONSHIP BUILDING 
In recent times, great scholarly focus has shifted to the relationship building aspect of 
public relations.  Ledingham (2008, pp. 243-244) identifies five developments believed to 
have informed the emersion of the relational perspective as a paradigm for public 
relations. He enumerates the five developments as: 
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1. The recognition of the need for the field of public relations to focus on 
relationship rather than the organization, the publics or the communication 
process. 
2. The reconceptualization of a management function requiring strategic planning 
and evaluation. 
3. The construction of models for organization-stakeholder relationship which 
includes antecedents, maintenance processes and consequences. 
4. The distillation of relationship attributes from the literature of interpersonal 
relationship and allied disciplines. 
5. The development of organization-stakeholder relationship scales that would 
enable the measurement of relationship quality. 
 
One of the leading researchers focusing on relationship in public relations is Ferguson 
(1984), who, as a result of a landmark study previously undertaken, recommends that 
public relations scholarship should focus on the relationship between the organizations 
and the publics they interact with. Sallot, Lyon, Acost-Alzaru & Jones (2003, p. 32), 
following Ferguson, present six reasons for placing relationship at the core of the public 
relations discipline, and they are: 
 
1. The perspective should engender a better understanding of relationships, both to 
the organization and the public. Furthermore, it is assumed that the relationship is 
the prime issue of concern, rather than the parties involved. 
2. The perspective should birth, on a macro level, a new method for studying 
relationship, which includes the units of analysis that are different from those 
used in analyzing communication. 
3. A domain for research effort should be created, by concentrating public relations 
scholarship on public relationship, which would guide students of public relations 
to share similar assumptions and knowledge. 
4. Consequent on the inclusion of the organization, the public, and communication 
variables in a relationship model, the stage is set for integrating findings from 
many relevant disciplines.  
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5. By focusing on the relationship as the unit of analysis, opportunities are provided 
for scholarship, irrespective of how narrow or broad. 
6. A perspective such as this has the power to “legitimize” the field in terms of 
public relations, just as past efforts have done in defining the field in respect to 
the activities of those who practice it. 
 
Following the identified need to make relationship the core of public relationship, Cutlip, 
Center & Broom (1985) quickly incorporate it into their public relations text. By this, 
they set the stage for further scholastic exploration of the relational concept. They also 
updated their text in 1994, thereby including recent studies of the concept (Cutlip, Center 
& Broom, 1994).  
 
Also contributing to the existing body of work, Broom & Dozier (1990) suggest a 
coorientation approach as a means of determining the level of agreement and accuracy 
between organizations and their publics as indicators of relationship quality.  The 
implication of their suggestion is that the orientation must be bi-directional; it should be 
pursued both on the part of the organizations and their publics without any assuming the 
dominance.  
 
Broom & Dozier (1990) further suggest that the level of mutual agreement and accuracy 
between the two parties can be used as indicators of the quality of their relationship. For 
this to occur, researchers who would measure the relationships would need to determine 
levels of agreement between the two parties concerning major issues. They will also need 
to identify the degree to which an organization and its major publics can accurately 
predict or anticipate each other’s position on those issues.  
 
Ferguson (1984) makes a list of attributes that can be used to measure organization-
public relations, and they are (1) their dynamic nature (2) level of openness (3) degree of 
satisfaction for both parties (4) distribution of power and (5) extent of mutuality of 
understanding and agreement and consensus. In addition, Grunig, Grunig & Ehling 
(1992) suggest two more items to Ferguson’s list which include trust and reciprocity. 
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Grunig (1993) goes further to augment the attributes by making a distinction between 
what he refers to as symbolic relationships, which are communication driven, and 
behavioral relationships, which are action-based. He argues that public relations 
practitioners must be able show that their efforts contribute to the goals of their 
organizations by helping to build long-term behavioural relationships with strategic 
public. 
 
According to Ledingham (2008), the review of literature on interpersonal relationships, 
marketing, psychology and other relevant disciplines revealed 18 relational attributes 
presented as follows: 
 
Investment, commitment, trust, comfort with relational dialectics, 
cooperation, mutual goals, interdependence, power imbalance, 
performance satisfaction, comparison level of alternatives, 
adaptation, nonretrievable investment, shared technology, summate 
construct, structural bonds, social bonds, intimacy, and passion (p. 
3). 
 
 
Ledingham further explains that a small-group discussion was organized, which led to the 
reduction of the 18 attributes to five; these are- trust, openness, involvement, investment 
and commitment. He shares the operationalized significance of each of the five attributes 
by stating that “Trust” implies an organization doing what it says it will do, “Openness” 
involves sharing the organization’s future plans with the publics, “Involvement” means 
the organization getting involved in the welfare of the community, “Investment” signifies 
the organization investing in the welfare of the community, and “Commitment” entails 
the organization being committed to the community’s welfare. 
 
Several other scholars have also contributed significantly to the discourse and the effort 
to expand the frontiers of knowledge in respect to the relational perspective (Huang, 
1997; Thomsen, 1997; Broom, Casey & Ritchey, 1997; Grunig & Huang, 2000). Hon & 
Grunig (1999) develop an organization-public relationship measurement scale with six 
relational attributes- control mutuality, trust, satisfaction, commitment, exchange 
relationship and communal relationship.  
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One of the significant contributions of their scale is that it differentiates between 
“exchange” relationship and “communal” relationship. While exchange relationship 
involves one party providing benefits to the other with the expectation of reciprocation, 
communal relationship involves one party providing benefits to the other simply out of 
concern for the other’s welfare and without reciprocation in mind. According to Hon & 
Brunner (2002), the scale has enjoyed widespread application and seems to be emerging 
as the standard for the field.  
 
Over the years, several scholars have approached the relational concept from the 
perspective of their particular expertise. Coombs (2000), for instance, capitalizes on the 
trend to enumerate the benefits of the relational approach in respect to crises. Coombs 
suggests a research agenda for further study on relationship and crises, and also 
introduces the idea of “relational history” to existing literature on organization-public 
relationship.   
 
Also similar to this contribution is the work of Bridges &Nelson (2000), in which the 
relational perspective is applied to sphere of issue management. They argue that the 
relational approach should be adopted as a preventative strategy, also claiming that a 
proactive focus on building and maintaining relationships with both existing and potential 
publics is the only way issue managers can begin to protect their organizations from 
unwanted legislation and litigation. Bridges and Nelson (2000) further suggest that “If an 
organization can identify and work with affected publics to determine and work towards 
mutual interests and goals, the organization has a good probability of ending 
organizational-public conflict,” (p. 111). 
 
The relational perspective is particularly applicable to our current study because it 
provides a way for examining the relationship between the oil companies in the Niger 
Delta and the oil producing communities. This perspective advocates that relationship 
should form the core of public relations. Hence, the community relations activities of the 
oil companies should focus on mutual relationship building, rather than the companies or 
the communities.  
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Broom & Dozier’s (1990) contribution is invaluable to this study because of their 
suggestion that the level of agreement and accuracy between an organization and its 
publics can be used as indicators of the quality of their relationship. The implication of 
this for our current study is that by determining the level of agreement between the oil 
companies and the Niger Delta communities on major issues, and by identifying the 
degree to which both parties can accurately predict each other’s positions on the issues, 
we would be able to determine the quality of relationship they share. 
 
Another important aspect of the relational perspective that applies to this study is Hon & 
Grunig’s (1999) distinctions between exchange and communal relationships. This 
dimension will aid our quest to determine the relationship that exists between the 
companies and communities. To do this, we will find ourselves querying whether the 
relationship involves the companies providing benefits to the communities with the 
expectation of a payback, or they are simply providing the benefits out of concern for the 
communities’ welfare. And of course, Coombs’ (2000) contribution is also useful for this 
study considering that our investigation is on the conflicts that are playing out between 
the oil companies and the host communities in the Niger Delta.  
 
2.6 CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND PUBLIC RELATIONS 
Conflict resolution has been a part of human experience for centuries. Although this is 
factual, Burton (1993) argues that it is relatively recent in scholarly discourse. He points 
out that some scholars interchange “dispute” with “conflict.” According to him, 
settlement refers to the negotiated or arbitrated results of disputes while resolution refers 
to the result of a conflict situation. Hence, there is “dispute settlement” and “conflict 
resolution”. He, however, goes on to say that though dispute and conflict may refer to 
different conditions and scope of human relationships, they operate on the same 
principles and can be used interchangeably.  
 
According to Wilmot & Hocker (1998), there are several modes of intervention and they 
include facilitation, mediation, counselling and therapy, conciliation, quasi-political 
procedures, informal tribunals, arbitration of different types and criminal and civil justice 
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systems. In practise, these modes are usually combined for conflict resolution. Otite 
(2001) states that conflict resolution carries out a healing function in societies. This 
occurs by providing the opportunity for parties involved to examine alternative pay-offs 
in the situation. By so doing, normalty is restored to the society thus facilitating 
discussion. It also places the parties in the conflict in a situation in which they can choose 
alternative positive means for resolving their differences. Otite further explains that 
consensus-building, social-bridge reconstructions, and the re-enactment of order in the 
society are achieved through conflict resolution. 
 
The process of conflict resolution focuses on the rebuilding of broken-down 
relationships, and this falls within the purview of public relations. Public relations 
practice has become well known in recent times because of the great assistance it offers 
in crises resolution. Because of the complexities of the world today, it is certain that 
organizations and people cannot avoid trouble and violence. Wherever there is violence 
and trouble, wise counsel is required (Seitel, 2007). Conflict is the outcome of unchecked 
degeneration in human relationships, and according to Folarin (1998), it evolves in 
stages; first we have an issue, then it evolves into conflict, and finally into a crisis. 
 
2.6.1 What is an Issue? 
Folarin (1998, p. 45) presents the following descriptions of an issue: 
1) It is a topic or subject matter that is of interest to all or some of the publics of an 
organization or institution. 
2) It is a matter or an event that has the potential of far reaching consequences for a 
public or the publics of an organization or institution. 
3) It is a topic around which public opinion has crystallized into identifiable 
characteristics. 
 
Hence, to forestall, or at least minimize the frequency and/or magnitude of crises, it is 
necessary for issue management to become a routine aspect of public relations 
practice.  
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2.6.2 Issue Management 
Issue management is a term coined in 1976 by Howard Chase (1982) who says: 
 
Issue management is the capacity to understand, 
mobilize, coordinate, and direct all strategic and policy 
planning functions, and all public affairs/public 
relations skills, towards achievement of one objective: 
meaningful participation in creation of public policy 
that affects personal and institutional destiny (pp. 1-2).  
    
Baskin, Aronoff & Lattimore (1997) describe issue management as a process that aims at 
early detection of any problem. It serves as an early warning system for organizations so 
that they can stand a better chance of shaping public discourse and decision making, 
rather than reacting to them. They identify the two major goals of the issue management 
function as early identification of issues that may affect the organization, and taking 
appropriate measures in order to prevent them from causing grievous consequences for 
the organization. 
 
The authors, however, observe that the term may be misleading because no one can 
actually manage issues in a free society. Nevertheless, organizations can manage their 
own actions and statements as far as public issues are concerned. They can determine 
what issues to be involved in, as well as when and how to make statements or take action. 
Like to marketing, issue management involves efforts to manage an organization so that 
it can interact effectively with its dynamic external environment.  
 
Baskin, Aronoff & Lattimore (1997) also observe that though the issue management 
aspect of public relations experienced rapid growth in the 1970s and early 1980s, it has 
been fairly restrained in recent years. The situation was credited to tight corporate 
budgets, issues requiring organizational change as well as communication, and the lack of 
interdisciplinary professionals. 
  
Seitel (2007) identifies five steps in issue management: 
1) Identification of issues that an organization or individual should be concerned 
about. 
  47
2) Analysis and delimitation of each issue, taking into consideration its effect on 
constituent publics. 
3) Exhibition of various strategic options available to the organization. 
4) Implementation  of action programmes to communicate the organization’s views, 
and to influence the perception on the issue 
5) Evaluation of the action programmes in terms of reaching organizational goals. 
   
2.6.3 Managing a Crisis 
The Harvard Business School defines crisis as a situation that has reached a critical stage 
requiring dramatic and extraordinary intervention to avoid or repair major damage (Long, 
2001, as cited in Seitel, 2007).  Hence, crisis management includes those methods that are 
used to respond to the crisis (Ogedengbe, 2005). Managing a crisis may be the first step 
in resolving same, since it has to be curtailed before a more lasting solution can be 
considered.   
 
An organization’s skill in handling its affairs in the midst of a crisis will affect the way it 
is perceived by its various publics. Since public relations has been defined as the “Art and 
social science of analyzing trends, predicting their consequences, counselling 
organizations’ leaders and implementing a planned programme of action, which serves 
both the organization and the public interest” (Daramola, 2005, p. 12), it becomes 
obvious that it has a role to play in crisis management. 
 
From the definition given above, public relations analyzes trends by assessing the past 
records of an organization. If the organization has encountered some level of conflict in 
the past, or if there are unresolved issues, this will be an indication that the publics of the 
organization are not satisfied with its activities. By analyzing the precedents of the 
organization, it would be possible to predict the consequence of the organizational 
policies. For instance, if the oil companies in the Niger Delta had analysed the trends of 
their relationship with their host communities, they would have been able to predict the 
increase in the violence against them. This is because the subject of the people’s agitation 
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in the Niger Delta today is the same as it was ten years ago, though it may have become 
more profound and diversified.      
 
Another of the very salient attributes of public relations is the ability to mediate. This 
attribute is particularly valuable in times of conflict when a middle ground has to be 
found. Because the parties to a conflict are directly involved, it is logical to assume that 
their objectivity in viewing the issue would be affected. Hence, public relations plays the 
role of a go-between for the organization and its affected publics. 
 
2.6.4 Community Relations and the Niger Delta Crises 
According to Baskin, Aronoff & Lattimore (1997), some sociologists and political 
scientists have taken the stand that our communities are dissolving in the face of 
increasing mobility and communication. Nevertheless, the community cannot be declared 
dead. In recent times, individuals and agencies have begun to pay special attention to the 
reality of the community. They emphasize that though organizations may be preoccupied 
by regional, national, and international community relations programmes, they must not 
forget their immediate communities, i.e. their host communities.  
 
  
Baskin et.al observe that in the 1990s, most organizations began to understand that their 
community relations efforts must become more organized and proactive. They state that 
the key to any effective community relations activity is positive and socially responsible 
action.  This will help the community on behalf of the organization. The organization 
must, at all cost, guard against negative acts and also work to preserve existing 
relationships. For this to be possible, proactive and positive actions are crucial so that the 
organization can achieve its goals. 
 
Effective community relations can only be achieved when an organization recognises its 
interdependence with other institutions. When the management recognises the many 
ways its organization can impact on the local community and the extent of reciprocal 
dependence, it will help to establish social balance. The practice of good community 
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relations assists the organization in securing its needs from the community while it also 
provides what the community expects. Also, it helps to secure the company’s 
investments, increase sales of products, the value of stocks, and improve the general 
operating climate of business.    
 
It has been erroneously believed by several scholars that the crises in the Niger Delta are 
beyond what community relations can handle. The view is also held in some quarters that 
community relations does not address the core problem in the Niger Delta.  This view, 
however, fails to appreciate the essence of community relations. If the oil companies 
carry out their activities in the interest of the host communities and adhere to quality 
ethical practices, the conflicts would focus on the government, thereby excluding the 
companies.  
 
Community relations is not about window dressing; rather, it is about protecting the host 
community.  As Baskin et.al (1997) point out, even the staff of the organization would be 
productive when proper community relations is carried out. Considering the fact that 
most of the staff of any organization live in that community, any improper or 
inconsiderate attitude displayed by the management can endanger their lives, as can be 
seen in the kidnap cases in the Niger Delta.  
 
 
2.7 GAP IN THE LITERATURE 
There exists several scholarly works on the crisis in the Niger Delta, its causes and 
possible solutions. Several scholars have also agreed that the conflict is multidimensional 
(Aaron & Patrick, 2008; Edeogu, 2008), and that it has unquantifiable consequences on 
the Nigerian nation.  Schools of thought have even evolved on the extent to which the 
crisis can be attributed to the exploration of oil in the area. While some believe that Niger 
Delta communities have been excluded from the oil wealth generated from their region, 
others claim that the protesting youths and women are only pawns in the hands of the 
privileged class (Ibaba, 2005). 
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Individuals, groups, the media and even the government have continually called on oil 
companies to demonstrate a higher degree of social responsibility to their host 
communities. Some scholars are, however, of the view that oil companies should not be 
relied upon for development because of their past failures. Aaron (2008) observes that 
with the huge amount claimed to have been invested by oil companies in their host 
communities, the level of underdevelopment in those communities, as well as rising 
incidents of conflicts, a logical conclusion may be drawn that corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), as practiced by the oil companies in the Niger Delta, is a gross 
failure.  
 
Aaron (2008) notes:  
Even a cursory look at the financial records of the major 
oil companies operating in the Niger Delta region of 
Nigeria reveals a phenomenal rise in budgetary 
allocations to community development projects- Shell 
alone spent $59 million and paid $114 million to NDDC 
in 2006 (p. 268).  
 
He goes further to state that the CSR of the oil companies has neither developed the 
communities, nor secured the social license of the transnationals (oil companies) to 
operate. He concludes that it would amount to wishful thinking to expect the oil 
companies to meaningfully develop the Niger Delta communities since they are for-profit 
organizations, pursuing by all means possible to achieve their objective of making more 
profit. 
 
Consequent on the foregoing discussions, some important issues require urgent attention. 
If on one hand we could accept as a fact that the oil companies actually invested the 
amount they claimed in their host communities, then it becomes an issue of such serious 
concern what became of the investments. Were they entrusted into wrong hands? Were 
they too negligible compared to the developmental challenges? It is obvious at this 
juncture that this is a question of the strategies involved in relating with the communities.  
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According to Aaron (2008), Shell spent $59 million and paid $114 million to NDDC in 
2006, yet there was no visible evidence of the expenses. If these huge amounts, which are 
somewhat considered to be a fraction of the company’s profit, left no trace of their 
existence, what is the possibility that the entire profit, assuming it was ever possible to be 
given, would make any difference? On the other hand, if we say that the figures claimed 
by the oil companies were mere window dressing, then we cannot claim that CSR has 
failed because it has not been practised in the first place.  
 
This study focuses on the gap between the communities and the oil companies. It 
investigates the community relations strategies used by the oil companies to resolves the 
differences between themselves and their host communities in the Niger Delta. This is 
important, particularly because a plethora of materials abound on CSR of oil companies, 
their failures, the motives behind their efforts and even the lack of involvement of the 
communities in the planning and execution of such projects. However, there is scanty 
scholarly work on the specific community relations strategies engaged by the oil 
companies. This study, therefore, presents a holistic picture from both the perspectives of 
the oil companies and the host communities by examining the oil companies’ strategies, 
what the communities prefer, and how there can be a synergy.   
 
Again, several scholars have worked on the use of community relations, hence, public 
relations, as a means of conflict resolution (Baskin et.al, 1997; Chase, 1982; Folarin, 
1998). It is a consensus among public relations scholars that the best response to conflict 
is to be prepared. According to Igben (2008), preventive public relations, which is also 
known as proactive PR, involves taking action ahead of time.  Aliyu & Mohammed 
(2008) also say that public relations professionals believe that proactive approach to 
conflict management is the most strategic approach.  
 
The Niger Delta crises are ones in which all the proactive strategies of the oil companies 
in relation to conflict management have failed. If those strategies have been effective, the 
conflicts and violence against them would have been envisaged and forestalled, or at the 
very least, nipped in the bud. Hence, reactive public relations is the most suitable 
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approach to adopt now. This involves adapting existing plans to dynamic situations. 
Though Aliyu & Mohammed (2008) suggest some public relations strategies that can be 
used in a crisis situation, they are, however, limited to communication and information 
management.  
 
This study is aimed at examining and evaluating the actual community relations strategies 
used by oil companies within the crises context; not just the ones they planned 
beforehand. Also, a lot of the work that has been done on the Niger Delta and the oil 
companies have focused more on what the oil companies have done or are expected to do 
for their host communities (Aaron, 2008; Aaron & Patrick, 2008; Edeogu, 2008).  This 
study will, however, focus on the techniques used in executing those community relations 
plans and the communities’ perception of them. 
 
 
 
2.8 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The significance of theories in shaping this study cannot be overemphasized. Lewin 
(1958) states that good theories enable researchers to put facts in perspective and to 
hypothesize what will happen, even before they do happen (as cited in Folarin, 2005). 
Folarin (2005) also says that theories help researchers to manage reality. Hence, some 
theories have been selected to provide focus for this study, and they are the Conflict 
Theory, Situational Theory, and Stakeholder Theory.  
 
2.8.1 Conflict Theory 
Conflict theory posits that in a society or an organization, each individual participant 
and/or group struggles to maximize certain benefits and this inevitably contributes to 
social change. This change may include political struggles and revolution. The theory 
focuses on the idea that personal or group’s ability has a role to play in exercising 
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influence and control over others in producing social order. Hence, conflict theorists 
believe that there is a continual struggle between all different elements of a particular 
society. 
 
According to Wallace & Wolf (2006), conflict theory evolved as a major alternative to 
the functionalist approach to analyzing a society’s general structure. Ritzer (2003) also 
observes that apart from the theory’s origination in reaction to structural functionalism, it 
also has other roots that include Marxian theory and works of Georg Simmel on social 
conflict. Conflict theory provided an alternative to the functionalist approach in the 1950s 
and 1960s. Although it was superseded by a variety of neo-Marxian theories after the 60s 
(Ritzer & Goodman, 2004), it has become increasingly popular and relevant in modern 
sociology (Wallace & Wolf, 2006). 
 
Functionalists consider societies and social institutions as systems in which equilibrium is 
created through the interdependence of all the parts. They do not deny the existence of 
conflict; however, they believe that the society evolves means of controlling it. This 
forms the basis of functionalist analysis. Conflict theorists, on the other hand, perceive 
the society in a different light. Contrary to functionalists’ view of the existence of 
interdependence and unity in the society, conflict theorists view the society as an arena 
where groups contend for power. For conflict to be controlled, one group must be able to, 
at least temporarily, suppress its rivals. Conflict theory focuses on the shifting balance of 
power among competitors in the society, rather than the creation of equilibrium through 
interdependence and cooperation (Wallace & Wolf, 2006). 
 
This Marxist perspective has been specifically applied to international 
organizations/multinational corporations, which are the focus of this study. According to 
Pease (2003), Marxists argue that international organizations are products of hegemony. 
However, traditional Marxists and Gramscian Marxists have two separate notions of 
hegemony, thereby leading them to different conclusions on the nature of international 
organizations. While traditional Marxists tend to equate hegemony with military and 
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economic dominance, Gramscian-inspired Marxists claim that it is the relation of consent 
to political and ideological leadership (Simon, 1982). 
 
Both the traditional and the Gramascian Marxists perspectives can be applied to this 
study, though in varying degrees. The notion of the traditional Marxists is applicable, 
more so when we consider that the Multi-national companies (MNCs) actually dominate 
the economy of the countries (e.g. America and Japan), but particularly the communities, 
in which they operate. This they do by taking over the means of production of the 
communities, while the people live on compensations. The oil companies, however, did 
not dominate the Niger Delta through the use of force, at least at the initial stage. Military 
force was introduced much later with the rise of vandalism and militancy.  
 
On the other hand, the Gramscian Marxists’ argument is also very fundamental to the 
study. The relevance of their own argument is embedded in the question: “How does the 
ruling class get subordinate classes to consent to their own domination and exploitation?” 
(Pease, 2003, p. 79). Pease presents the answer; it is by linking the dominant class’ 
interests to the interests of the subordinate classes. This involves the development of a 
coherent set of values that transcends both class and national boundaries without 
compromising the dominant class’ position.  
 
According to Saiyou (2006), the initial reaction of the Niger Delta communities to the 
discovery of oil in their territory was that of joy and anticipation of development. At that 
initial stage, the goals of the oil companies were linked with those of the communities. 
However, as the communities began to realize that the goals of the oil companies were 
being realized while theirs were abandoned, conflict began to develop. 
 
Marxists believe that MNCs are tools of exploitation and mechanisms of domination that 
promotes underdevelopment. According to Pease (2003), MNCs seek out states with lax 
environmental and labour standards under the guise of drive for market efficiency. Many 
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of them locate areas where labour is not represented by unions so as to keep labour cost 
low. It is obvious that the oil companies in the Niger Delta are taking advantage of the 
inconsistency of the Nigerian Government to increase their profit. Several deadlines have 
been set for the termination of gas flaring, yet, it is still being flared. A vast majority of 
the Niger Delta residents increasingly face child respiratory diseases, asthma, cancer, and 
premature deaths as a result of the massive flaring (Rizvi, 2005). 
 
From the foregoing, it is obvious that the conflict theory is pivotal to this study. The 
theory has enabled us to identify the sources and nature of conflicts as well as how they 
relate to the Niger Delta. Nevertheless, it does not identify the nature and stages of 
human response to conflicts. Hence, the Situational Theory has been included to cater for 
these aspects of conflicts. 
  
2.8.2 Situational Theory 
According to Baskin, Aronoff &Lattimore (1997), the situational theory was proposed by 
Grunig and Hunt in 1984. It states that a public can be defined or characterized according 
to the degree of its awareness of the problem confronting it and the extent to which it 
seeks a solution to it. The theory aims at helping to understand the different component 
parts of a community and how organizations relate with them at different times.  
 
The situational theory was propounded to explain how and when different types of public 
can be identified. An active public, as defined by Grunig & Hunt (1984), is one that seeks 
and processes information concerning an organization or an issue of interest to an 
organization (cited in Baskin et al, 1997, p. 56). They further identify three variables that 
determine whether or not an individual is active and when he will seek and process 
information about an issue. 
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1.  Problem recognition: when a person is faced with an issue, he must first become 
aware of it and recognise the fact that it has the potential to affect him. 
2.  Constraint recognition: this describes how individuals perceive the obstacles in the 
way of a solution. If they believe that they stand a chance of overcoming the 
obstacles, they will seek and process information on that issue; in the alternative, 
they remain passive. 
3.  Level of involvement: this refers to the extent to which an individual cares about 
an issue. The degree to which he cares will determine his involvement in seeking 
and processing information about it. 
 
In assessing Niger Delta communities using the steps above, it is crystal clear that they 
are active publics. Firstly, they recognise that there is a problem, and the problem is that 
they are both physically and economically disadvantaged (Ibaba, 2005; Alabi, 2008). 
They also recognise the possible consequences of the problem for them; indeed, they are 
actually heavily affected (“Children Kidnapped,” 2007).  Secondly, Niger Delta 
communities identify both the government and the oil companies as their obstacles in 
accessing their due share of the oil resources, and they probably believe they can 
overcome the obstacles through the use of violence. Thirdly, the extent of protest and 
violence clearly indicates how much they care about the issue. 
 
2.8.3 Stakeholder Theory 
The concept “Stakeholder” was first used in 1963 in an internal memorandum at the 
Stanford Research Institute. According to its first usage, stakeholders are groups whose 
support the organization needs so as to remain in existence. The concept was developed 
into a theory and championed by Edward Freeman in the 1980s (Freeman & Reed, 1983, 
p. 89). Freeman and Reed (1983) later write on the comparison between stockholder and 
stakeholder, and Freeman (1984) provides more details on the theory.   
 
The stakeholder theory states that a corporation has stakeholders who are generally the 
groups and individuals that benefit from, or are harmed by the corporation’s actions. The 
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rights of these parties can either be violated or respected by the corporation (Hartman, 
2005). The stakeholder theory identifies the groups and individuals relative to a 
corporation. It also describes as well as recommends methods by which the interests of 
each party can be catered for by the management of the corporation (Freeman & Reed, 
1983). The stakeholder theory is one of the classical theories in public relations. 
 
As Philips (2004) observes, the question of who is and who is not a stakeholder has been 
discussed for years. Some of the questions that appear relevant to a proper 
conceptualization here are: Should stakeholder status be a reserved right for 
constituencies having close relationship with the organization? Should the status be seen 
to apply broadly to all groups that can affect or be affected by the organization? Should 
activists, competitors, natural environment or even the media be classified as 
stakeholders? In an attempt to answer these questions, Freeman & Reed (1983) explain 
that the narrow definition only includes the groups that are vital to the survival and 
success of the organization, while the wide or broad definition accommodates all groups 
that can affect or be affected by the actions of the corporation.  
 
Still in an attempt to identify who the stakeholders should be, Dougherty (1992) and Ray 
(1999) classify them into four groups; enabling publics, functional publics, normative 
publics and diffused publics. Stephens, Malone & Bailey (2005, p. 395) explain that 
enabling publics provide leadership for the organization and also control the resources 
that allow it to exist and among them are shareholders, regulatory bodies and boards of 
directors. The functional publics are those who exchange inputs in an organization for 
outputs such as the employees, unions, suppliers and customers who provide labour or 
make use of the organization’s products and services. Normative publics are those with 
shared values or similar problems such as trade unions and professional societies. The 
last group is referred to as the diffused publics, which emerge when external 
consequences result from an organization’s activities; these include the media, 
environmentalists, residents, and the community, among others. 
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In a later work, Freeman, Winks & Parmar (2004, p. 364) elaborate further on their 
previous work by stating that the stakeholder theory is managerial in nature because it 
reflects and directs how managers operate, rather than primarily addressing management 
theorists and economists. From the analytical point of view, a stakeholder approach 
provides assistance to managers through the promotion of the analysis of how the 
corporation fits into its larger environment (Mayer, 2008). It also encourages the 
evaluation of how the standard operating procedures of the corporation affect 
stakeholders like employees, managers and investors who are within the company, and 
customers, suppliers and financiers who are outside the company.  
 
Freeman (as cited in Mayer, 2008) suggests that managers should fill a “Generic 
stakeholder map” with specific stakeholders. This will help the managers to always keep 
them in perspective, particularly when making important decisions. He emphasizes that a 
rational manager will not make a major decision for the organization without first 
considering its implications on each of the stakeholders. The stakeholder theory posits 
that every legitimate person or group involved in the activities of a firm is a stakeholder 
for the sake of benefits, and that the priority interest of every legitimate stakeholder is not 
self-evident (Furneaux, 2006).  
 
According to Donaldo & Preston (1995, p.66), the stakeholder theory has the following 
characteristics: 
 
1) The stakeholder theory is descriptive: it offers a model of the corporation. 
2)    It is instrumental: it offers a framework for investigating the links between 
conventional firm performance and the practice of stakeholder management. 
3) It is fundamentally normative: although stakeholder theory possesses the above 
two characteristics, it is more fundamentally normative. Stakeholders are 
identified by their interests and all stakeholders are considered to be intrinsically 
valuable. 
4) It is managerial: it recommends attitudes, structures and practices and requires 
that simultaneous attention be given to the interest of all legitimate stakeholders. 
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The existence of an organization depends on its ability to create value and acceptable 
outcomes for different groups of stakeholders (Jones, 2004). Stakeholders are generally 
motivated to participate in an organization if the inducements they receive exceed the 
value of the contributions they are required to make. Different stakeholders use the 
organization simultaneously to achieve their goals. It is pertinent to note, however, that 
the viability of the organization and its ability to accomplish its missions of providing 
goods and services depends mainly on the contributions of its stakeholders. 
 
There are some counterarguments to those of the stakeholder theory, and prominent 
among them is the stockholder theory, which was popularized by Milton Friedman 
(1970). This theory actually existed before the stakeholder theory and was, in fact, the 
argument that led to the reaction that birthed the stakeholder theory; nevertheless, it 
remains the premise on which critics of the stakeholder theory base their arguments.   
 
Friedman states that a corporation’s only responsibility is to make money and sell 
products so that people can be hired and paid (Seitel, 2007). Hence, a business has no 
business in social responsibility (Kiipoye & Patrick, 2008). The stockholder theory 
argues that corporate involvements in philanthropy distorts the market as well as robs the 
shareholders of their wealth. He insists that the idea of business having social 
responsibilities is meaningless, because only people can have such. Since a corporation is 
only an artificial person, it may only have artificial responsibilities.  
 
Alexei (2000) agrees with Friedman by stating that it is questionable why firms should be 
obligated to give something back to those whom much has already been routinely given. 
He furthers his argument by explaining that contrary to the “enslaved” portrayal of 
employees, they are usually paid wages and benefits by firms for their labour. Also, 
customers are not stolen from; rather, they are usually delivered with goods and services 
in return for the revenue they provide. Firms are not guilty of taking a free ride on public 
provision; rather, they typically pay taxes and obey the law. 
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Still, the shareholder theory projects the separation thesis, which begins by assuming that 
ethics and economics can be clearly and sharply separated (Freeman, Wicks & Parmar 
2004, p. 364). This view is supported by Sundaram & Inkpen (2004) who observe that 
governing a corporation requires purposeful activity, and that any purposeful activity has 
a goal. According to them, the only appropriate goal for modern corporation managers is 
maximizing shareholder value. Freeman, Wicks and Parmar, however, object to the 
single-objective view of the firm which distinguishes the economic from the ethical 
consequences and values on the ground that it leads to a parochial theory that cannot fully 
account for the array of human activities. 
 
Freeman, Wicks & Parmar (2004, p. 364-369) offer three main criticisms of Sundaram & 
Inkpen (2004, p. 350-363). Firstly, they insist that the stakeholder theory is 
misrepresented in their article because all views that did not project shareholder 
maximization were lumped together as part of stakeholder theory. Such views included 
corporate chartering, unions, consumer interests, care for natural environment, etc. They 
point out that though the stakeholder theory can be many things, it is wrong to assume 
that it is everything anti-shareholder. Since shareholders are also stakeholders, bifurcating 
the world into “shareholder concerns” and “stakeholder concerns” is as illogical as 
contrasting “apples” and “fruits”. 
 
 Sundaram and Inkpen argue in favour of the primacy of shareholder value maximization 
with the following five-point argument (Freeman, Wicks & Parmar, 2004, p. 366): 
1)  The goal of maximizing shareholder value is pro-stakeholder 
2) Maximizing shareholder value creates the appropriate incentives for managers to 
assume entrepreneurial risks. 
3) Having more than one objective function will make governing difficult, if not 
impossible. 
4) It is easier to make shareholders out of stakeholders than vice versa. 
5) In the event of a breach of contract or trust, stakeholders, compared with 
shareholders, have protection (or can seek remedies) through contracts and the 
legal system.  
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Secondly, Freeman, Wicks & Parmar (2004, p. 366) criticise the five points with five 
counter arguments as follows:  
1) The stakeholder theory is decidedly pro-shareholder: values are created for 
shareholders when they are created for stakeholders. When managers create 
products and services that customers are willing to buy, when jobs are offered that 
employees are willing to fill, when relationships are extended that suppliers are 
eager to have, and when behaving as good citizens of the community, values are 
being created for shareholders. It is not necessary to posit the two theories as 
opposed. 
2) The stakeholder theory offers the correct way to think about entrepreneurial 
risks: according to Venkertaraman (2002) as cited in Freeman, Wicks & Parmar 
(2004), a stakeholder approach enables us to develop a more robust 
entrepreneurial theory in which the role of entrepreneurial risk is better 
understood. In practice, as opposed to the world of economic journals, there are 
often collaborations between managers and stakeholder groups such as customers 
and suppliers to test new products and services. In fact, customers and suppliers 
accept some inherent risks in the development of new ideas, products and 
services. 
3) Having one objective function makes governance and management difficult:  
having a single function, according to Sundaram & Inkpen (2004), makes the 
tasks of managers easier simply because it cuts through confusing claims and 
potential responsibilities accorded managers. The only responsibility of managers 
is to make money for shareholders. Freeman, Wicks & Parmar (2004), however, 
insist that though convenient for managers, the view distorts reality and 
encourages a worldview in which managers exempt themselves from being moral 
agents who are responsible to a wide array of groups for their actions. 
4) It is easier to make stakeholders out of shareholders: this point is considered 
obvious since shareholders are already stakeholders. 
5) Stakeholders have remedies that shareholders do not have: it is erroneous to 
focus on the derivative suits by shareholders as the only means by which 
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shareholders can be protected. Since the desired condition is for value creation 
and trade to be self-sustaining (so that parties to the contract can pay the cost of 
safeguarding that contract, rather than impose it externally on others), the 
stakeholder approach is the only move of conceptualization. 
 
Lastly, Freeman, Wicks and Parmar (2004, p. 368) close their argument by noting that the 
impression the shareholder ideologists strive to create is that economic freedom, and 
therefore, political freedom, are threatened by the stakeholder theory. They insist that this 
view is fallacious. According to them, “Seeing business as the creation of value for 
stakeholders and the trading of that value with free consenting adults, is to think about a 
society where each has freedom compatible with a like liberty for all,”  (Freeman, Wicks 
& Parmar, 2004, p. 368). Value creation and trade are complimentary. Hence, the idea of 
economic and political freedom being separable should be jettisoned. 
 
The stakeholder theory has been applied to several studies. One of the major studies in 
this category is “Communication with stakeholders during a crisis: Evaluating message 
strategies,” conducted by Stephens, Malone & Baily (2005, p. 390-419).  The study 
explores message strategies used by organizations in dealing with crises involving 
technical details. While applying the theory, the authors explain that the nature of the 
relationship existing between the stakeholders and the organization is a major factor in 
shaping the response of stakeholders to pressure.   
 
Stephens, Malone & Baily (2005, p. 395) observe that the purpose of communication 
during crisis is to influence the perception of the public towards the organization as well 
as to maintain a positive image among stakeholders. It can also be used to restore the 
company’s image in case it has already been damaged among stakeholders. The authors 
made use of literature to develop an integrative coding scheme and a parallel set of 
strategies, which they referred to as technical translation message strategies. Content 
analysis was adopted for the study and 154 accounts representing 10 different technical 
crises were analyzed.  
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From the findings of the study, it was suggested that different crisis-message strategies 
were used in communicating with different stakeholders. It was also discovered that 
when technical details were discussed, “Organizations rarely go beyond an attempt to 
directly state the technical facts with little or no explanation provided to the stakeholders” 
(Stephens, Malone & Baily (2005, p. 1). 
 
Consequent on the arguments in favour of the stakeholder theory and its application in 
studies such as the one presented above, the theory has been adopted for this work.  The 
stakeholder theory is considered appropriate for this study because of its managerial 
nature. It alerts the corporation to the existence of an array of parties that it is responsible 
to. In the context of this study, this theory helps oil companies in the Niger Delta to 
become aware of the fact that there are several individuals and groups that are affected by 
their actions. Prominent among these parties are the host communities. The host 
communities are considered to be among the most important stakeholders of the oil 
companies, because they are physically connected to the companies. 
 
Stephens, Malone & Bailey (2005, p. 393) explain that one of the effective ways to 
describe the behaviour of organizations is to adequately take into consideration the nature 
of their relationship with their stakeholders. Hence, the stakeholder theory will enable us 
to describe the behaviour of Shell, Chevron and Agip after we have evaluated the nature 
of their relationship with their host communities in the Niger Delta. A cordial or not 
cordial relationship with the Niger Delta communities will, therefore, give us a picture of 
how well or badly the selected oil companies have behaved.  
 
Stephens, Malone and Bailey (2005, p. 394) further observe that the management of an 
organization may consider one stakeholder to be inconsequential one day, and the next 
day realises that the same stakeholder demands its total attention. This is described by 
Mitchell, Agel & Wood (1997) as stakeholder salience, which they suggest can shift from 
time to time.  
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The implication of this for our current study is that there is a possibility that the oil 
companies once considered their host communities inconsequential, and thereby failed to 
give them due attention. The one sided relationship then resulted into protests and 
conflicts, which in turn upgraded the communities to become the oil companies’ most 
important stakeholders. Following Stephens, Malone & Bailey’s (2005) explanation of 
the four categories of stakeholders, that the victims may join the functional publics during 
crises, it can be said that the conflicts in the Niger Delta have engendered the elevation of 
the communities from the diffused publics of the oil companies to their functional 
publics. 
 
 Stakeholder theory also provides a robust approach to corporate responsibility, unlike the 
shareholder theory, that parochially considers only the shareholders as worthy of 
attention. This helps oil companies in the Niger Delta to realize that by creating values 
for their host communities, they are creating values for their shareholders. This cannot be 
better emphasized than by the fact that their outputs have been greatly reduced due to the 
crises in the area.   If by ignoring their host communities they intended to make more 
money for their shareholders, it is quite obvious that they have achieved the opposite. The 
companies definitely have more losses, such as vandalized pipelines and installations, 
than gains. 
 
Again, by using the stakeholder approach, it will be realized that there is no basis for 
enmity between shareholders and stakeholders, since the former is a part of the latter. 
Shareholders should work in the interest of stakeholders because there, their interests will 
be protected. If, for instance, Shell is ejected from the Niger Delta due to bad community 
relations, it will surely affect the investments of shareholders. Shareholders should, 
therefore, pressurize oil companies to become more responsible.  
 
After the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa in 1995, private investors dumped Shell’s shares 
in Britain in a bid to force the company out of Nigeria. This move was, however, 
defeated because ironically, the company gained the support of large institutional 
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investors, causing the share price to continue to rise (“Private Investors Dump Shell,” 
1995).   
 
It is probable that, had the whole shareholder body realized their shared values with the 
host communities, Shell would have at least been forced to be more responsible. Thirteen 
years after that incident, it is very clear that the oil companies have still not learnt any 
lesson.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
METHOD OF RESEARCH 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the method used for this study. It comprises the description of the 
research design, study population and the techniques used to select the sample. The 
chapter also provides information on data gathering and analysis.  
 
3.2 STUDY DESIGN 
This study adopted triangulation, that is, the use of focus group discussion, key informant 
interview and survey. Hence, both the qualitative and the quantitative research methods 
were used for a clearer understanding of the research problem (Wimmer & Dominic, 
2003, p. 108). The rationale for using the qualitative method was based on three 
important characteristics as highlighted by Wimmer & Dominic (2003). According to 
these authors, a qualitative research is an interpretative study which allows each observer 
to create reality as part of the research process, which believes in the fundamental 
difference in human beings and strives for the depth of the study rather than the breadth 
of it.  
 
This study investigated the nature of the current community relations of the selected oil 
companies used for conflict resolution in the Niger Delta, the strategies employed, 
variations in techniques, shortcomings and possible strategic improvements. Hence, this 
method is appropriate for investigating the questions raised in the study. The focus group 
discussion and key informant interviews were the qualitative research designs adopted for 
this study. These designs enabled the gathering of qualitative data that explored the depth 
of community relations and conflict resolution in the selected communities in the Niger 
Delta.  
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The quantitative research method, on the other hand, was used in this study to 
complement the qualitative data generated. This became necessary due to the 
shortcoming of qualitative data in terms of generalization. Hence, quantitative method, 
due to its attribute of sampling the opinion of a large number of people on specific 
subjects, was adopted for its capacity to be generalized. Also, since one of the objectives 
of this study is to examine the host communities’ perception of the community relations 
strategies of the oil companies, the quantitative research method will ensure a 
representative sample. The quantitative research design adopted for this study was the 
survey.   
 
3.3 STUDY POPULATION 
The population for this study comprised the corporate affairs units of oil companies in the 
Niger Delta and the indigenes of Omoku and Obrikom communities in Rivers State and 
Eruemukohwarien, Tisun and Kolokolo communities in Delta State.  
 
Three major oil companies in Delta and Rivers States were selected- Shell, Chevron and 
Agip. The oil companies were selected firstly because of their scale of operations in the 
Niger Delta, particularly in the selected states, and secondly, because they had varying 
records of attacks during crises (Aaron, 2008). Consequently, they were considered 
suitable for the purpose of examining their different community relations strategies. Shell 
Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) is the subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell, a 
British/Dutch company, and it operates in Nigeria. Agip, also known as the Nigerian 
Agip Oil Company Limited (NAOC), is an Italian company which operates in Nigeria, 
and Chevron is an American company which operates in Nigeria under the joint venture 
name, Chevron Nigeria Limited (CNL). 
 
The corporate affairs units of Shell, Chevron and Agip were selected as part of the 
population because they directly represented the companies with their host communities. 
They also executed and coordinated all the community relations strategies for the 
companies. Hence, they were considered the most appropriate representatives of the oil 
companies to provide the information needed for this study. 
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Eruemukohwarien, Tisun and Kolokolo communities in Delta State, and Obrikom and 
Omoku communities in Rivers State were selected because they are oil producing 
communities. Though the population had heterogeneous characteristics in terms of age, 
education and socio-economic status, it still had some common denominators such as 
geographical location, host to oil companies and low level of development.    
 
 
3.4 SAMPLE SIZE 
For the quantitative aspect of this study, a survey was carried out in the five selected 
communities in Delta and Rivers states in the Niger Delta. The sample size was 595 
consisting 182 respondents from Eruemukohwarien, 22 from Tisun, 36 from Kolokolo, 
283 from Omoku and 72 from Obrikom communities. The sample size for this study was 
informed by the population of the communities used for this study.  
 
The population figure obtained before this study showed that the population in Tisun was 
3,415, Kolokolo was 5, 966, Eruemukohwarien was 5, 265, Obrikom was 5, 316 and 
Omoku was 33, 962. Based on those figures, 200 respondents were proposed for Tisun, 
Kolokolo, Eruemukohwarien and Obrikom, while 300 were proposed for Omoku. It was, 
however, discovered on the field that the population resident in Tisun and Kolokolo were 
38 and 45 respectively. Hence, the copies of the questionnaire distributed were reduced. 
In Eruemukohwarien, Obrikom and Omoku, the samples selected were affected by the 
willingness of respondents to participate in the study because of its sensitive nature. 
Nevertheless, the fidelity of this study was ensured by the random selection of the 
respondents to ensure the representation of the communities. 
 
Nine focus groups were constituted for this study. Four groups were constituted in 
Eruemukohwarien: Elders group (6 participants), women’s group (7 participants), youths’ 
group (8 participants, ages 20-35 years) and young girls’ group (6 participants, ages 16-
25 years). In Tisun community, only one group was constituted because of the low 
population, and it was the men’s group (7 participants). The women were, however, not 
available for the focus group discussion (FGD). In Kolokolo, two groups were 
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constituted: Youths/men’s group (7 participants), and women’s group (8 participants). 
Only one group each was constituted in Omoku and Obrikom because of their internal 
political issues. The youths were restrained from participating and the women were also 
not available. Hence, the elders’ group was constituted in both communities (8 
participants in Obrikom and 11 participants in Omoku).  
 
Therefore, a total of 68 discussants participated in this study.  As can be seen, the 
numbers of discussants that constituted the groups vary. The standard number adopted for 
this study was eight, but in cases where the target could not be achieved, six was made 
the minimum. The exception in the case of Omoku (11 participants) was because the 
interview was granted after an elders’ meeting. Hence, all those present participated in 
the FGD.  
 
Key informant interview was conducted with one Corporate Affairs/Public Relations 
representative of Shell and Chevron, while Agip’s representative was not available to be 
interviewed. In Eruemukohwarien, two elders, women leader and a youth leader were 
interviewed. In Tisun and Kolokolo, the oldest men in each community, as well as the 
secretary of the Trust that represents both communities were interviewed.  Two youth 
leaders and the Eze-ogba Nwadei Ogbuehi in Omoku were interviewed. Finally in 
Obrikom, the Regent and the women leader were interviewed. This makes a total of 14 
interviewees for this study. 
 
 
3.5 SAMPLING TECHNIQUE 
This study made use of three sampling techniques and they were simple random 
sampling, systematic random sampling and purposive sampling techniques. Each of the 
techniques was used because of its attributes and the nature of the samples required from 
the population.  
 
Simple random sampling was used to select the communities studied. All the elements of 
each population were written on pieces of paper, rolled up and put in a container. The 
  70
samples required were randomly selected from that container, thereby using the simple 
random sampling without replacement. Shell’s operations in the Niger Delta are 
classified into Eastern area of operation (Akwa Ibom, Cross River and Rivers States), 
Central area of operation (Bayelsa) and Western area of operation (Delta and Edo States). 
Western area was randomly selected for this study and Delta state was selected. Of the 
local government areas hosting Shell operations, Ughelli North was randomly selected. 
Eruemukohwarien and Afiesere were also randomly selected, but Afiesere had to be 
dropped because of the volatile condition in the Niger Delta.  
 
Chevron established an Itsekiri Rural Development Council that was made up of 23 
Itsekiri communities within five oil fields of its operations. The five fields are Abiteye, 
Dibi, Escravos, Ughoegungun and Olero. Dibi oil field was randomly selected and of the 
six communities in that category, Tisun and Kolokolo communities in Delta State were 
selected. Agip also had its operations in Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers states. After randomly 
selecting Rivers State, Obiafu/Obrikom oil location was selected in Ogba/Egbema/Ndoni 
Local Government Area. Afterwards, Omoku and Obrikom communities were finally 
selected.  
 
Systematic random sampling was used to select the individual respondent. In each of the 
communities, a starting point was randomly selected and the respondents were chosen 
according to a selected sampling interval. Wimmer and Dominick (2003, p. 91) explain 
that systematic random sampling is similar in some ways to simple random sampling but 
it saves more time, resources and efforts. They observe that systematic samples are 
frequently used in mass media research and that, “since the procedure so closely 
resembles a simple random sample, many researchers consider systematic sampling to be 
as effective as the random procedure,” (Wimmer and Dominick, 2003, p. 91). 
 
The FGD and key informant interview participants were purposively selected. This 
technique provided the researcher with the opportunity to select the respondents who 
were considered exposed to the situation enough to provide the needed information. 
Dawson, Manderson & Tallo (1993) state that it may be foolish to use random sampling 
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in this context since some of the samples that would be obtained may not be fit to discuss 
the required subject.  
 
3.6 INSTRUMENT OF DATA COLLECTION 
This study made use of the focus group discussion, key informant interview and survey 
designs. The instrument that was used to gather data for the focus group discussion was 
the question guide, also known as the question line. The question guide was designed by 
the researcher and it had three basic parts (See appendix 4). The first part was the face-
sheet. This page was used to record factual information such as time, date, and place of 
discussion. It also contained the demographic information of the discussants. The second 
part contained the actual questions that were asked and the last part of the guide is the 
post-interview comment sheet. This sheet was used for notes after the discussion. Here, 
details of the researcher’s feelings, interpretations and other comments were documented. 
The focus group discussion sessions were conducted by the researcher with the aid of 
interpreters where necessary. 
 
Data from the in-depth interview were gathered through the use of two interview guides; 
one for the representatives of the oil companies and another for members of the host 
communities. The guides were constructed by the researcher and they contained lists of 
questions that were asked from the interviewee. The questions were simple and flexible; 
therefore, they encouraged in-depth responses. Only a few questions were asked so as to 
give adequate time for responses.  There were two different interview guides, one for the 
Public Relations Officers of the oil companies (See appendix 2) and one for selected 
members of the communities (See appendix 3). For both the focus group discussions and 
in-depth interviews, a digital audio recorder was used for data gathering, hence, 
increasing the fidelity of the information gathered. The interview sessions were 
conducted by the researcher with the aid of interpreters where necessary. 
 
A 22 item questionnaire was designed by the researcher for the survey (See appendix 1). 
It contained demographic questions, which elicited basic information from the 
respondents, such as their ages, sex and other details about their communities. It also 
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contained questions on the relationship between the respondents’ communities and the oil 
companies, and questions related to their perception of the community relations strategies 
of the companies. Copies of the questionnaire were administered by the researcher and 
research assistants.  
 
3.7 MEASURABLE VARIABLES 
This section presents the major dependent variables that were measured in this study. The 
variables are presented below: 
1. Frequency of conflict occurrence in the Niger Delta involving Shell, Agip and 
Chevron: both quantitative and qualitative data were generated to measure this 
variable. Copies of the questionnaire retrieved were analyzed using simple 
percentage. The focus group discussion and interview data were analysed 
through the creation of themes and interpretation. 
2. Consequences of Niger Delta conflicts on host communities and oil companies: 
to measure this variable, interviews were conducted in the selected oil 
companies, while focus group discussions, interviews and survey were 
conducted among the host communities. 
3. Community relations strategies adopted by Shell, Agip and Chevron to 
avoid/resolve conflict: interview was used to find out the companies’ unique 
strategies while survey was used to investigate the communities’ point of view. 
4. Structural differences in the community relations strategies adopted by the 
selected oil companies: to measure this variable, interviews were conducted in 
the selected oil companies. 
5. Host communities’ perception of oil companies’ community relations strategies: 
to measure this variable, survey was adopted. Likert Scale was used for 
adequate measurement of perception. 
6. Host communities’ preference of oil companies’ strategies: interview was used to 
find out what the oil companies believed the communities preferred while 
survey, focus group discussion and interview were used to find out what the 
communities actually preferred. 
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3.8 DATA MANAGEMENT AND ANALYSIS 
The notes taken during the focus group discussion sessions were developed and data were 
transcribed. The data generated were carefully considered. The responses were 
categorized according to themes and similarities. Codes were generated for each category 
and a code book was kept for proper documentation. A log book was also created in 
which all the categorized responses from all the focus groups were entered according to 
topics of interest. The presentation of the results included the statement of the findings, 
diagrammatic representation of findings and the discussion of the various perspectives 
elicited in the study. For the in-depth interview, the tapes were also transcribed, thereby 
creating the written text of the interview. Information gathered were grouped based on 
themes, commonalities, and patterns. After this had been done, the results were presented 
and discussed. As for the data generated through the questionnaire, they were analyzed 
using percentages and presented using simple frequency and cross tabulation.    
 
3.9 RELIABILITY  
According to Sobowale (2008), a researcher must subject the instrument/questionnaire to 
a pretest before sending it to the field, to ensure that it is good enough. Hence, the 
research instrument for this study was pre-tested to ensure that it measured what it set out 
to measure and to quickly identify the difficulties the respondents might encounter in 
understanding the questions. The pre-test was conducted in Eruemukohwarien, one of the 
communities used for this study. After the responses were returned, they were evaluated 
and it was discovered that the questions were clear and the responses were consistent.  
 
To further ensure the standardization of the instrument, particularly for measuring 
perception, the Likert scale measurement responses were adapted for this study. This was 
based on the existing statistical proof that Likert scale is adequate for measuring the 
degree of responses particularly with respect to studies aimed at measuring perception 
(Wilmer & Dominic, 2003).  
 
Also, the reliability of the instrument was confirmed by calculating the internal 
consistency reliability using two methods; split half and Cronbach’s Alpha. The split half 
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yielded a coefficient of 0.692 while the Cronbach’s Alpha yielded a coefficient of 0.79. 
The research instrument was administered once on forty (40) respondents in 
Eruemukohwarien. 
 
3.10 VALIDITY 
 
Efforts were made to ensure the content validity of the questionnaire by dividing the 
variables into specific themes that the respondents could easily relate to. Multiple choices 
were provided and the option for the respondents to suggest their answers was also 
provided to ensure that the fullest possible data were generated.  
 
Expert scrutiny was also employed to ensure the validity of the instrument. An expert 
each from the fields of Mass Communication, Sociology and Psychology scrutinized the 
instrument and they agreed that it possessed content validity. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
In this chapter, the results derived from the investigation are presented. The first part of 
the results is based on the 595 copies of the questionnaire that were distributed, properly 
filled and retrieved from Eruemukohwarien, Tisun and Kolokolo communities in Delta 
State and Omoku and Obrikom communities in Rivers State. The second part of the 
results is based on the Focus Group Discussions (FGD) and the Key Informant Interviews 
(KII) that were conducted, while the third section of the chapter presents the discussion 
of both the quantitative and qualitative data. 
 
 
4.2 QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS 
 
This section contains data presentation and analyses of the finding from the survey 
conducted. Firstly, the socio-demographic profile of the respondents are provided, 
followed by data on  conflict occurrences in the communities, the oil companies involved 
and a general description of the relationship between both parties. The section ends with 
a measurement of host communities’ perceptions of different aspects of their 
relationships with oil companies. 
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TABLE 4.1 
COMMUNITY DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS 
 
COMMUNITY PERCENT 
Eruemukohwarien 
30.6 
Tisun 
3.7 
Kolokolo 
6.1 
Omoku 
47.6 
Obrikom 
12.0 
TOTAL                            100.0% 
                            n                                       595 
 
As already stated, this study was carried out in five Niger Delta communities. The 
community distribution of the respondents reveals that the largest percentage came from 
Omoku, followed by Eruemukohwarien, Obrikom, Kolokolo and Tisun (Table 4.1). The 
relatively low percentages from Tisun and Kolokolo communities were due to the 
Itsekiri-Ijaw crises that occurred in 2004, which compelled most of the indigenes to 
relocate to urban centres for security reasons.     
 
TABLE 4.2 
AGE AND GENDER DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS 
 
 
AGE GENDER 
 
MALE FEMALE 
20-35 63.5% 82.8% 
36-50 31.1 14.6 
51-65 5.1 1.9 
66+ 0.3 0.7 
Total  
n 
100.0% 
334 
100.0% 
261 
  77
Table 4.2 shows the distribution of both male and female respondents by age. It reveals 
that majority of the respondents from both gender fell within the age category of 20-35. It 
also shows us that there were more female respondents (82.8%) within this age category 
than there were males (63.5%). A closer look at the table also reveals that there is an 
inverse relationship between the age categories and the number of respondents within 
them. Hence, the higher the age ranges, the lesser the percentage of respondents. This 
observation is true for both the female and male categories, though again, more females 
(0.7%) than males (0.3%) fell into the final category of ages 66 and above.  
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4.3 
AGE DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY COMMUNITIES 
 
Age Name of Community 
Eruemukohwarien Tisun Kolokolo Omoku Obrikom 
20-35 52.7% 40.9% 72.2% 84.5% 80.6% 
36-50 40.1 40.9 27.8 13.4 16.7 
51-65 7.2 13.8 .0 1.8 2.4 
66+ .0 .4 .0 .3 .3 
Total 
n 
100.0% 
182 
100.0% 
22 
100.0% 
36 
100.0% 
283 
100.0% 
72 
 
 
Table 4.3 provides a follow up to Table 4.2 by showing the respondents’ age distribution 
according to their communities. As can be seen, majority of the respondents from each of 
the five communities fell within the 20-35 age range. Considering that the youths were 
the most active participants in the Niger Delta crises, particularly in terms of restiveness 
and militancy, it is not surprising that they had the highest representation in this study. 
This may be due to their activeness and readiness to express themselves, or their 
realization that they had more at stake than their aged leaders. 
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TABLE 4.4 
GENDER DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS ACCORDING TO THE COMMUNITIES 
 
Gender Communities 
Eruemukohwarien Tisun Kolokolo Omoku Obrikom 
Male 65.9% 63.6% 72.2% 47.7% 54.2% 
Female 34.1 36.4 27.8 52.3 45.8 
Total 
n 
100.0% 
182 
100.0% 
22 
100.0% 
36 
100.0% 
283 
100.0% 
72 
 
In the table above, it can be seen that more males participated in this study than their 
female counterparts, except in Omoku. A possible explanation for this may be found in 
the educational level of the communities, as presented in Table 4.5 below. Omoku 
appears to be the most educated of the five communities, followed by Obrikom. It is 
interesting to note that female participation in this study also followed the same 
progression. Hence, we can safely conclude that the more educated the communities 
were, the more willing the females were to express their views. 
 
 
TABLE 4.5 
EDUCATIONAL STATUS OF RESPONDENTS  
 
 
Education 
Communities 
Eruemukohwarien Tisun Kolokolo Omoku Obrikom 
SSCE or less 95.6% 95.5% 86.1% 42.0% 68.1% 
HND/Degree 3.4 4.5 13.9 51.6 29.1 
MSc/MA 0.5 0 0 5.7 1.4 
Ph.D 0.5 0 0 0.7 1.4 
Total 
n 
100.0% 
182 
100.0% 
22 
100.0% 
36 
100.0% 
283 
100.0% 
72 
 
 
Table 4.5 shows the educational distribution of the respondents according to their 
communities. A general look at the table reveals that though Obrikom had the highest 
percentage of Ph.D (1.4%), Omoku appears to be a more educated community than the 
others. This is because 58% of its respondents had HND/Degree and above, as against the 
31.9% of Obrikom, 13.9% of Kolokolo, 4.5% of Tisun and 4.4% of Eruemukohwarien. It 
is also ironic that while the second largest percentage of respondents came from 
Eruemukohwarien, majority of them had SSCE or less. It is even more ironic considering 
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that Eruemukohwarien is located on the mainland, between Ughelli and Warri in Delta 
State, with both cities being urban centres, while Tisun is located in the creeks with no 
single school in the community. 
 
 
TABLE 4.6 
OIL COMPANIES’ CHANNELS FOR RELATING WITH COMMUNITIES 
 
 
Channels for Relating with the 
Community 
Resident oil company 
Shell Agip Chevron 
Royal fathers only  3.1% 25% 7.7% 
      Elders only  32.0 2.1 6.2 
       Family heads only  4.1 3.0 3.1 
   Youths only  43.2 8.6 12.2 
 All levels above  8.8 58.6 70.8 
    No level at all  8.8 2.7 0 
Total 
N 
100.0% 
194 
100.0% 
336 
100.0% 
65 
 
 
The result in Table 4.6 shows that of the three oil companies, Agip related more with the 
communities through the royal fathers, Shell related more through the elders, family 
heads and youths and Chevron generally favoured a combination of the four channels. It 
can be observed that on a general level, none of the three companies was particularly 
disposed towards the use of family heads as a channel for relating with the communities. 
 
 
TABLE 4.7 
RESPONDENTS’ ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF CONFLICTS OCCURRENCES IN THEIR 
COMMUNITIES 
 
Any conflict in 
your 
community? 
 Name of Community 
Eruemukohwarien Tisun Kolokolo Omoku Obrikom 
Yes 95.6% 4.5% 66.7% 78.0% 90.3% 
No 4.4 95.5 33.3 21.6 9.7 
Total 
n 
100.0% 
182 
100.0% 
22 
100.0% 
36 
100.0% 
283 
100.0% 
72 
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Conflicts may occur when there is incompatibility between the goals, objectives or values 
of the oil companies and host communities in the Niger Delta. The result in Table 4.7 
shows that the highest percentage of conflict acknowledgement came from 
Eruemukohwarien, while the lowest was from Tisun. It is not surprising that 
Eruemukohwarien returned such a high percentage because a conflict occurred in the 
community about a year before this study was conducted. Members of the community 
demanded that their road network should be repaired by Shell but there was no response 
from the company. Hence, a demonstration was staged during which the operations of 
Shell in the community were shut down. A year after the incident, the cause of the 
conflict was yet to be addressed. Hence, the issue was of current relevance in the 
community. Tisun, on the other hand, claimed to be a peaceful community and this 
reflected in the respondents’ acknowledgement of conflicts. 
 
 
 
TABLE 4.8 
RESPONDENTS’ ASSESSMENT OF THE FREQUENCY OF CONFLICTS IN THEIR 
COMMUNITIES 
 
Frequency of 
conflict in 
communities Communities 
 Eruemukohwarien Kolokolo Omoku Obrikom 
Rarely  90.7% 100.0% 64.8% 46.5% 
Often  6.6 0 22.1 42.3 
Very often  2.7 0 13.1 11.2 
Total 
n 
 
 
100.0% 
182 
100.0% 
29 
100.0% 
267 
100.0% 
71 
       
 
A look at table 4.8 reveals that conflicts rarely occurred in the five communities. Tisun 
was not represented in the table because only one individual responded to the question 
and his view could not be taken to be the representation of the community. The lack of 
response in Tisun was expected, however, because majority of the respondents had earlier 
claimed ignorance of any conflict in their community.  
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The information on this table, as far as the other communities are concerned, 
nevertheless, contradicts that of Table 4.7. In explaining this contradiction, the 
respondents claimed that though they had experienced some conflicts in their 
communities, violence was rare. Hence, it appears that conflict in this context was 
interpreted to mean crisis. Considering that a crisis is a situation that degenerates into a 
critical stage in which extraordinary intervention is needed to remedy, it becomes 
understandable that majority of the respondents claimed its rarity. Therefore, while the 
communities were familiar with conflicts, they rarely experienced crises. 
 
 
TABLE 4.9 
RESPONDENTS’ ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF CONFLICTS IN THEIR COMMUNITIES AND 
THE OIL COMPANIES INVOLVED 
 
 
 
Conflict in the 
communities 
 
Resident oil company 
Shell Agip Chevron 
             Yes 93.8% 81.8% 44.6% 
               No 6.2 18.2 55.4 
Total 
n 
100.0% 
194 
100.0% 
336 
100.0% 
65 
 
 
Table 4.9 above presents the respondents’ views on the occurrence of conflicts in their 
communities and the oil companies involved. The finding reveals that more respondents 
identified Shell as being involved in more conflicts in their communities than the other 
two companies. Considering that Shell has the largest operations in the Niger Delta, the 
company is likely to be more involved in conflict situations than the others.  On the other 
hand, Chevron’s operations are mostly restricted to the Itsekiri communities, leading to 
the fewer acknowledgements of conflict involvements. This table agrees with the finding 
in Table 4.7, which further shows that the responses provided in Table 4.8 were referring 
to crisis rather than conflict. 
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TABLE 4.10 
OIL COMPANIES’ CHANNELS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
 
 
Channels of Conflict Resolution 
Resident oil company 
Shell Agip Chevron 
 Elders 5.7% 54.7% 13.2% 
 Youths 5.7 30.1 13.2 
 Government 51.5 7.5 60.5 
 Consultants 37.1 7.8 13.2 
Total 
N 
100.0% 
194 
100.0% 
322 
100.0% 
28 
                                                                                    
                                                                                        
 
The most preferred channel of conflict resolution by Agip was through community elders 
and youths while Chevron and Shell preferred external channels i.e. the government and 
consultants (Table 4.10). By identifying with its host community, Agip tended to avoid a 
tripartite approach in resolving conflict with its host communities. The approach may 
explain why the degree of conflict between Agip and its host communities was less than 
Shell’s but more than Chevron’s (Table 4.9) that favoured a relatively higher use of the 
channels (Table 4.10). 
 
 
TABLE 4.11 
RESPONDENTS’ PERCEPTION OF THEIR COMMUNITIES’ RELATIONSHIP WITH THE OIL 
COMPANIES 
 
 
Community’s Relationship with Oil 
Company 
Resident oil company 
Shell Agip Chevron 
 Cordial 6.2% 39.3% 15.4% 
  Neutral 5.7 39.0 9.2 
  Not cordial 88.1 21.7 75.4 
 Total 
N 
100.0% 
194 
100.0% 
336 
100.0% 
65 
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Table 4.11 above shows that more respondents believed that Agip enjoyed a cordial 
relationship with their communities than those who believed the same for Chevron and 
Shell. Agip equally returned a higher percentage among those who were neutral. This 
might mean that they did not have any serious complaint against the company; otherwise, 
they would have taken a stand. Nevertheless, a contradiction exists between the positive 
ratings of the company in this table and the percentage of respondents who acknowledged 
its involvement in the conflicts in their communities (see Table 4.9).  
 
The answer to this may lie in the channels Agip adopted for conflict resolution (see table 
4.10). Considering that the company was perceived as favouring internal community 
structures over external ones for resolving conflicts, it is understandable that Agip would 
enjoy a cordial relationship with the communities. Ordinarily, it is a paradox to describe 
the relationship Agip shared with its host communities as cordial while more than three-
quarter of the respondents also acknowledged its involvement in conflicts. Nevertheless, 
a cordial relationship is not necessarily one that is void of conflicts, but one in which 
avenues are made for proper mitigation. A look at Tables 4.12 and 4.17 shows that Agip 
communicated more frequently with its host communities and the communities were 
more satisfied with its conflict resolution efforts. Hence, in spite of Agip’s involvement 
in conflicts, its efforts to mitigate them helped to maintain its cordial relationship with the 
host communities.   
 
Shell, on the other hand, had a larger percentage of respondents who said it did not enjoy 
a cordial relationship with their communities. This result is consistent with the finding in 
Table 4.9. Also, Shell’s perceived preference for external assistance during conflict 
resolution might have influenced the respondents’ opinion about their communities’ 
relationship with the company.  
 
Chevron also returned a predominantly negative perception of its relationship with the 
communities. This result contradicts the finding in Table 4.9. While the table presents 
Chevron as having the least claim of conflict involvement, the current table shows that 
more than three-quarters of the respondents believed that it did not enjoy a cordial 
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relationship with their communities. This, again, may be associated with the company’s 
adopted channels for conflict resolution.  
 
 It appears, therefore, that Agip had a more cordial relationship with the communities 
than Shell and Chevron, while Shell had the least cordial relationship of the three. In 
general, the communities perceived their relationships with Shell and Chevron far less 
cordial. 
 
 
TABLE 4.12 
RESPONDENTS’ PERCEPTION OF THE FREQUENCY OF OIL COMPANIES’ 
COMMUNICATION WITH COMMUNITIES 
 
                                                                        
 
The role of communication in building a mutual relationship between oil companies and 
host communities cannot be overemphasized. Communication can be simply described as 
the exchange of relevant information between the parties involved. Table 4.12 reveals 
that of the three oil companies under study, more respondents believed that Chevron 
never communicated with their communities. Considering the importance of 
communication in any relationship, particularly one that is channelled towards conflict 
resolution, it is not surprising that majority of the respondents claimed that Chevron did 
not enjoy a cordial relationship with their communities. Idemudia (2007, p. 380) observes 
that a poor communication flow between host communities and oil companies “Creates 
huge latitude for misinterpretation and misinformation.” This, therefore, explains the 
frequent conflicts between the Niger Delta youths and the oil companies. 
 
 
Frequency of Company-Community 
Communication 
Resident oil company 
Shell Agip Chevron 
 Never 2.6% 4.2% 73.8% 
  Once in a while 89.7 55.7 18.5 
  Often 7.7 40.2 7.7 
Total 
N 
100.0% 
194 
100.0% 
336 
100.0% 
65 
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Shell returned the highest percentage among the respondents who claimed it 
communicated once in a while with their communities. Shell’s inability to commit to 
frequent communication with the communities was probably one of the factors 
responsible for the frequent attacks on the company.  This result may be one of the 
factors responsible for the company’s level of involvement in conflicts with host 
communities (Table 4.9) and the lack of cordial relationship with them (Table 4.11). 
 
Also, a higher percentage of the respondents believed that Agip communicated often with 
their communities. This result is consistent with the findings so far in this study.  No 
doubt that the company’ communication with its host communities contributed to its 
rating as the most cordial of the three oil companies under study (see Table 4.11).  
 
Going by the result in this table, majority of the respondents believed that Chevron never 
communicated with their community, Shell communicated once in a while and Agip 
communicated often. Hence, it can be said that as far as the respondents were concerned, 
Chevron had the worst communication record of the three, Agip had the best, while Shell 
was average.    
 
 
TABLE 4.13 
RESPONDENTS’ PERCEPTION OF OIL COMPANIES’ CONTRIBUTIONS TO COMMUNITY 
DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
Company's Contribution to 
Community Development 
Resident oil company 
Shell Agip Chevron 
 Yes 6.2% 51.2% 9.2% 
  Sometimes 78.4 41.4 43.1 
  No 15.5 7.4 47.7 
Total 
N 
100.0% 
194 
100.0% 
336 
100.0% 
65 
                                                                                     
                                                                                         
In assessing strategies for peaceful coexistence with host communities and oil 
companies’ corporate social responsibilities, respondents were asked about their 
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perceptions regarding the companies’ development efforts in their communities. By 
development we mean the establishment of schools, building of clinics/hospitals, 
provision of boreholes and other similar social amenities.  The finding presented in Table 
4.13 indicates that Agip was perceived to have contributed more to community 
development than Shell and Chevron. While this result corresponds with the finding 
presented in Table 4.12, which shows that Agip enjoyed a cordial relationship with the 
communities, it contradicts that of Table 4.9, in which more than three-quarters of the 
respondents claimed that the company was involved in the conflicts in their communities. 
This contradiction may be explained by the communities’ claims that though Agip 
contributed to development, they sometimes had to protest and demonstrate for such 
contributions to be made. 
 
Shell, on the other hand, returned its highest percentage among the respondents who 
claimed it contributed once in a while to community development. Respondents’ 
perception, so far, has shown that Shell did not engage the communities enough as to win 
their goodwill. Also, of the three oil companies, the highest percentage of respondents 
believed that Chevron did not contribute to community development at all. A study 
conducted by Idemudia (2007) reveals that all the Niger Delta villages surveyed expected 
development benefits from the oil companies, as part of their entitlements as host 
communities. Failure to deliver such benefits automatically engendered hostility from the 
communities. The finding in Table 4.13, therefore, explains one of the sources of hostility 
towards oil companies in the Niger Delta.  
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TABLE 4.14 
RESPONDENTS’ PERCEPTION OF OIL COMPANIES’ CONSULTATION WITH THE 
COMMUNITIES BEFORE EMBARKING ON DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS 
 
 
Consultation with Community before 
executing Development Projects 
Resident oil company 
Shell Agip Chevron 
Never  8.2% 9.8% 78.5% 
Once in a while  84.5 47.0 16.9 
Often  2.1 31.3 1.5 
Very often  5.2 11.9 3.1 
Total 
n 
100.0% 
194 
100.0% 
336 
100.0% 
65 
                                                                                                      
One of the major ways by which host communities can be allowed to participate in 
deciding their own development is to be consulted by oil companies. Consultation in this 
context implies a meeting between two or more parties to consider a particular question, 
which in this case is the question of development. Table 4.14 presents respondents’ 
answers to the question on the oil companies’ consultations with the communities before 
embarking on development projects. Of the three oil companies, Chevron returned the 
highest percentage, 78.5%, among the respondents who claimed it never consulted with 
its host communities. Shell consulted the communities once in a while, as claimed by 
84.5%, while more than four out of ten respondents said Agip both consulted often 
(31.3%) and very often (11.9%). 
 
This table reveals that majority of the respondents were of the opinion that Chevron never 
consulted with their communities before embarking on development projects, Shell 
consulted once in a while, and Agip consulted both often and very often.  Although it can 
be observed that Agip had its highest percentage (47%) in the “once in a while” category, 
this does not negate the fact that it performed much better than its counterparts in the 
“often” and “very often” category, which means it had better and more open community 
involvement.  
 
Though the responses in Table 4.14 may be viewed as limited considering that the social 
status of the respondents will significantly influence their privilege to witness or even 
participate in negotiations between oil companies and host communities, it may still be 
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argued that awareness cannot be ruled out. The communities possess structures which 
give responsibilities to representatives and mandate them to report to the people they 
represent during town hall sessions.  
 
 
TABLE 4.15 
RESPONDENTS’ PERCEPTION OF THE OIL COMPANIES’ POSITIVE INFLUENCE ON 
THEIR COMMUNITIES 
 
 
Company Positively Influences 
the Community 
Resident oil company 
Shell Agip Chevron 
Strongly Disagree  63.9% 10.7% 49.2% 
Disagree  9.3 13.4 9.2 
Undecided  14.4 8.0 12.3 
Agree  4.1 32.7 16.9 
Strongly Agree  8.2 35.1 12.3 
Total 
N 
100.0% 
194 
100.0% 
336 
100.0% 
65 
                                                                                         
 
From Table 4.15, Agip was perceived to have the greatest influence on its host 
communities. This means that the company had the ability to favourably affect the 
communities using its presence to the benefit of its hosts. This is interesting and a serious 
indictment on Shell, the oldest and the biggest of the three. It is little wonder that the 
company has suffered more from the militants than the others. On the other hand, we see 
that Shell was perceived as having the least influence on the communities. Though 
Chevron was in-between Shell and Agip in assessment, a look at the table shows that of 
the total number of respondents who shared their views on the company, 58.4% (a 
combination of strongly disagree and disagree) were negative about its influence on their 
communities. 
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TABLE 4.16 
RESPONDENTS’ PERCEPTION OF THE OIL COMPANIES’ EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION 
WITH THEIR COMMUNITIES 
 
 
Company Communicates with 
Community Effectively 
Resident oil company 
Shell Agip Chevron 
Strongly Disagree  8.8% 8.6% 29.2% 
Disagree  35.1 21.7 38.5 
Undecided  42.8 12.2 9.2 
Agree  3.6 30.4 16.9 
Strongly Agree  9.8 27.1 6.2 
Total 
N 
100.0% 
194 
100.0% 
336 
100.0% 
65 
                                                                                                   
                                                                                                   
 
According to Table 4.16, Agip again remains the most open oil company with a majority 
of 57.5% saying that it either agreed or strongly agreed that the company had better and 
effective communication with the host communities. A look at previous tables shows that 
Agip has maintained far better relations than others. Chevron and Shell follow in that 
order. 
 
 
TABLE 4.17 
RESPONDENTS’ SATISFACTION WITH OIL COMPANIES’ CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
STRATEGIES 
 
 
Satisfaction with Company's 
Conflict Resolution 
Resident oil company 
Shell Agip Chevron 
Highly Dissatisfied  53.1% 18.2% 46.2% 
Dissatisfied  20.1 18.5 40.0 
Undecided  16.5 18.8 7.7 
Satisfied  4.6 25.9 1.5 
Highly Satisfied  5.7 18.8 4.6 
Total 
N 
100.0% 
194 
100.0% 
336 
100.0% 
65 
                                                                             
                                                                                         
Table 4.17 reveals that respondents were most satisfied with Agip in terms of conflict 
resolution. Again, this result is consistent with the previous findings in this study. It is 
  90
also not surprising, considering that communication is one of the major preconditions for 
successful conflict resolution and the company was perceived to have had a better and 
more effective communication than the others (see Table 4.16).  
 
On the other hand, Chevron was considered by the respondents to have exhibited the least 
satisfactory conflict resolution of the three oil companies. A combination of the “strongly 
disagree” and “disagree” response categories shows us clearly that Chevron returned 
86.2% dissatisfaction rate among the respondents. Chevron was closely followed by Shell 
with 73.2%.  This finding crystallizes another aspect of the issues the Niger Delta 
communities had against the oil companies, which was poor response to conflicts. It also, 
to some extent, explains the enduring conflicts in the region; the conflicts were either not 
resolved to the satisfaction of the communities, or were not resolved at all, thereby 
leading to the degeneration of the problems.   
. 
 
TABLE 4.18 
RESPONDENTS’ PERCEPTION OF OIL COMPANIES’ READINESS TO NEGOTIATE 
DURING CONFLICTS 
 
 
The company is ready to 
negotiate during cconflicts 
Resident oil company 
Shell Agip Chevron 
Strongly Disagree  23.2% 9.5% 44.6% 
Disagree  8.8 14.9 20.0 
Undecided  20.1 14.9 10.8 
Agree  7.2 36.3 20.0 
Strongly Agree  40.7 24.4 4.6 
Total 
N 
100.0% 
194 
100.0% 
336 
100.0% 
65 
                                                                  
                                                                                        
A look at Table 4.18 indicates that Agip and Shell were perceived by respondents to be 
more willing to negotiate with their host communities to resolve their conflicts. This 
should not be surprising because the two companies have different reasons to negotiate. 
Agip, as we have seen in previous analyses, has been the most open and communicative 
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of the three oil companies under study. It, therefore, would like to discuss its 
disagreements more readily than others. 
 
Shell, on the other hand, has had more conflicts than other companies, probably because 
it has the largest operations in the Niger Delta. This means that whether it likes it or not, 
it must negotiate its numerous conflicts, the medium notwithstanding. It is, however, 
ironic that in spite of the company’s perceived readiness to negotiate, almost three-
quarters of the respondents were not satisfied with its conflict resolution (see Table 4.17). 
 
Just about a quarter of the respondents said Chevron was ready to negotiate its conflicts 
with the communities. This is likely to be related to the relative size of the conflicts the 
company has had to face and perhaps, the size of the sample expressing views on this 
matter.  
 
 
 
TABLE 4.19 
RESPONDENTS’ PERCEPTION OF THE REDUCTION OF CRISES FREQUENCY THROUGH 
OIL COMPANIES’ COMMUNICATION 
 
 
Company’s Communication 
reduces crises frequency 
Resident oil company 
Shell Agip Chevron 
Strongly Disagree  20.6% 11.3% 43.1% 
Disagree  14.9 21.1 46.2 
Undecided  21.6 17.9 0 
Agree  37.6 30.1 4.6 
Strongly Agree  5.2 19.6 6.1 
Total 
N 
100.0% 
194 
100.0% 
336 
100.0% 
65 
                                                                  
                                                                                         
In Table 4.19, Agip’s communication was perceived by respondents to have reduced 
crises frequency in the communities. This finding suggests that effective community 
relations can actually reduce crises frequency in the Niger Delta. Agip was followed by 
Shell, with 42.8% of the respondents either agreeing or strongly agreeing that its 
communication reduced crises frequency in their communities. It is interesting to note 
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that though majority of the respondents had earlier said that Shell was less effective in its 
communication and they were less than satisfied with its conflict resolution, the 
company’s communication was still perceived as having reduced crises frequency. The 
answer to this may lie in Shell’s readiness to negotiate, as shown in Table 4.18 above. 
Over three-quarters of the respondents said that Chevron’s communication did not reduce 
crises frequency in their communities. This result is consistent with previous findings in 
this study. It also suggests that Chevron’s relatively fewer conflicts (see Table 4.9) were 
not as a result of its communication with the communities. 
 
 
TABLE 4.20 
RESPONDENTS’ PERCEPTION OF THE OIL COMPANIES’ FULFILMENT OF PROMISES 
 
 
Company fulfils promises 
Resident oil company 
Shell Agip Chevron 
Strongly Disagree  51.0% 11.9% 53.8% 
Disagree  13.4 18.2 29.2 
Undecided  14.9 15.8 3.1 
Agree  6.7 29.2 6.2 
Strongly Agree  13.9 25.0 7.7 
Total 
n 
100.0% 
194 
100.0% 
336 
100.0% 
65 
                                                     
                                                                                 
Table 4.20 reveals that Agip has maintained its lead among the other companies. It was 
perceived as having fulfiled its promises by a majority of 54.2%. This result reveals, 
perhaps, the most valuable factor responsible for Agip’s perceived cordial relationship 
with the communities. The company’s readiness to negotiate would have been a waste if 
it did not fulfil its promises. Chevron was, however, perceived as the least trustworthy, 
followed by Shell. Considering this finding, therefore, it is not surprising that both 
companies were perceived by more than three-quarters of the respondents as not enjoying 
cordial relationship with the communities (see Table 4.11). 
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4.3 QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS  
As it has been earlier stated in this chapter, this study comprises the quantitative and 
qualitative aspects. Having presented the quantitative data above, the qualitative data are 
reported in this section. The qualitative data was generated from eight focus group 
discussion sessions and thirteen key informant interview sessions. It is important to note, 
at this point, that Agip, one of the companies under study, declined any interview, 
thereby reducing the comparison we can make among the oil companies. Nevertheless, a 
comprehensive analysis of the data generated was carried out. Themes were created to aid 
clarity and easy presentation. 
 
4.3.1 The Community Relations Structures of the Oil Companies  
Fig. 4.1 
AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE OIL COMPANIES’ STRUCTURES FOR 
COMMUNITY RELATIONS 
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Figure 4.1 illustrates the structures of Shell and Chevron for relating with host 
communities. Shell’s major structure is the Government and Community Relations 
Department (GCRD). According to the company’s representative, the department has the 
dual function of maintaining good relationship with the government on one hand and the 
communities on the other. Maintaining a favourable relationship with the government is 
crucial for the creation of enabling environment for business.  
 
Also, on the other hand, since the communities inhabit the physical environment in which 
the business is executed, the company must also seek their goodwill. Considering the 
audience involvement strategy (GMOU) that has been adopted by Shell, which will be 
discussed in greater detail later in this work, the GCRD’s responsibility does not include 
identifying the needs of the communities. The communities identify their own needs and 
present them to the GCRD through their representatives, while the Department makes 
arrangement for the funding.   
 
The GCRD is further broken into three units for effective operation. The first unit is the 
Eastern area of operation, which includes Rivers State, Akwa Ibom and Cross Rivers. 
The second is the Central, and it focuses on Bayelsa State. The third is the Western area 
of operation, which covers Delta State and Edo State. The primary responsibility of these 
units is to relate with every party that is connected with any of Shell’s current or potential 
projects. First, the company identifies such parties; it then develops and maintains a 
relationship with them. For instance, when Shell wants to explore oil in a community, 
after making necessary arrangements with the government, it approaches the leadership 
of the community to seek their consent and support. After this has been done, it tries to 
develop and maintain a good relationship with the community by opening a line of 
communication and attending to the complaints of the people while the project lasts.  
 
Shell also makes use of external structures in relating with the communities. External 
structure, in this context, refers to independent individuals, organizations or bodies that 
offer professional or humanitarian assistance to the company in the process of building a 
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cordial and practicable relationship with the communities. Shell’s external structures 
include consultants and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  
 
The consultants are used both to relate with the communities and to enlighten them on 
whatever Shell is trying to achieve. For instance, if Shell wants to embark on a project in 
a particular community, it engages the services of consultants to penetrate the community 
and to enlighten members of the community on the inherent benefits of the project. 
According to Shell’s representative, “Those consultants would have to be professional, 
development consultants who understand the dynamics of development and also what the 
community’s perception might be.” 
 
 NGOs are engaged to help guide the communities with respect to the execution of the 
agreements in the global memorandum of understanding, which shall be examined in 
greater details later in this report. Both the consultants and the NGOs are evaluated based 
on the objectives of their engagements, which may vary, depending on circumstances 
surrounding such engagements, while GCRD serves as a coordinating office. Shell’s 
representative was of the opinion that they have been effective in their operations so far. 
 
Fig 4.1 also presents Chevron’s structure for relating with the communities. Chevron has 
a Corporate Office which is responsible for the packaging and representation of the 
organization, among other responsibilities. Packaging in this context, more or less, refers 
to branding; the entirety of the organization’s identity and reputation among its publics. 
Located in the Corporate Office is the Community Engagement Unit, which is directly 
responsible for liaising with the communities. Chevron’s representative explained, “What 
we try to do is that each of our braches in a community has in-house somebody who 
serves as a contact, like a public affairs contact.” The contacts are known as Community 
Engagement Representatives (CER).  
 
As in the case of Shell, Chevron also makes use of external structure in relating with the 
communities. Chevron makes use of NGOs but not consultants. According to Chevron’s 
representative, the company works with NGOs to build capacity in the communities. The 
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NGOs also work with the communities to draw up development plans that will be 
presented to the company for assistance. He further explained: 
 
 We make use of quite a lot of NGOs to create a type of 
relationship with the communities that is professional 
when we want to do peace assessment, total relationship 
assessment. When you want to change the way they think 
about some things, we use NGOs. 
 
When we compare the structures of Shell and Chevron, we will observe that Shell has a 
more centralized structure than Chevron. Shell has three regional units attending to the 
entire Niger Delta area. This style of operation can aid easy administration since there are 
not too many units to focus on. Chevron, on the other hand, has a structure that is 
represented in each of the company’s branches in the communities. This brings the 
company closer to the people and can help to establish company presence.  
 
Fig 4.2 
AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE UNIQUE COMMUNITY RELATIONS 
STRATEGIES OF SHELL AND CHEVRON 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The community relations strategies that are unique to each of the oil companies are 
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it practices its corporate social responsibility (CSR). The company’s representative 
explained that while the host communities are undeniably part of Chevron’s most 
important communities, one should not lose sight of the fact that Chevron is partly owned 
by NNPC and even the Nigerian government, thereby making the entire nation its 
community. Consequently, Chevron makes constant effort to keep in touch with all its 
communities. According to the company’s representative: 
 
 We have this volunteer programme; we encourage our employees 
to go and contribute to the society and we support them. For 
example, we have someone who was sent to Nasarawa University 
to go and lecture twice in a semester. 
 
According to him, some other employees teach in University of Lagos (Unilag) and 
University of Ibadan (UI). He went further to say that: 
 
We know people who will contribute money, even as employees, if 
you raise 1 million naira, Chevron will give you another 1 million 
naira to go and do all these services to the community. I can tell 
you how many computers have been given to students of UI, and so 
many other things. Just to let you know that we also go beyond 
dealing with communities now. We have built several hospitals 
among other things we are doing (in the host communities).  
 
 
Another community relations strategy that Chevron utilizes is the Global Memorandum 
of Understanding (GMoU). This strategy was adopted in 2005. Chevron’s representative 
explained that though the GMoU was originated by Chevron, it has been adopted by 
other oil companies. Hence, one may not be able to classify it as being unique to the 
company anymore. According to him, the company has redefined its community 
engagement strategies in such a way that it does not have to deal directly in developing 
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the communities anymore; rather, the communities are now responsible for their own 
development. He explained: 
 
The GMoU works to provide the communities in such a way that 
the ideas are original to them. We then authorize this body to then 
work with the stakeholders- the communities and NGOs- to draw 
up their own development plan. So, they draw up their own 
development plan, and then implement their projects. They are the 
ones that will design the project, they are the ones that will get 
contractors, and they are the ones that will supervise it. If they 
need a school, they are the ones that know where they need the 
school and what kind of school they need 
 
 
Fig. 4.2 shows that Shell also makes use of GMoU as a strategy for community relations. 
Shell adopted the strategy in 2006, but it became fully functional in 2007. While 
explaining the reason for adopting the strategy, Shell’s representative said that initially, 
the company signed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with each community for 
activities it wanted to undertake.  
 
For example, if we want to move a rig from Community A to 
Community B, we go and sign MoU saying what we will do or not 
do, and the community signs. By the time you want to remove the 
rig to another place, you sign another thing with another. So, in a 
typical operation, you may have several MoUs you have signed for 
that same community. That meant that in most cases, sometimes, 
the resources to follow them up or to implement whatever has been 
agreed, or to even remember that we had signed… to manage it 
properly became a challenge more or less. 
 
In operating the GMoU, Shell categorizes the communities into groups taking into 
consideration their local government areas and their ethnic affinities. Members of each 
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group meet together to decide their own development, thereby taking the lead in the 
developmental process, rather than the company. The company’s representative further 
explained that “GMoU means that out of a thousand-five hundred communities we have 
been dealing with before, and signing all those MoUs in different forms, we are saying, 
we are grouping them into 67.” The 67 groups of communities are referred to as clusters, 
and each cluster has a Cluster Development Board (CDB). The CDB serves as the overall 
governing body that determines what the basic needs of the communities are. 
 
Shell provides each cluster with the financial support by giving it money for a fixed 
period of five years. Within those five years, it is expected that the money would be used 
by the cluster as they determine their own development. The fund is renewable after five 
years. Shell’s representative also stated, “They (the clusters) are also free to go to any 
other organization and look for money, because by the virtue of their underdevelopment, 
they have to do a lot more for themselves.”  
 
Shell’s representative again identified other strategies he considered unique to the 
company and the company’s business ethics was one of them. According to him, “If you 
claim you are a good neighbour, the things that you do will show that you are mindful of 
your neighbours.” Being mindful, according to him, means doing things that are 
beneficial to the communities and minimizing any negative impact. For instance, the 
company should be able to apologise if the communities are offended. 
 
Shell also considers making information available to the communities as one of its 
community relations strategies. According to the company’s representative, “We are 
always relating with the communities. Because they have to know what is going to 
happen and how it affects them, and gives them the opportunity to express themselves.” 
He went further to say: 
 
If they feel that you have been consulting them very well, or putting 
them in the know of what’s been going on, you are not hiding 
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anything from them, or you are honest and transparent as it should 
be or can be, then the level of trust will be very high. 
 
  Another unique community relations strategies of Shell is its business principles. The 
company claims to have what it refers to as the Statement of General Business Principles, 
which serves as the company’s guideline for all its activities. The company’s 
representative claimed that “Even if you do find it elsewhere, it will not be the same way 
we express it here, so, that may be the uniqueness. Those principles are our guiding 
principles, the frame work within which we relate” 
  
Shell’s representative concluded on the issue of uniqueness of strategy by saying that 
Shell may use the same tactics that everybody has heard about, but the uniqueness is in 
how it is actually used to achieve desired results in a particular situation. Hence, 
uniqueness does not necessarily mean that the strategy does not exist elsewhere. He went 
on to say: 
 
For example, every organization might have heard of what we call 
a town hall session or workshops or seminars, and they have it, but 
the thing is, what is the content of it; what is it you are trying to 
achieve? If you say, “I want to have a town hall session as a 
stakeholders engagement strategy or community relations,” what 
will you be discussing? How are you going to start the discussion? 
Who are you going to invite? Those are the elements that create 
that uniqueness that I am talking about 
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4.3.2 The Internal Structures of the Communities 
 
Fig 4.3 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE OF TISUN AND KOLOKOLO 
COMMUNITIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tisun and Kolokolo communities share a similar structure in terms of the leadership of 
the communities. The Council of Elders is the apex unit which oversees all the activities 
in the communities. The elders also settle disputes at every level in the communities. The 
Council is headed by a Chief and as at the time this study was conducted, the chiefs of 
both communities were residing in Warri, a major city in Delta State. This is because the 
communities are in the creeks and are grossly underdeveloped. The implication of this is 
that the chiefs may not be able to adequately represent their people since they are not 
subjected to the same living conditions.   
 
The next level of leadership is the Trustee or Trust, as the communities preferred to call 
it. The Trust acts as the executive decision making body of the two communities. It 
represents the elders in negotiations with the oil companies and also serves as the 
communities’ link with the larger society. The Trust has its own set of executives for easy 
administration and this includes the chairman, secretary and treasurer among others.  
 
After negotiating with the oil companies for a job, for instance, the Trust takes the 
allocations to the youth executives for further distribution. According to a member of the 
COUNCIL OF ELDERS 
TRUSTEES WOMEN 
NATIONAL YOUTH 
  102 
youth executive in Kolokolo, “Then we will now sit down and brainstorm and share the 
work. Then if the job is ten allocations, we will always get some amount that will come to 
the youth. Then we will fix people up.” Some active elders of the communities also get 
some allocations when such is available.  
 
Hence, if the government or the oil companies want to execute a project in the 
community, the Trust represents the communities in the discussion with them. Members 
of the Trust too do not reside in the communities; a youth in Tisun community said, 
“They are members of this community, born and brought up here then, but as their post 
was beginning to enlarge, they relocated to the township.” 
 
The National Youth is the next level after the Trust. The major responsibility of the 
youths is to work to maintain the community. The youth executives focus mainly on 
sharing job allocations. The youths report to the Trust while the Trust in turn reports to 
the elders. The Trust mediates disputes among the youths and the elders do the same for 
the Trustees.  
 
The women in Tisun and Kolokolo are not officially in the administrative hierarchy; 
nevertheless, they are a force to reckon with. They have access to every level of 
leadership in the community and they play an advisory role. Culturally, the women in 
Tisun and Kolokolo are not seen but they are heard. Though they seem politically 
passive, they are actually major pressure groups in their communities. An elder in Tisun 
community said the following about the role of the women in the community: 
 
They are helping us the men; there are some issues that we feel 
we cannot go into, we can tell the women to represent us. 
Because, if there is a fight between two communities now, and we 
see that if we men go there, it will cause problem, we send some 
women there, and there will be no problem. 
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Fig 4.4 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE OF OMOKU AND OBRIKOM 
COMMUNITIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Omoku and Obrikom, as in the case of Tisun and Kolokolo, have similar administrative 
structures. The Council of Elders (COE) is the ceremonial head of the communities 
because it is the traditional institution that oversees the traditions and culture of the 
communities. This Council is also called the “Amaala”. Though the Council of Elders is 
seen as the first, in the actual sense, the Council of Chiefs (COC) is the highest policy 
making body of the community. This information is presented in the figure above using 
dotted lines to indicate the functional position of the COC. Whenever a project is to be 
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executed in the community and the company gets a contractor to undertake the project, 
such a contractor must first inform the Council of Chiefs before commencing the project. 
 
Next on the hierarchy is the Community Development Committee (CDC). This is a 
government approved institution that sees to the development of the community. The 
CDC negotiates with the oil companies on behalf of the community, while reporting to 
the Council of Chiefs. The committee comprises selected members of the community. 
 
The Women Association is the next in line. Unlike in the case in Tisun and Kolokolo, 
women are actually given a place on the administrative hierarchy in Omoku and 
Obrikom. This may be because the latter communities are larger and the women are more 
enlightened. Another reason that may be responsible for the official recognition of 
women in these communities is their organized nature, since the women have an 
association. Nevertheless, the women in Omoku and Obrikom perform, more or less, the 
same function as the ones in Tisun and Kolokolo, which is to advise their men.  
 
The youths are seen as the vanguard of the communities; they work and report to the 
Council of Chiefs. When the communities have needs and there is no favourable response 
from the oil companies, the CDC usually allows the youths to represent the communities 
after receiving the necessary clearance from the Council of Chiefs. In some occasions, 
however, the Council of Chiefs, the CDC and the youths represent the community 
together, with each of them sending their delegates.  
 
All the units in the communities report directly to the Council of Chiefs. According to 
one of the chiefs in Obrikom, “Every other ruling arm revolves around the Council of 
Chiefs; be it CDC, Women Association, Council of Elders, or the youths. The Council of 
Chiefs is the highest policy making body.” This structure is unlike that of Tisun and 
Kolokolo communities in which one level of the hierarch reports to the one directly 
above it. Hence, we can say that while the former communities practice the vertical form 
of administration, the latter communities practice the central form. The functional 
structure of Omoku and Obrikom is illustrated in Fig. 4.5 below. 
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Fig 4.5 
THE FUNCTIONAL STRUCTURE OF OMOKU AND OBRIKOM 
COMMUNITIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 4.6 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE OF ERUEMUKOHWARIEN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 4.6 shows us the structure Eruemukohwarien community operates. From the figure, 
we see that the first administrative organ in the community is the Council of Elders. This 
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council serves as the traditional head of the community. It is, however, not directly 
involved in policy making; rather, it plays an advisory role.  
 
Next to the Council of Elders is the Central Governing Council (CGC). The CGC is the 
highest policy making body in the community and consists of a president and his cabinet. 
In the past, the members of the CGC were elected into office, but in recent times, 
selection has been favoured over election. One of the youths who participated in the 
focus group discussion explained, “We used to elect people before, but we realized that 
with election, people go by violence, threats, etc, so we decided to go by selection from 
each of the street that makes up this community.” This has, however, not reduced the 
violence. One of the visits to the community, during this research, coincided with the 
selection day, and the scene witnessed was that of commotion. It was gathered that some 
youths were not satisfied with the selection, hence, the village was in a state of confusion.  
Nevertheless, one of the most important functions of the CGC is to represent the 
community in negotiations with oil companies and the government. 
 
The youth executives coordinate the activities of the youths in the community. The 
youths usually maintain and clean the community. They also organise protests whenever 
they are dissatisfied with the activities of the oil companies. The next administrative body 
is the Employment Committee. This committee identifies employment opportunities and 
engage individuals who can fill up the space.  
 
The women in Eruemukohwarien are not officially on the administrative hierarchy, as in 
Tisun and Kolokolo, but they have access to every level of leadership in the community 
and they play an advisory role. They help to stabilize the community, particularly in 
times of conflict. Also, in the event of a conflict, if it gets out of hands and the men will 
be endangered if they maintain active participation, women are sent. According to an 
elderly woman, during the focus group discussion, “When the company is not doing 
well… the whole community women will now gather, they will now dance from here to 
the Shell yard.” Another woman explained it further saying:  
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If there is going to be a protest, because of Shell with their 
forcefulness (military engagement), the community will 
allow the women to do the protest. Because when they see 
that the youth are there, the forces will become violent, so 
instead of the youth to go there, the women go for the 
protest. 
 
The women in Eruemukohwarien community also make use of symbolic communication 
in passing across their messages to members of the community. They have a special drum 
they only beat when there is a serious issue they wish to voice out.  Whenever they sense 
an impending danger, they beat the drum to converge and holding leaves, they dance 
around the community. According to one of the youths: 
 
 They (the women) have a different drum. If the women’s 
drum sounds, you know that there is something going 
wrong, because they don’t beat the drum anyhow. They call 
the general meeting, they advice the youths and the elders 
and whosoever for peace- they want peace, they don’t want 
their children to be scared away from the place- they call 
their children to order for peace 
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4.3.2.1 Leadership problems in the communities 
 
Fig. 4.7 
AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE CAUSES OF LEADERSHIP PROBLEMS IN THE 
COMMUNITIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Some of the participants in the focus group discussion (FGD) and key informant 
interview (KII) sessions identified the existence of leadership problems in their 
communities. As can be seen in Fig. 4.7, several factors were identified as the causes of 
their problems. One of the factors that the participants believed were responsible for 
leadership challenges in their communities was the failure of their leaders to empower the 
communities. A young woman from Kolokolo, during an FGD session, claimed that 
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To me, without the chief in this community, I will make it, 
because if I can stand, and I can successfully complete my 
schooling next year, I will become a petroleum engineer. I know 
my rights, chief will not help me, and with my application letter, I 
will not come and meet chief because he will not help me. But I 
want to go to different places to spread my light; so, that is why I 
am saying that even if chief does not want to help me, how about 
those people that are here, that have really suffered a lot?  
 
A further discussion revealed that in Kolokolo, the women endured rigors to feed their 
families. While their husbands were predominantly fishermen, the women made their 
living from picking Periwinkles; small edible marine snails. They would wade through 
waist deep mud for long hours before they gather a few. One of the women had four 
children to cater for, and according to her, “Periwinkle is 600 naira, garri (Cassava 
flour) is 350 some people sell 400. If you use that 600 naira to buy garri, there is nothing 
remaining. ” The women expressed their desire to engage in businesses, but claimed that 
they had not been assisted by their chief. 
 
Another factor that was identified as a cause of leadership problem was non-residential 
leaders. This was particularly the case in Tisun and Kolokolo because the communities 
were in the creeks. The oldest man residing in Tisun (several indigenes had relocated to 
bigger cities) said, “Even our leader…he is from this area, yet, he doesn’t know this 
place.”  One of the youths in Tisun said, “Most of our people that govern stay up land 
there and don’t know what we feel here, they don’t feel it. They stay upland there, they 
stay in light.” Even members of the Trust, who negotiated on behalf of the communities, 
did not reside in the communities. This, therefore, raises the question as to how a leader 
can effectively represent his people when he does not live among them. A respondent 
said, “The one that used to pain me most is this, the people that are not staying here, 
those are the people that used to enjoy the goods of this place.” 
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Some participants also claimed that the leaders in their communities oppressed the 
youths. They were of the opinion that common fund was spent indiscriminately, thereby 
endangering the future of the youths. They said there was no plan put in place to invest in 
the youths. One of the young girls in Eruemukohwarien said, “But most of the things we 
are seeing in this community are not really helping us. Most of the elders,  most of the 
time, they oppress the youth.” Another youth said, “The elder come, the ones that are in 
the front, pack all the money and give themselves.” 
 
Also, sabotage was identified as another cause of leadership problem in the communities. 
It was observed that this factor cut across all the communities, since it was mentioned by 
most of the participants in one form or the other. One of the forms in which they believed 
sabotage manifested was their leaders blocking external aids from coming to the 
communities. A young woman in the FGD session in Kolokolo said: 
 
  Wetin dey even pain mi self be, … anything you wan do 
for us, may be they (the leaders) fit block you for town 
there, them fit say nothing dey there, no mind them. Maybe 
better thing wan come out now, our leader them go take 
am. (What pains me is that, anything you want to do for us, 
the leaders may block you in town. They may say, “There is 
no problem there, don’t mind them.” When good things are 
coming our way, our leaders would take them.”) 
 
Scholarship was another issue in which sabotage was claimed. Some of the respondents 
in Kolokolo explained that whenever scholarship was due to their community, the 
community leaders would seize it and keep the money for themselves. During an FGD 
session, one of the young women said, “We have money in this our community. They (oil 
companies) give us scholarships. Sometimes, we submit our results, but our leader would 
seize it. So, we have the money, but our leader is the one that owns the money.” 
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Also, as far as job allocations were concerned, some participants said they were confused 
because they didn’t know who to blame, whether the oil companies or their leaders. A 
youth from Kolokolo claimed that the youths made several recommendations, but nothing 
came out of them. A young woman in Kolokolo insisted that the leaders were either 
bribed or they themselves bribe to fix other people up for job allocations due to the 
community. She further said about their leaders, “They have work in town, but they sell 
the work to another different country (expatriates), some of the countries that are not 
parties to the assets of this community, yet they give them work.”  
 
Another woman said, several times, the leaders would collect the names of the women in 
the community and use the list to process allocations, “But when the result comes back, 
our names are not present, then the big women carry the money and run.” Emphasizing 
the same point, a woman said: 
 
You know all of us as we dey here so, they don use our names ehn, 
e don even pass five times. When dem dey carry book come they 
say make we write, say they wan give us loan, we go write, after 
we don write, the loan don come out, them no give us anything. 
They just use our name collect money. (You know, as we are all 
here, our names have been used more than five times. They (the 
leaders) come with books to write our names, saying they want to 
give us loan. After writing and the loan is given, they would not 
give us anything. They just use our names to collect money) 
 
Yet, another woman had this to say, “Na so them (the leaders) dey do, oh, na lie. If dem 
wan give us money, e no go pass N500 or N2000, they no dey bring am (loans) come, but 
dem go use our name. (That is what they do, and it is all a lie. If they give us money at 
all, it won’t be more than N500 or N2000. They don’t give loans, they only use our 
names.) ” 
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The last, but not the least, cause of sabotage identified by the participants was that some 
of the leaders sell out to the oil companies. The leaders who were considered guilty of 
this were not only elders, but mainly indigenes working for the oil companies, 
particularly at the management level. According to His Royal Majesty Eze Imordi, the 
Eze-Ogba Nwadei Ogbuehi (Usomini Mornarch) in Omoku, the oil companies could 
have meant well for the communities, but the indigenes working for them were 
sycophants.  He said: 
 
Most of our children know as much as the Italians too. There is no 
reason they should owe allegiance, so much so, that they should 
betray us. I say betray, yes, betray in the sense that some of them 
try to protect the interest of the companies they are serving. It is 
true that they are to protect the interest because it is where they 
feed, but if they are over doing it, it’s like over pampering a child. 
The sabotage comes from our people. “Don’t mind them, just give 
them one naira, one naira is okay instead of ten naira they are due 
for.” Sabotage! “I want promotion master; there is a way I can do 
it. They are my people, I’ll talk to them.” Sabotage! He wants 
promotion. 
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4.3.3 Communities’ Perception of the Direction of their Relationship 
with the Oil Companies 
 
 
Fig. 4.8 
AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE COMMUNITIES’ PERCEPTION OF THE 
DIRECTION OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE OIL COMPANIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.8 illustrates how members of the communities viewed the relationship between the 
oil companies and their communities. There were three main response categories; some 
were of the opinion that the relationship was cordial, some others said it was fair, while 
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some still said it was not cordial. All of these responses were supported by the reasons 
the participant responded in that particular way. 
 
Participants who responded to the first category, which said the relationship was cordial, 
were of the opinion that the oil companies had done a lot for the communities for which 
they were appreciative. One of the reasons given for this position was that the companies 
provided some benefits for the communities. According to one of the chiefs in 
Eruemukohwarien, who also happened to have worked with the oil companies in the past, 
“The oil company is our friend because it is developing our village.  If not for the oil 
companies, so many people will not be eating, because the government is not giving 
anybody food, it’s not employing people.” 
 
The Chief also mentioned the oil companies’ monetary contributions to the Niger Delta 
Development Commission (NDDC) as mandated by the Federal Government of Nigerian. 
He opined that the companies had been playing their part though it was not certain what 
NDDC was doing with the money. He went further to highlight the contributions of Shell 
to Eruemukohwarien during his tenure as the president of the Central Governing Council, 
which included six market stalls, water facilities, and road network. The Chief also said 
that Shell usually consulted with the community before embarking on developmental 
projects, and when the community made demands, Shell would tell them to wait for 
another financial year for it to be incorporated into the company’s development plan. He 
stated emphatically that “Shell has done enough, Shell has done enough; it is the 
government that matters now.”  
 
Also in Obrikom, the women leader said that Agip built a market for the community. The 
company also built a health center and was already making plans to build a Women 
Development Center. Considering all of those, she stated that the community had a 
cordial relationship with Agip. 
 
The second reason that was given by the respondents, who agreed that their community 
had a good relationship with the oil companies, was that the companies provided few 
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jobs. Of course, they believed that the allocations were not enough but they got them 
notwithstanding. One of the youths in Kolokolo described the job allocation process. He 
stated that if, for instance, Chevron has a dredging job, it would be handled by the 
Nigerian Westminster Dredging and Marine Ltd. According to him: 
 
Westminster Dredging will now bring from their staff- most of 
their staff will come together with us. The job will last for six 
months, then they will now tell the community that, since the job 
will not last more than six months, let us give you four allocations. 
Then, maybe the community executives will now tell Westminster 
that the four allocations is not enough for our youths, because we 
have a lot of youths, that are not working in the community. 
 
Fig. 4.8 also presents a second category of responses, and this includes the participants 
who were of the opinion that the relationship between the oil companies and their 
communities was fair. The participants said that the oil companies were making efforts, 
but there were still some gray areas to be looked into. The reasons they gave for the fair 
relationship were; some consideration for the illiterate or uneducated members of the 
communities; the companies’ responses were usually delayed, there were inadequate 
employment opportunities; and the companies required pressure before they made their 
contributions to the communities. These reasons are presented below.  
 
The participants who said that the companies had some consideration for illiterates in the 
communities explained that education should not be made a criterion for everything. 
They insisted that not everyone could be educated due to uncontrollable circumstances. 
According to a youth in Tisun: 
 
No be everybody na him be graduate, but them dey push only 
graduate, graduate for here, that is why militants full everywhere. 
Some of the boys in this community, not only in this community 
self, they have nobody to run to. It gets to a time, maybe you lose 
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your father, you left the school because there is no body to help. 
You can struggle on your own so te, you don tire, you will just be 
trying to survive, many like that… it is just like a discouragement 
to those who no go school. (Not everybody is a graduate, but they 
focus only on graduates here. That is why there are many militants 
everywhere. Some of the boys in this community- not even this 
community alone- have no one to run to. Some have lost their 
fathers, so they had to leave school because they had no 
assistance. They struggle on their own until they become tired; 
merely trying to survive. There are many like that… it is a 
discouragement for those who can’t go to school.) 
 
Some participants also said the oil companies usually offered delayed responses. They 
explained that anytime anything was needed in the communities, or whenever there was 
an oil spillage and the communities had informed the oil companies, they would delay 
their response. In most cases, the damage from the delayed response would end up being 
more than that of the incident itself. 
 
Also, some participants said their communities’ relationship with the oil companies was 
fair because there was inadequate employment. They admitted that there was 
employment, but they were grossly inadequate. A youth in Kolokolo claimed that there 
were several graduates in the community, but they were not employed by Chevron. He 
said, “Only very few of us are working, the rest of the boys fish; or if there is any building 
job in this town, they roll wheelbarrow to pack concrete before they feed their wives and 
children.” He further expressed his dissatisfaction with the unemployment situation in 
the community by hypothetically stating that if only five people were employed out of a 
hundred, what would become of the remaining 95? If on the other hand, 80% were 
employed, at least the remaining 20% would be catered for.  
 
Another participant from Tisun stated that his community was not benefiting from 
Chevron as far as job was concerned. He said that for instance, whenever Chevron’s 
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representatives came to the community to flag off a project that would last for three 
months; they would only employ one or two people from the community. According to 
him, those employed “May not even work two months there self, if you work one and a 
half months there, thank God. When you now do the work finish, you will now remain like 
that (without a job) for five to seven years. You will struggle to even get spoon.” 
 
A past youth president in Eruemukohwarien explained that the community had no 
representative in Shell. The few who were employed at all were assigned menial tasks 
such as cutting grasses, digging drainages and doing security work. Those employed were 
paid between N10, 000 and N12, 000 only. He lamented the fact that even those menial 
jobs had been withdrawn, particularly the security jobs, and the indigenes were replaced 
by soldiers. He went on to state that only three indigenes of the community worked with 
Shell and they were mere contract staff. Two of those individuals were employed only 
when the community staged a protest. According to him: 
 
Last year, after serving about 15 years or so, they were converted 
to their junior staff. Also, one of our boys was employed this year 
as a contract staff CLO in Brass. Apart from that, no other person, 
and we have plenty of them roaming about. 
 
Another youth in the community agreed with the earlier participant by stating that 
positions that should have gone to the community legitimately, being an oil producing 
community, were given out to others. He cited the instance of the Community Liaison 
Officer (CLO) position in Shell that was not given to the indigenes of the community. 
According to him, “They (Shell) went to the Hausas, Igbos and the Yorubas who did not 
even have oil, then people who did not have oil you are now using them as a CLO who 
did not even know our pains.” 
  
The last reason that was given for the fair relationship between the oil companies and the 
communities was that the companies had to be pressurised before they make their 
contribution to the communities. One of the youths in Kolokolo said, “Chevron is a 
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company that always needs iron hand, but we don’t want to use anything violence.” An 
elder in Eruemukohwarien observed that while there were tarred roads, water and light in 
the southern part of Nigeria, until his community fought, they didn’t get anything. He 
said, “Each time we demand things which ought to be given to us naturally, we have to 
demand it by force, go to demonstrate, go to protest for a long, long time, before they 
listen.” He went on: 
 
Just yesterday, Otorogun was blown up. Otorogun had been 
attempted many times. They (oil companies) and the government 
are saying that where there is peace there will be development, we 
are peaceful here, but we are not seeing development. 
 
Another elder in the same community expressed his agreement saying, “The Federal 
Government, they like the areas that are operating under militant activities, that is why 
they normally focus their attention on the people of Bayelsa, and other places where 
militant is operating.” 
 
The third category of responses on the relationship between the oil companies and the 
communities is that the relationship was not cordial. Poverty was one of the major 
reasons given for this position. The participants explained that they had to struggle to 
survive and to maintain their families. A young woman in Kolokolo explained that the 
women in the community usually gathered Periwinkles and sold them to cater for their 
families. According to her: 
 
Before twelve, you go see all of us dey pack dey go. See how poto-
poto dey reach us for here. We dey jump for poto-poto dey pick. 
We be not pick this thing you dey see for here, we no go eat. Our 
children no dey go school, unless we get this thing… na suffer we 
dey, if you dey this village for just two days, you go see the suffer 
wey we women dey suffer so. (Before12pm, you will see all of us 
going to pick Periwinkles. We wade through mud as we pick them. 
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If we don’t pick what you see here, we cannot feed. Our children 
will not go to school unless we pick it. We are suffering. If you live 
in this community for two day, you will see the suffering the women 
undergo).   
 
The young woman also stated that of all the women who took part in the FGD, there was 
none whose husband was working. She said, “Our husband no get anything wey dem they 
do, so without this thing (Periwinkle), we no dey chop o. So the thing e don tire us.” A 
young girl also expressed her helplessness saying that she came home for holiday, “To 
have some money to go back to school, my mother doesn’t have, my father doesn’t have- 
we need help in this our community.” Another young girl explained that she never had 
the opportunity of going to school. According to her: 
 
Even my mother, my sisters, a lot of our friends, they are really 
suffering in this place. My mother has a lot of children, we are ten 
in number. So, since I was a baby, my mother used to use 
periwinkle to train us. How can you use money to pay for school 
fees, when the money to eat is not there? So, please, anything you 
can do to help us in this community. 
 
Another reason that was cited for the not cordial relationship with the oil companies was 
pollution. Pollution was cited as a major problem throughout the Niger Delta. The 
participants identified water pollution as one of the pollutions they experience in their 
communities. According to one of the youths in Tisun, whenever the oil companies 
dredged in his community, there was always a possibility of pollution. He explained that 
a little leakage could result in a spill, thereby causing the crude oil to flow into the water. 
He said, “Once it (the leakage) causes the oil spillage, those of us who go for fishing, we 
will not be able to kill any fish.” Another youth in Kolokolo supported this comment by 
saying, “Since Chevron pollutes the water, nobody can fish; the whole fish run away, 
some of them  die.” Yet, another youth said, “Our swamps are polluted, we have lost our 
original aquatic animals. We used to have shrimps.” 
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Air pollution was also mentioned as one of the pollutions experienced in the 
communities.  Gas was constantly flared in the communities and the air was almost 
always polluted. A youth from Eruemukohwarien said, “I can tell you, the hazard they 
(oil companies) expose us to here is much, if you stay here for the next three to four hours 
now, you will see the flare.” Another youth, while describing how polluted the air was 
said: 
 
As this your shirt is now, if sun is shining and you wash this T-
shirt, just go and sun it, within 30mins or 40mins time, come back 
and look at it- it will be black because of the flare. You know, what 
we inhale in is dangerous. 
 
The participants stated that the air in their communities was so polluted that it affected 
the rain water. One of the youths in Kolokolo said, “If we have rain now, the water that 
drops, tomorrow morning, check it, it is going to be black, and that is what we drink.” 
Not only is the atmosphere polluted by gas flaring, thereby causing acid rain, the flare 
also corrode the aluminum roofing of the houses. One of the participants said, “Look at 
our zincs (roofing sheets), when the time comes, you will see it practically- the fume that 
is falling on top of the zincs. You cannot drink the water coming from the rains.” Another 
participant said, “Our zinc, they go black. And our cloth, when we spread them, they 
change colour, so it affects us, even our water and our every other things.” 
 
 The participants also said that the gas flaring usually went with a lot of noise and 
vibration, which they considered unhealthy. During the FGD session held with the old 
women in Eruemukohwarien, one of the women said, “Midnight, when you sleep in the 
night, you will feel the shaking; the house will be making noise. We don’t even know now 
whether in time to come, earthquake will even happen here” This means that there was 
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usually a lot of noise and vibrations at night. According to one of the elders in Obrikom, 
during the FGD: 
 
Another thing they (oil companies) are doing which is worrying us 
is pollution- air pollution. We hear this noise, in fact, if you stay 
here at night, you will not hear people in the next room. Vibration 
every time; sometime you have this vibration to the extent that the 
walls crack. All of them are as a result of vibration from the gas 
plant. 
 
The land was not exempted from the areas the participants had noticed pollution. 
According to a youth in Eruemukohwarien, “I was made to understand that the village 
had a very fertile soil of which crop used to grow very well. But now today, not even 
grass is growing, talk less of crops.” One of the young men in Tisun said, “If you go to 
the forest, no big tree is growing because of oil activities; there is fire pollution 
everywhere.” Some of the participants were also of the opinion that the oil that was being 
extracted from the land in their communities was responsible for the lack of fertility of 
the land. 
 
Poor infrastructure was another reason cited for the not cordial relationship between the 
oil companies and the communities.  It was an irony that communities in the Niger Delta 
would lack decent water supply, but unfortunately, that was the case. One of the young 
men in Tisun said, “Look at the community now, common water, we don’t have to drink. 
Assuming we take you to the well we drink from in this community, you will pity us.” 
Another man supported this, saying, “We still drink from the Jacob’s well, the well our 
elders and ancestor left in this place. As you are going to Kolokolo now, you’ll see a 
pond with greenish stuff, that’s the water we still drink.” One of the elders in Tisun went 
on to provide a detailed description of the well: 
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The Jacob’s well is where we drink water from, at the bottom of 
that palm tree. You will have to dig the bottom of the palm tree, as 
you are digging, when frog comes out, water will just gush out of 
that place, and we drink it plus the spit of the frog. Jacob’s well, 
the one that was dug during Abraham’s days, no elder in this 
community knows how they dug that well. So, what do we do now? 
If the thing is drying up, we look for where we can get frog to come 
out from under the tree, as we dig it. Why won’t we engage in 
mutiny my brother? 
 
A similar experience was reported in Kolokolo. The participants in the village also 
lamented over the kind of water they had to drink, which was in no way better than the 
one described above. A young girl who only visited the community during her holidays 
said, “We used to drink the water before, but I don’t even go near the water anymore 
because it will purge you. We now always drink pure water. We buy it for N20 here. The 
pure water that is sold for N5, we sell it N 20 here.” In Eruemukohwarien, one of the 
elders said:  
 
Once in a while they (oil companies) throw peanuts at us, they go 
to the schools, and they give us one or two classrooms, they give us 
water. Sometimes, we use the water, but it may not function again 
for the next twenty years. They will not come back until there is 
uproar again. 
 
Some of the respondents also complained about the state of power supply in their 
communities. The participants claimed that in Eruemukohwarien, there was no power 
supply, whereas, there was power at the Shell office close by. A youth in the community 
said, “That very power there is directly from NEPA to Shell and the power line goes 
through this land, we also requested for that, but they ignored it. As you can see, there is 
no light.” A participant in Tisun said that the entire village was not electrified. According 
to him: 
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See that young man, he’s the only young man that managed to buy 
a generator through fishing, and that is the only way we can see. 
Every day now, and now that Obasanjo has given us phone, we go 
there and charge our phones. That’s the only man that succeeded 
in buying generator. 
 
The participants also complained about the state of the roads in their communities. In 
Eruemukohwarien, one of the elders said that Shell built a road network in the past, but 
the road was bad and the company would not repair it. Another elder said 
 
 The only thing we demand from the State Government and SPDC 
(Shell Petroleum Development Company), they could not do it, 
they failed woefully. We did not ask you to come and pay us. For 
example, if you go to Rivers State, you will see that they pay some 
of the community people. In the riverine area, some of their old 
men are placed on salary. But here, there is nothing like that. Just 
to give us road, only road, we demanded and they refused. They 
went to the army barracks and brought lorries of army men to 
come and kill us. 
 
A youth in Eruemukohwarien also expressed his displeasure about the road in the 
community. He said, “We have some roads that have turned into a breeding place for 
mosquitoes. You cannot sleep well in your environment due to bad roads. No drainage, 
nothing.” While the participants in Eruemukohwarien, Omoku and Obrikom lamented 
their bad roads, those in Tisun and Kolokolo didn’t even have solid ground underneath 
them to start with. One of the young men in Tisun said, “Look at my shoe, if you don’t 
wear rain boot, you can’t pass here. The tide is low now, if the tide is full, we will begin 
to readjust our rain boot again.” Another man in the same community agreed with him 
saying, “You see that there is mud, you passed on top of planks, we just set them in case 
of visitors, otherwise, if it is me and my brother, we just match the mud.” 
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Another infrastructural complaint that the participants had was about the physical 
structures in their communities. One of the men from Tisun noted that Chevron started 
building a primary school for the community since 1997 and was yet to complete it as at 
2009. Another man in the same community insisted that there was no major infrastructure 
that indicated the existence of any oil company in the community. He said the oil 
companies usually claimed to the outside world that they built storey buildings, schools, 
and borehole amongst others, in the community. He, however, argued that if that was the 
case, there would still be signs of them. According to him, “Militants no destroy those 
one o (the structures), there has not been earthquake here, abi? Those things sink inside 
the ground?  No! They say the terrain here is bad, how much will it cause Chevron to 
sand-fill this place?” 
 
In Obrikom, the women leader complained about the state of health in the community. 
She said, “We are talking of hospital, particularly an eye clinic, because the flame of the 
gas is disturbing us. So, we need something like that, but they’ve not come up to help us.” 
Also in Tisun, one of the men said: 
 
 No health centre here. It is now that they are just building 
something, but it is not functioning now. If someone is sick here 
and you have no money, it will not be possible to move the person. 
If a sick person is coming, those waves and everything, before you 
can rush that person to Koko or Sapele… many people have died 
like that, just like that. This has caused a number of deaths 
 
He also claimed that the oil companies did not respond to the health needs of the 
community, even during emergency. According to him, “If we’re sick here, we cannot 
run to them (Chevron) for medical care or anything; they just lock their gate.” An elder 
in Kolokolo described the difficulty they encountered whenever they want to leave the 
community for health and other reasons. He said:   
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If someone wants to travel from anywhere, maybe to Sapele or 
anywhere at all, if you don’t get yourself to the river, you will not 
get a boat. And before you get yourself to the river, it will take you 
a long time. We don’t have engine (speedboat) that will make the 
movement short. So, if you want to travel tomorrow, you must 
leave today so that you can meet up. If you leave here that 
afternoon, before you get yourself to that side, it will be evening, 
then you’ll sleep at the mouth of creek there, then tomorrow 
morning, you will board the morning speedboat. That’s the way we 
travel here. 
 
 
Fig. 4.8 shows us that wrong prioritising was listed next among the reasons the 
participants considered the oil companies’ relationship with their communities not 
cordial. One of the youths who participated in the FGD session in Eruemukohwarien 
claimed that every company must have a document called “CASHES.” According to him: 
 
Each of those alphabets represents words, and those words, the 
first alphabet which is C represents community, that is, the 
company must settle community first, then followed by affair, then 
the S stands for safety, then H stands for health, then E stands for 
environment, the last S is security. So, with the present status 
here, they forgot the first alphabet which is the community… they 
jumped to the last alphabet which is security. 
 
He insisted that Shell preferred to invest in employing armed forces for protection rather 
than to solve community problems. He observed that the initial incursion of the company 
into the community was without military protection, which he credited to the company’s 
initial willingness to work with the community. He further stated:  
 
They (Shell) will tell the army that, “You must be very careful 
where you are going; the people are very bad o!” But by the time 
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the army stay one month- I mean one week, two week, three weeks- 
they see that what they said about the people is not true. They 
begin to make friends, they come to the town here and they buy 
drinks. They sit with us and we drink together; they even make 
friends with our girls. 
   
The participants also complained about unemployment in their communities. It was a 
general situation across the five communities that were used for this study. One of the 
elders in Eruemukohwarien said, “The oil companies, they do not employ our people, our 
graduates are not employed by the oil companies. Our engineers, the big ones who go to 
the big schools, they are not employed by the oil companies.” He lamented the fact that 
the few casual workers that were employed by Shell were even being gradually dropped. 
He also said that in about 40 years that Shell had been operating in the community, all the 
indigenous CLOs that had been employed by the company had been on contract. Another 
elder recounted the experience of a friend: 
 
Recently, a lawyer from this area was annoyed, and he resigned 
from Shell. He was in Shell for upward of 15years and was not 
made a Shell staff. The man was annoyed and said, “I have served 
you for 15 years and you can’t make me a staff!” He resigned. It’s 
as bad as that. 
 
In Tisun community, most of the men resorted to fishing for lack of job opportunities. 
One of the elders said that the situation usually discouraged youths who had left the 
community from returning. According to him, “Only those people that have nowhere to 
go and nothing to face, like us, come back to do the fishing.” Another aspect they 
considered distressing was the fact that other ethnic groups were brought in to work in 
the oil companies. The issue was raised in each of the five communities used for this 
study, which implied that it was a general notion among the communities in the Niger 
Delta. According to a young man in Tisun: 
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There are people there who didn’t even go to school at all, just like 
us. But they are working there (in Chevron). If you go there, you 
see Hausa, they are laundry people. Hausa, doing laundry here in 
the Niger delta! Yorubas, coming here to work! They stay in the 
house boat, they board chopper, and they board plane. 
 
The youth leader of Obrikom said that the community had a graduate association. 
According to him, the association was established to deal with the excuse the oil 
companies gave in the past that there were no graduates in the community to employ. 
The association’s major task, therefore, was to encourage education, monitor the number 
of graduates in the community, and push for placements in the oil companies. He also 
expressed the same sentiment that had previously been expressed by participants in 
Eruemukohwarien, Tisun, and Kolokolo: 
 
If you go to AGIP now, you will see our boys- young boys and 
girls- doing menial jobs. You don’t see them in big offices. It is the 
people from the north, the Yorubas, and the Igbos that you see in 
all the offices. Employment is very hard for our boys. 
 
The youth leader in Eruemukohwarien also explained how his community got committed 
to education as a means of securing better placement with Shell and how the efforts had 
not yielded any result. He said: 
 
Formerly, our youths were not the type that went to school. But we 
saw the day to day activities of Shell, and publications in 
newspapers that they needed graduate. Sometimes, Shell would tell 
us that our boys were not educated, so, they would not employ 
anybody. Today, I can tell you that 75% of the community’s boys 
are graduates. Some have graduated, some are still in school, but 
they are all struggling, even to train themselves to become 
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something because of the challenge between us and oil company 
(Shell). Even then, they are not still helping matters. 
  
Neglect was the next reason given for the not cordial relationship between the oil 
companies and the communities. In Eruemukohwarien, the participants complained that 
the community had been neglected by Shell. They claimed that the neglect was such that 
Shell’s flow station in the community was not named after Eruemukohwarien, and there 
was not even a signboard to indicate the existence of the community.   
 
A chief in the community insisted that all other flow stations were named after their host 
communities, and felt that it was a deliberate ploy by Shell to ignore the community. 
One of the youths said, “We are so surprised to see the only land terminal in the whole 
country, the name of the place (Eruemukohwarien) is not on the map of Nigeria.” The 
power station, flow station, and terminal are named after Ughelli, a major town miles 
away from Eruemukohwarien, hence, the grudge the community had against Shell. The 
leaders of the community feared that, just like in the case of the name, other benefits too 
might have been diverted.  
 
The Eze-Ogba Nwadei Ogbuehi in Omoku discussed another aspect of the neglect. He 
talked about some communities that were referred to as exit communities. Though they 
were not oil producing communities, the oil must be evacuated through them. According 
to him: 
 
If the man who owns that access route or pipeline does not allow 
you to put the pipe, how do you evacuate the oil to the refinery? 
The people known as exit community landlords are suffering 
equally as the man who owns the oil wells. A man has pipeline, he 
has access route, yet you have dug that place to use to do your job, 
render the place useless. The man can no longer go there to use 
the place for farming. Sometimes when it rains, it will be over 
flooded, and some companies are careless enough not to fence it; 
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some children, during the rainy season or flooding, go there to 
look for either snails or  edible frogs. I will say that the law should 
state that they must fence the place. These are the calamities that 
are befalling people. There was such a case I was handling… 
where two brothers fell into a pit and died. 
 
An elder in Tisun summed up the point by saying, “Grievances between the youths and 
the company, which brought about this Niger Delta violence, is because of this neglect.” 
 
Poor education was the final reason given for the not cordial relationship between the oil 
companies and the communities. A young girl in Eruemukohwarien complained about the 
state of education in the community. She said that most parents could not afford to train 
their children. She also pointed out that there were no teachers in the school so the 
students roamed the streets. She went on to say, “Science students in our schools hardly 
do practical, and you know that without practical, a science student cannot go 
anywhere.”  
 
An elder in Tisun also said of his community, “Chevron will build school, but for them to 
bring teachers to come and teach these children, they will not bring them; they just put 
the school there like that.” A young girl in Kolokolo explained that she stayed most of 
her life in the village without education. The crisis that occurred in the community, which 
led to her escape to the city, gave her the opportunity to go to school.   
 
A woman in the same community raised the issue of scholarship. She said, “Children full 
ground and they no go school; we no get scholarship. (There are many children and they 
don’t go to school; we have no scholarship).” In Tisun, one of the men also said, “Even 
those of our people that Chevron gave scholarship to for two three years now, they have 
not even be able to pay the money to the beneficiaries. Most of all those things cause 
crises.” 
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Fig 4.8 shows that all the factors highlighted in the third category above, if unchecked, 
have the tendency of degenerating into violence or crisis. They are, in fact, part of the 
reasons for the current conflicts. It was observed during this research that though the 
communities claimed to be peaceful, most of the participants displayed violent tendencies 
or support for conflict due to their frustration. For instance, one of the youths in 
Eruemukohwarien said, “When one is tolerant to some extent, he will like to react. You 
see, I have no other choice than to react.” Another youth in Kolokolo, while reacting to 
the oil company’s excuse that there was no employment for the uneducated said: 
 
If you tell me say I no go school, so I no fit work for Chevron, na 
bad thing. If na gun I fit carry, I go carry am. So anything thing I 
fit do I go do make I survive. This is what cause calamity. (If you 
tell me that because I did not go to school, I cannot work for 
Chevron, it is bad. If I can take up arms, I will, because I must 
survive. That is the cause of this calamity) 
 
The FGD sessions stirred up some emotions among the respondent and one of the men in 
Tisun said, “Even as we are talking to you, I’m feeling another grudge like taking a 
cutlass.” Another man concluded his own contribution by saying, “It’s worth carrying 
gun for. I’m telling you, it’s worth carrying gun for. Then people will stay up there (in 
government) and begin to blame people saying, ‘Kill them, kill them’.” Yet, another man 
said: 
 
If they want to solve these issues, they should come, because they 
are saying amnesty, the thing may degenerate again to another 
thing. Personally, I can decide to do undo. Do you think this boys 
will not do undo if they are treated like this? From what we are 
seeing now, we will always continue to get war. 
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4.3.4 Factors Responsible for Crises or Non-Crises in the Communities 
 
Fig 4.9 
AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE FACTORS INFLUENCING THE PRESENCE OR 
ABSENCE OF CRISES IN THE COMMUNITIES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                               
                                                 FACTORS 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                    FACTORS                                       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 4.9 illustrates the responses of the participants to the question of whether or not there 
had been crises in their communities with the oil companies. The figure also presents the 
factors that determined whatever position that was taken. As expected, all the responses 
to the question fell into two categories; those who admitted to crises in their communities 
and those who denied same. 
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The participants who admitted that crises had, at one time or the other, occurred between 
their communities and the oil companies offered different reasons for their position. One 
of the reasons given was that the oil companies represented the government. While the 
government could not be attacked directly, the oil companies could. Hence, the 
companies were attacked so as to get at the government. According to one of the elders in 
Eruemukohwarien: 
 
That is why the tension grows on Shell. No matter what Shell does, 
it cannot pacify the community because it is Shell that is seen in 
the community; they don’t see the government. The government is 
not coming here to work, but Shell is coming here to work. So, it is 
you (the oil company) taking my land that I’m seeing, but the 
government is standing at your back. 
 
He opined that the government was the reason for all the militancy in the Niger Delta. He 
said, “They (militants) are not doing it because they are angry with Shell, no, they are 
doing it because they are angry with the government; but the government is hiding.” He 
also said that the government collected money from the oil companies just to divert same 
for their own benefit. Another elder in the community insisted that notwithstanding the 
Federal Government’s law that the land belongs to the government, some people still 
reside on it and farm it. Hence, the government owed the communities some 
compensation. He cited United States where he claimed the owners of the land owned the 
oil. 
 
Another cause of crises in the communities is poor infrastructure. The poor state of the 
roads was a major concern for the communities. One of the youth in Eruemukohwarien 
observed, “From the entrance of this our community to Shell yard, they tarred that place 
to their facility. Shell tarred the road to their facility, but when you enter the main 
village, it is a mess.” He stated that the road was the cause of the community’s recent 
conflict with Shell. Another youth said that in the first place, Shell destroyed the roads 
with its heavy trucks; therefore, it ought to take responsibility for it.  
  133 
Some of the participants also said that crises were allowed in their communities so as to 
attract the attention of the oil companies and the government. They explained that the 
government seemed to be focusing on the communities where there were conflicts, while 
the relatively peaceful communities were ignored. They therefore argued that a way to 
gain the attention of the companies and the government was to allow crises.  
 
One of the elders in Tisun said, “Those people that are harsh to them (oil companies), we 
used to hear that they used to satisfy them. But we who are lenient with them now, they 
don’t satisfy us.” An elder in Eruemukohwarien also said that it was when Shell reported 
the community to the government because of the conflict, that the governor knew for the 
first time that there was an oil company in the community.   
 
Some participants were also of the opinion that some of the conflicts experienced in the 
Niger Delta had political undertone.  The Eze-Ogba Nwadei Ogbuehi in Omoku was of 
the opinion that politicians gave guns to the youths to help them rig elections. According 
to him: 
 
They (politicians) trained our boys; they used them to win election 
and then abandoned them. Now, some of them (youths) go into 
crude oil; they give it to our enemies. Our friends who turn to be 
enemies, who sell the guns, train them there at the high sea. The 
pirate people are our boys.  
 
One of the men in Tisun also agreed with the suggestion of political involvement. In his 
own case, he felt that the act was perpetrated by some influential persons in the 
communities, not for elective offices, but for personal gains. He said: 
 
Some riots and demonstrations are masterminded by the big 
people in the community for selfish ends. They may be seeking 
contracts, so, if they are not given, they will go and motivate the 
people to demonstrate- with the people thinking that they are 
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demonstrating for roads and water to the oil companies. But the 
masterminds go back (to the oil companies) to say, if they had been 
given the contract, the demonstration would not have happened. 
They would even assure the company that the next demonstration 
may be bloody.  
 
The last cause of community crises that was mentioned was the companies’ failure to 
keep to agreements. An elder in Eruemukohwarien stated that whenever a Memorandum 
of Understanding (MoU) was signed, the oil companies would selectively fulfil the 
agreements. According to him, “The bad thing there is that they don’t carry out this MoU 
to the fullest. They will do some things; if you talk about employment, they will abandon 
those ones. They will do some road projects and leave some.” 
 
The second category of responses to the question of whether or not there were crises in 
the communities comprises participants who denied the occurrence of crises in their 
communities. These participants also identified the factors responsible for their opinion. 
One of the reasons they gave was that their communities had peaceful heritage. One of 
the elders in Obrikom explained that from the origin of the community, their forefathers 
had told them that the community must be calm and peaceful; hence, militancy was not 
condoned in Obrikom.  
 
One of the youths in Eruemukohwarien also claimed that the community was peaceful 
and that they always tried to avoid anything that could cause trouble. The Omoku youth 
leaders also said, “We are peace loving people, we are not violent. That is why you can’t 
find any militant activities in this place.” He went further to say, “If we see the militants 
crossing the boundaries, we always alert the soldiers or armed forces, for them to be 
aware of what is trying to encroach into our area.”  
 
The fear of invasion was another reason given by the participants who denied the 
occurrence of crises in their communities. This sentiment cut across the five 
communities; the need for safety. According to one of the youths in Eruemukohwarien:  
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We know quite well that if we go by that (violence), the Federal 
Government will just troop in army to bomb the whole place, and 
we know that we cannot fight the government. You can see we are 
in the land; the Ijaws are in the water. When they do anything at 
all, they just enter the creek and that is all. Where do we run to? 
We have no place to run to. Before you do anything, soldiers have 
rounded you up. So, if we do it (blow up installations) now, we are 
just punishing ourselves. Most of us here, our fathers and mothers 
are from this town, if we destroy it, where do we run to? 
 
One of the men in Tisun also explained that his community did not stand a chance against 
the military force employed by the oil companies and the government. According to him, 
“We don’t fight. Who are we going to fight with? Can somebody with spoon go and fight 
someone with hammer? The issue is that there is subjugation, total subjugation. The 
powerful are oppressing the less privileged.” 
One of the youths in Eruemukohwarien stated that a lot of Shell’s facilities were based in 
the community, such as gas plant, flow station, compressor station, fire safety station and 
the only land terminal in Nigeria. He said: 
 
Tampering with anything there will cause problem. It’s a small 
thing! One can just go there and do something small, and cause 
explosion. Then when there is explosion, Shell will come and say, 
“What is happening, let us settle”. But if you do it, what of your 
safety? 
 
Another youth from the community noted that the oil companies surrounded themselves 
with solders and mobile police (MOPOLs), hence, making them inaccessible. He said, 
“There is no room to make or create crises because of what is guiding the companies. 
Like I said, they brought the soldiers, the MOPOLs, and the police, to guard them in 
order to siphon our oil without compensation.” 
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Fig 4.9 shows that respect for elders is another reason for the absence of crises in some 
communities. One of the youths in Eruemukohwarien said, “We are hearing of the Ijaws 
blowing up the whole place there. We cannot do that because we have elders here, and 
we the youths, we listen to our elders.” Another youth explained further saying: 
 
Sometimes our youths, once we are about to do something, the 
elders would call and say, “Stop there.” Everybody will just listen 
to the elder because we have fathers at home. Otherwise, maybe 
something bad would have happened in this community. Yes, it is 
as a result of the respect the youths give to the elders. 
 
Some of the participants also cited the fear of God as one of the reasons for the absence 
of crises in their communities. They claimed that they knew what they could have done to 
the oil installations in their communities. According to one of the youths in 
Eruemukohwarien, “If not for God, we know what to do now! We know where to go to 
blow all those things up. But we don’t want to do that. Even forget about security there, 
we know what to do, but we don’t want to do it.” 
 
 Some of the participants claimed, lastly, that their respect for the law was another 
reason for their restraint. One of the elders in Eruemukohwarien said, “We want to abide 
with the government laws, we don’t take laws into our own hands to do something bad to 
the company.” The Eze-Ogba Nwadei Ogbuehi in Omoku said: 
 
As a non-violent community, we cry out, we follow our matters 
constitutionally. We don’t believe in violence because violence can 
never do well to any man at all. When you are shooting, you don’t 
know who the bullet will touch; whether your brother is passing 
through the way it touches, you don’t know 
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4.3.5 Effects of Crises on Host Communities and Oil Companies 
 
4.3.5.1 Effects of Crises on Communities 
 
It is very important, at this point, to mention that as far as crises are concerned, the 
experiences tend to differ from community to community. The crises experienced in 
Eruemukohwarien, Omoku and Obrikom were generated as a result of their protests 
against the oil companies, while those of Kolokolo and Tisun were as a result of them 
hosting oil companies. What this means is that Kolokolo and Tisun communities were 
allegedly attacked by the Ijaw communities because of the perceived benefits they 
enjoyed from the oil companies, which in actual fact, according to the participants, were 
only mirage.  
 
The Ijaws launched an attack against the Itsekiri communities and according to a young 
girl in Kolokolo, “They even burnt a lot of villages in this place, to make those people 
run for their dear lives.” One of the men in Tisun also said, “I’m above 40 years, we 
(Itsekiris and Ijaws) have been living together for so many years, and even intermarried- 
no crisis. But the crises started when oil companies started coming here.”  
 
The secretary of the Trust provided further explanation about the crises by stating that the 
Ijaws fought the Itsekiris for two years, because they believed that the Itsekiris were 
blocking them from the oil. According to him, “They laid siege and it was as though they 
launched a genocide against the 23 Itsekiri communities, because they have more oil than 
the Ijaws.”  He said the Urhobos also join the Ijaws, until they realized that the Itsekiris 
were not the problem, so they faced the government. According to him, “Most 
communities were razed to the ground and all escape routes were blocked. The attacks 
were mostly at night. They even went to Warri to kill the Itsekiris there.”  
 
Having identified the two dimensions of crises experienced in the communities under 
study, the following sub-sections examine the effect of the crises generally on the 
communities. 
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Loss of Lives and Properties 
One of the major effects of the crises on the communities was the loss of lives and 
properties. According to one of the men in Tisun, the crises devastated the entire 
community, causing people to lose the little possession they had gathered over the years. 
He narrated the experience: 
 
People died. Behind that house, about three people were buried. 
This man (a participant) was living with about four boys; nearly 
all of them were killed, I think he was the only boy left among 
them. Some women were butchered and their heads were carried 
away. The eldest man in this community, the eldest man that 
governed the community, was beheaded too, and they took his head 
away. He had a block house; they demolished it, and set fire 
everywhere, they set it ablaze. Some people died, not because they 
shot them, not because they beheaded them; some people slept in 
the bush, some corpses were not found. For instance, one woman, 
Akele, the corps was not even discovered. She just ran inside the 
bush, died there and was buried by crabs or anything. 
 
 
Another man in Tisun said that the crisis really reduced the population of the community. 
The entire community was reduced to nothing and everybody had to start building from 
the scratch. One of the women in Kolokolo said, “Those who had, they have nothing now 
because of the crisis. So, this crisis has caused us a lot of things and it has destroyed a lot 
of things in our community.”  
 
Neglect by the Oil Companies 
Most of the participants complained that the oil companies usually withdrew during or 
after crises. A man in Tisun noted that before the crises, the community’s relationship 
with Chevron was so cordial that representatives of the company would come and discuss 
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with the community and inquire about their problems. He explained that, even at that 
time, the community felt cheated by the oil companies, but at least they showed up. He 
said: 
 
They came here frequently. They made promises and we clapped to 
those promises. But the promises didn’t yield any dividend; though 
it sometimes encouraged us that maybe tomorrow they would come, 
tomorrow they would come, until the crises came. So, the only thing 
we benefited from that regime was that it encouraged us, “don’t 
worry, it will soon be better.” Those were the only benefits we 
benefited, because we saw their faces. 
 
Another man said, “We no longer see Chevron around this area. All we know is that they 
cut us off; they barricaded the place. If you go where they are now, they have barricaded 
it.” An elder in the community said, “They (Chevron) are using what other people are 
doing to react to the community.” A youth in Kolokolo said that despite the fact that he 
and a couple of other youths did surveillance work for Chevron, guarding oil installations 
and oil wells, they were not allowed into Chevron’s facility. He said that their reports 
were submitted to the security operative at the gate of the company. 
 
The women leader of the Obrikom Women Association also agreed that the oil 
companies usually withdrew in the event of crises. According to her:  
 
We had little clashes- crises I should say, here in Obrikom 
community. But they have been somehow resolved now. Since 
those crises, the community has not been having normal/nice 
relationship with them (Agip). You know Agip, they even like a 
community that makes problem. Because when your community is 
making problem, when these people (community representatives) 
go, they (Agip) will say, “Go, go, go (stay away), your community 
is making problem.” They don’t want to put their mouth 
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(intervene), and indirectly, they’re using that time to their own 
gain. They use that to excuse themselves. 
 
The youth leader in Eruemukohwarien agreed with the views of the Obrikom Women 
Association leader about the oil companies’ disposition towards crises. He said, “Let me 
tell you one thing first of all, if there are crises in a community, all these oil companies 
are happy, because they make their money through that process.” He went further to 
accuse the oil companies of instigating inter-communal crises. He created a scenario 
about Efeoto and Eruemukohwarien communities to explain his point, saying: 
 
Shell can manipulate to set problem between both communities. 
So, when there is problem in these two communities, Shell would 
be happy in their operations. They would make more money 
because they would not come here (Eruemukohwarien) to do 
anything, and they would not go there (Efeoto). We would then say, 
“If Efeoto man reach there (Shell office), there would be 
problem,” and they will say, “If Eruemukohwarien man reach 
there, there will be problem.” So, Shell on their own will be happy; 
instead of settling issues, they cause the problem. They will not 
settle it; they will just leave the matter like that. Not until both 
parties understand themselves that, “We are losing o, let us 
settle,” they will not settle, because they make their money from 
there. 
 
He also explained that Shell may randomly select a person in the community and pay him 
a small amount to get a job done. Not only would the company get the job done cheaper 
than if it were to go through the official community channel, it would also set the entire 
community against the person who did the job. Hence, while the community would be 
divided over the issue, Shell would carry on its business. He said: 
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Instead of settling crisis, they believe in setting more fire. Like all 
this boys (militants), if you look at it critically, Shell contributed to 
the problem that is bringing these crises today. But the thing is 
now robbing both Shell and state government, and even other 
companies around. So, I do not think Shell has any way of settling 
matters, in fact, they believe in 419 to dupe people and get 
whatever things they want and get out. 
 
The Eze-Ogba Nwadei Ogbuehi in Omoku complained that before the crises, any time 
there was a case of spillage and it was reported to the oil companies, they would respond 
and even compensate the community. After the crises, however, they stopped responding. 
He said, “Yes, everybody is aware that while there are crises, we get nothing.” 
 
Harassment by members of the Armed Forces 
 
Another major effect of crises on the communities was the harassment by military men. 
Of course, the forces were engaged by the oil companies and the government. A youth in 
Eruemukohwarien recalled the protest staged by the community, in which the community 
women denied Shell’s staff access to the company’s facility. According to him, “The next 
thirty minutes, there were forces all over the whole place; there were heavy forces from 
the government.” He explained that after government’s intervention and the eventual 
promise by Shell to repair the road, the road still remained as it was. He said:  
 
Then by tomorrow, if we cry back again to say we would rather do 
or die, they will troop in their army and just start killing people 
innocently here. And the army, they themselves, they know quite 
well that this people are suffering, but they are under the control of 
the Federal Government, they asked them to go and do mess there.  
 
The participants also complained that the oil companies labeled members of their 
communities as criminals. Hence, it became a standard procedure to always surround 
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themselves with forces and also use same against the communities, without waiting for 
reasons to do so. One of the youths in Eruemukohwarien said: 
 
There is something that Shell has been doing and I don’t like that 
thing. Maybe if they have a contract, like Abaimuna, when the 
contract starts, you'll be seeing them bringing in soldiers, MOPOL 
(mobile police), to disturb us and we are not disturbing them. We 
are not disturbing them from not doing their work. 
 
Lack of Development 
 
The participants were of the opinion that their communities were underdeveloped as a 
result of the crises. An elder in Tisun explained that the crises led to the destruction of the 
structures in the community, both physical and social, thereby making the community not 
conducive for habitation. According him: 
 
You hardly see babies like these in the town anymore because 
there is no school. The ones who can afford to take their children 
to the township do. But you will still see some, maybe as you were 
coming you saw some, those ones, they don’t even go to school, 
they can’t read “A.” 
 
The eldest woman residing in Kolokolo complained that she had only suffered since she 
returned to the community; having escaped along with every other person in 2004, when 
the crises occurred. While most of her mates never returned for fear of recurrence, she 
claimed that she could not desert the community. Having returned, however, she returned 
to nothing. According to her, “Crises are very bad. The crises have destroyed many 
things in this Niger delta. It is the crises that made us to come down, down, down.”  
 
As at the time the FGD was conducted in Kolokolo, the few villagers had just returned to 
the community, therefore, the community was still largely deserted. According to another 
woman in the community:  
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Na the crises make us come down small, make us fall this way. If 
you come this village before, wey them never pump this oil, we get 
things, but since the crises, everything has gone down. We no fit go 
thief, we no fit go be ashawo, na him dey make us suffer this way. 
(The crises reduced us this way. If you came to this village before 
oil exploration began- we had things, but since the crises, 
everything has gone down. We cannot steal and we cannot go into 
prostitution, which is why we suffer this way.)  
 
 
Fear of Future Attacks 
Some of the participants expressed the fear that their attackers might return, particularly 
in Kolokolo and Tisun. Consequently, they did not feel safe living in the community. One 
of the men in Tisun noted, “Even some of us that survived the crisis are not willing to 
come down again and experience that one in life. Those who have relations who can take 
care of them in town, they don’t come back.” Another man stated that some members of 
the community lived in the township even though they were not accustomed to the 
terrain. According to him, “Those men and women that were born and bred here, they 
are not used to the town. So, when they stay there, they don’t live long. They die; people 
will just die any how like that.”  
 
 
 
4.3.5.2 The Perceived Effects of Crises on the Oil Companies 
 
The participants also expressed their views on how they felt the oil companies were 
affected by the crises. Among the effects they mentioned are: 
 
Insecurity 
One of the major ways in which the crises affected the oil companies was in the area of 
security. The crises had generally made the companies automatically suspicious of the 
communities, thereby reducing the amount of direct interactions between them. One of 
the youths in Eruemukohwarien observed, “You go to the yard (Shell installation) now, 
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you will see army. They (Shell) will tell the army that, ‘You must be very careful where 
you are going; the people are very bad o!’ ” But after a while, according to him, the 
army men would develop a cordial relationship with members of the community. 
 
In Tisun, the participants explained that the oil companies were always suspicious of the 
community, including the youths they employed as casual staff. According to one of the 
youths: 
 
Even us, there are some youths that they (Chevron) have engaged 
in the surveillance business i.e. guarding their own oil installations 
and oil wells. Even those that are working as surveillance, they 
don’t allow them to enter the company, they just get to the gate, 
and submit their report to the gateman and go back. 
 
 
Another youth agreed with him saying: 
 
Like we now, we work there (Chevron). We cannot stay there 
except Yoruba’s… come to work there. It is the forest we trek 
through. Someone like me, I trek from here to go and work there, 
then in the night, I trek back. Inside the forest! Not as if they 
created a road there o, we pass the forest and we use our feet to 
create the road- foot path ourselves. 
 
Low Productivity 
 
The participants observed that the productivity of oil companies usually drops during 
crises. One of the chiefs in Eruemukohwarien opined, “When there is problem in the 
Niger Delta, when there is a lot of uproar in the riverine, I think it’s only half they (oil 
companies) produce, so, that’s why the oil producing now is costly.” For instance, the 
protest in Eruemukohwarien led to Shell’s facility being closed for a week, which 
disrupted the production schedule of the company. 
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4.3.6 Oil Companies’ Community Relations Strategies for Conflict 
Resolution 
 
 
Fig 4.10 
OIL COMPANIES’ COMMUNITY RELATIONS STRATEGIES ADOPTED FOR 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.10 presents the community relations strategies the oil companies claimed they use 
during crises. It can be observed from the figure that one of the strategies of Shell was to 
pull out of the community during crises. Shell’s representative was quick to differentiate 
between a crises and an issue. According to him, “When something becomes crisis, it’s 
like you’ve run out of all avenues of dealing with an issue.” He explained that he was 
more comfortable with the term “issue” since there were always issues in the 
communities. He went on to say:  
 
The issue might be development, they (communities) may say, 
“Well, we have not seen the impact of what the company is doing,” 
or they may say “The government has abandoned us,” or all kinds 
of things that they may have at the back of their minds. So, we tend 
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to see them as issues. It may even be about the environment, they 
may talk about environmental degradation- it’s an issue. 
 
He admitted that Shell had witnessed some issues escalate into crises and the Ogoni 
experience was a case in point. Hence, whenever an issue became a crisis, according to 
him, the company adopted appropriate strategies in dealing with it. Giving the example of 
Ogoni, he said, “We (Shell) then said, ‘Let this not become complex, we can’t let this 
escalate. So, in that case, we are going to pull out.’ ” He went on: 
 
In the Ogoni issue, the best way, as far as the company was 
concerned, was to pull out, so that people can sit down and think 
critically about what needs to be done. And I don’t think we have 
any regrets for pulling out. It helped the community to rethink and 
it also helped us as well. So, what we have done in Ogini, like I 
said, is more or less in the extreme. We have not had any other 
crisis, that has got to the stage of us pulling out. 
 
Another community relations strategy that Shell claimed to use during crises was 
dialogue with the communities. Shell’s representative said that the company did a lot of 
discussion with the communities. He also said that the company carried out its 
stakeholders’ engagement in a proactive manner by making all efforts to help the 
communities understand its own side of the story. Not only that, Shell’s representative 
explained, “We also try to put our feet in their shoes to say, ‘What if we live in those 
communities? What if what they say is true?’ ” The company tried to achieve all that 
through dialogue.  
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Shell also solicited the help of the government during crises. Shell’s representative 
explained that it was not the company’s responsibility to lead the processes of 
development; hence, the government was usually engaged. He was of the opinion that 
some of the crises in the Niger Delta were as a result of transferred aggression by the 
communities; the communities were dissatisfied with the government and they took it out 
on the oil companies. He explained that the communities had expectations that were 
mostly unfulfilled. He said: 
Whose fault is it? They (communities) may start telling you it’s 
because of Shell, but that is not the truth. Because, if Shell wasn’t 
there, maybe they still wouldn’t have had electricity. But because 
they cannot see the government, which is supposed to take the lead 
in the development, they cannot feel the impact. They have a State 
Governor who hasn’t been to their communities, they have a Local 
Government Chairman who sits in Abuja and does not go to see 
the communities. And they know that the government makes X 
amount of money from oil, and the money doesn’t get to them. The 
next person they see is the oil company, which will then tell them, 
“Listen, I pay my tax to the government, go and collect from the 
government.” So, it becomes an issue of who really should they be 
looking up to. That’s why I’m saying that it’s all about perception. 
As far as Shell’s representative was concerned, the company’s engagement of the 
government was for the sake of challenging it to take responsibility for its people. He 
said:  
Engage government officials; get them to understand that 
development really should be what they should be thinking about. 
How they use the resources from oil production is paramount 
because that will bring stability. So, indirectly, we are saying, 
“government, you take the lead and we will follow you, we will 
support you.” That’s another strategy in itself. 
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Shell also made use of situational approach when dealing with conflicts. The company 
believed that the situation determined the approach. Shell’s representative said, “It’s not 
a hard and fast rule for the ones that we have used for specific situations, because it 
depends on the situation.” He explained that what happened in Ogoni may not recur in 
other communities. Events may be of a different scale and magnitude; hence, the 
company would adopt the best strategies considered most suitable for current situations. 
He went on: 
That’s why I say a lot has changed, and our strategies have 
changed over times, so, it’s not static. If we feel- based on 
experience and what we feel, or we see happening, or what people 
are telling, or the communities are telling us- that there is need for 
change, we also adapt and move on. So, it becomes a process; 
community relations is a process. It’s not a static activity, it’s a 
process, and it’s quite dynamic. 
 
Community initiative was another strategy that Shell’s representative claimed the 
company used during crises. He explained that it involved allowing the communities to 
initiate the idea of their own development. According to him, that would ensure their 
satisfaction and consequently, a resolution of the crises. He further said, “If for example, 
in a particular cluster says ‘Education is our major need,’ it could decide to focus on 
education. Another group might say, maybe infrastructure; roads. They decide what they 
need to do.” 
Shell’s representative explained that there were two major factors that informed the 
company’s reaction or position in situations; first, Shell would determine the nature of the 
issue and second, it would try to understand what its role should be. According to him: 
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It has to be noted that Shell, as a company, does not have the 
primary role of developing communities. It’s not our primary 
responsibility. The primary responsibility of development in the 
communities is the government’s. So, whatever we do in the 
community is a contribution to the development process. That’s 
why we said we need to know where we draw the lines.  
 
It can be derived from the above that Shell determines its level of involvement as well as 
what it considers to be its legitimate responsibility before it embarks on any community 
engagement programme. 
Chevron also identified community initiative as the major strategy it used during crises. 
In fact, the company’s representative considered other techniques subsumed under it. 
According to him, community initiative, as a strategy, “Makes the communities the driver 
of their own development. I think it makes the communities responsible for their 
development.” He asked rhetorically, “When you (the community) are the one who is 
responsible for what a company does in your community, what do you want to fight that 
company for?” Hence, he considered community initiative as a strategy that was both 
preventive and mitigating in nature, as the case may be. 
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Fig 4.11 
THE COMMUNITY RELATIONS STRATEGIES IDENTIFIED WITH THE OIL 
COMPANIES BY THE COMMUNITES DURING CONFLICT AND THE 
COMMUNITIES’ RESPONSES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.11 shows the community relations strategies that the communities have identified 
with the oil companies during crises. Having considered the strategies that the oil 
companies claimed they used during crises, it becomes pertinent to examine the 
perception of the recipients on the subject. Hence, the strategies identified by the 
participants are presented below: 
 
No Communication at all 
Some of the participants claimed that one of the ways they had seen the oil companies 
deal with crises situations was to cut off all lines of communication with their 
communities. They were of the opinion that the companies usually withdrew rather than 
make efforts to establish a viable line of communication with the communities. One of 
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the elders in Tisun observed, “No way to pass, you cannot pass; you cannot communicate 
with them (oil companies).” 
 
Dialogue 
The participants also identified that the oil companies used dialogue as a community 
relations strategy during crises. One of the youths in Eruemukohwarien explained that 
Shell sometimes invited the leaders of the community for meetings where the problems 
on ground were discussed. In Kolokolo, one of the youths said that whenever the 
activities of Chevron negatively impacted the community, the leadership would go to the 
company to negotiate compensations.  One of the elders in Obrikom recalled that there 
was once a better relationship between the community and the oil companies, than what 
was being witnessed at the time. He was of the opinion that dialogue played an important 
role then. According to him, “Far back in 1980s, Agip was sending people to come down 
to the playground for Agip and the community to discuss, and the community will tell 
them the way things affect them.” 
 
A youth from Tisun said that the Trust of the community usually negotiated with 
Chevron on sensitive issues. He further said that sometimes, the community would force 
the company into dialogue. Giving an instance, he said:  
 
When the community mobilized the women to stop Chevron’s 
operation for two weeks, Chevron now sent their PA, public 
affairs; some of them are working in Leki, and some of them are 
working in Port Harcourt. They will now bring these people to 
come and negotiate with the executives in the village. 
 
One of the elders in Obrikom also said that the oil companies did not usually initiate the 
dialogue; they merely responded whenever they were invited. According to him, “They 
don’t send their own representatives into the community to meet with the head and other 
members of the community. No, they don’t do that; unless when they are invited by the 
Traditional Rulers’ Council.” The leader of the Obrikom Women Association also 
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agreed, saying that the oil companies forcibly embraced dialogue when they wanted to 
douse tension.  
 
Some of the participants also described how the oil companies engaged the communities 
in dialogue. One of the chiefs in Eruemukohwarien said that the companies would usually 
send the Community Liaison Officers (CLO) to discuss with the community. Another 
elder in the community said that the CLO “Links with the community to have the 
discussion, he then carries the discussion back to the management.”  
 
A closer look at Fig. 4.11 will reveal that the arrow pointing from dialogue to the 
community is bidirectional. This means that not only did the oil companies make use of 
dialogue to communicate with the communities, the communities also used it in return. 
According to one of the elders in Obrikom, “What we do is that we do not go into 
violence, we talk to them, trying to call them.”  
 
Provision of amenities 
The participants claimed that the oil companies sometimes embarked on some 
development projects just to placate the communities. They were, however, of the 
opinion that most of those projects were either shabbily done or not completed. 
According to one of the elders in Obrikom, “They (Agip) were able to build for us a 
health centre here, but if you go there, no drugs; it is not equipped. If you see the civic 
centre that we are just coming from now, it is uncompleted. These are the things we are 
suffering.” Nevertheless, a chief in Eruemukohwarien claimed that Shell had tried in his 
community as far as amenities were concerned. He said, “In fact, they always come up 
with one or two projects.” 
 
 
Military Intervention 
Military intervention was a strategy that the participants believed all the oil companies 
under study had in common. In fact, in Eruemukohwarien, the participants were of the 
opinion that military intervention was Shell’s most preferred strategy. According to one 
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of the youths in the community, “They (Shell) prefer using force, but that will not bring 
peace to the community.” Another youth said, “When they go round, they go along with 
army and MOPOL (Mobile Police) to scare the owners of the resources out of their 
facility.” He went on: 
 
For now, the oil company (Shell), they look at the host community 
as a thief, a robber or what have you. Because, those Shell people, 
when they want to come to the community, they come with a 
number of army, police, and the rest. Even going there, they force 
you not to be close to where they operate. 
 
Another youth from Eruemukohwarien explained, “They believe in the security, so that if 
we say we demand something, and they say no, because of the security, we cannot force 
them to do it.” Still, another youth was of the opinion that the money that the oil 
companies should have used to develop the communities was diverted into security. A 
youth from Tisun also said, “They’ve left us in abject poverty and now they even chase us 
with guns.”  
 
The situation became further complex because, apart from the military men’s primary 
assignment of protecting the oil companies, they also resorted to harassing the 
communities. According to the youth leader in Omoku: 
 
Even the military men, instead of doing what they were supposed 
to do, they started extorting money from people. Look at this place, 
Omoku Timber Market, if people here want to go and carry their 
wood, they will pay the military men; at every check point where 
an army man is on duty, they will pay the army man N300 or N400 
just like that, before they cross with their wood. 
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Government Intervention 
The participants stated that the oil companies made use of government intervention as 
one of their strategies during crises. As far as the participants were concerned, the oil 
companies and the government were partners in the business of depriving the 
communities of their entitlements. One of the youths in Eruemukohwarien said that the 
military invasion in the community was a product of the agreement between the oil 
companies and the government. While recounting a particular conflict witnessed in the 
community, in which the women blocked Shell’s access route, he said: 
 
 At the end of the day, Shell took us to the State Government. They 
didn’t know what to do, but they took us to the State Government. 
At the end of the day, the governor said we should go, that they are 
going to do the road. 
 
Recounting the same incident, an elder in the community said, “Shell now ran to the 
government. Some legislators came and said the governor was not on seat, he travelled, 
‘When he comes back, we will put up a system, before the well finishes, we will tar the 
road.’ ” He complained that it was about a year since the incident occurred and 
construction was yet to begin on the road. Another youth in the community felt that Shell 
pushed them to the government, and the government deceived them about the 
construction of the road. He further said, “Government is backing it (Shell) up, that’s why 
we are not having a good relationship.”  
 
Apart from hiding behind the government, the participants said that the oil companies 
also blamed the government for the underdevelopment in the communities. The 
participants felt that it was quite convenient for the oil companies to direct them to the 
government while expecting that the government would not be intimidated. One of the 
youths in Eruemukohwarien said: 
 
What we are even saying now is that Shell now, they are even 
telling us that our problems are not in their hands but in the hands 
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of the State Government, under the Federal Government. They said 
whatever thing they are suppose to do in the community, they are 
supposed to pay part of it and State Government will pay part of it. 
But at times, State Government is not trying to do anything. 
 
Giving Gifts to Leaders 
Some of the participants also claimed that the oil companies gave gifts and contracts to 
some of their leaders. According to a youth in Kolokolo, “Chevron gives contracts to our 
people, gives contracts to our Trust, gives contract to our executives; even they give 
contracts to the youth.” As far as he was concerned, the contracts had positive impact on 
the community. The youth leader in Omoku, however, saw the gifts given to community 
leaders during crises as an influence to make them compromise. According to him, 
“Whenever the chiefs raise their protests, they (oil companies) find an avenue to maybe 
send some token to them to calm them down.” He further explained: 
 
When the oil companies see that the demise (damage to the 
community) is high, they will now find a means of going to, maybe, 
one or two of the chiefs, and give them some token to calm them 
down. Whenever they do that, and other people discover that these 
people are signing away, and the companies are liaising with one 
or two people, while it is something that concerns the community 
in general, they (community) will now revolt against it. When they 
(companies) now want to have a situation with the community, they 
will now invite you to come to Port Harcourt and they will lodge 
you in a hotel, so that at the end of the day, they will corrupt you. 
You forget about why you were sent there, you forget your mission 
to that place. 
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Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)/Global Memorandum of Understanding 
(GMoU) 
In the earlier presentation of the community relations strategies of the oil companies, it 
was revealed that both Shell and Chevron differentiated between the MoU and the 
GMoU. It was also obvious that they both adopted the latter as an improvement on the 
former. Consequent on Agip’s decline to grant an interview, the inability to establish 
through any literature that the company adopted GMoU, and the constant mention of 
MoU by the participants from Omoku and Obrikom where the company operates, it was 
concluded that Agip still made use of MoU. In respect to MoU, therefore, one of the 
elders in Obrikom said, “The MoU is the major thing which we write sometimes once in 
three years, four years, or even seven years, as the case may be.” He further said: 
 
Let me say for the past ten years, they don’t just come to do any 
project; they do the projects according to what we agreed in the 
MoU. And the MoU, once written, they don’t do any other projects 
apart from what is in it. The bad thing there is that they don’t 
carry out this MoU to the fullest. They will do some things; if you 
talk about employment, they will abandon those ones. They will do 
some road projects, and leave some. 
 
 
The next strategy the participants said the oil companies used during crises was the 
GMoU. From the focus group discussion and key informant interview sessions, it was 
clear that only very few of the participants knew what the GMoU was. One of the men in 
Tisun said of the GMoU: “They (Chevron) said they have an MoU with all the 
communities around here, all around here, that they had a negotiation.” An elder in 
Kolokolo also said: 
 
There is one committee in this community, called the GMoU. The 
GMoU people, these are the community people who represent all 
the six communities, all the Itsekiri communities. These are the 
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houses they have built for almost about four or five years they have 
been in position now… these two bedroom flats wey see so.   
 
The clearest understanding of the GMoU was displayed by an indigene of Kolokolo, who 
was the secretary of the Trust. According to him, the GMoU was the brainchild of 
Chevron and it catered for 23 oil producing communities in five oil fields. He said, 
“Anything that has to do with funding is under the auspices of the GMoU.” He 
mentioned the five oil fields, and they were Dibi, Olero, Ughoegungun, Escravos and 
Abiteye fields. He explained that Chevron no longer dealt directly with the communities, 
rather, it went through the council; the Itsekiri Rural Development Council (IRDC). A 
distinction was made between the Trust and the IRDC; Trust was a set of community 
representatives cutting across all interest groups within the community at the community 
level, and the IRDC comprised two representatives from each community Trust within 
the cluster and other stake holders at the cluster level. 
 
The Trust’s secretary further said, “The primary aim of the GMoU is to address the issue 
of development and employment. In the last 3 years, the communities have witnessed the 
presence of Chevron more than the previous 33 years.” He said the GMoU was first 
signed in April 2005 and then reviewed in June 2009. He further explained that there was 
a working document that stated the terms of the agreement. According to him, “Chevron 
does not give room for negotiation. The company only negotiates with sub-contractors on 
the job available, and they then release it to the council. So, the council does not have a 
say or negotiate.” This is contrary to the impression of the participants from Tisun and 
Kolokolo that the Trust negotiated with Chevron on behalf of their communities. Still, he 
claimed that Chevron was making good effort in the area of funding, particularly for the 
council. He also said that the company usually fulfilled its promises.  
 
The other participants from Tisun and Kolokolo, however, did not agree with the 
secretary on the benefits of GMoU and the efforts of Chevron. One of the youths in 
Kolokolo said:  
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In 1997, after the community leaders don go (to Chevron), we as 
youth, we will go on our own, we will meet the director of the 
company and say, “abeg please o, we are from Kolokolo 
community. Abeg, we need some things o”, they will honour us, 
and give us. But after they don bring the GMoU come, nothing like 
that dey happen. (In 1997, after the community leaders would have 
gone to Chevron, we, the youths, would also go to meet with the 
director of the company saying, “Please, we are from Kolokolo 
community. Please, we need some things.”They would honour us 
and give us. But after they brought the GMoU, things like that 
don’t happen anymore.) 
 
The women in Kolokolo also agreed that they got less from Chevron after the 
introduction of the GMoU than they did before it. According to one of the women, 
“When the GMoU start, we no dey see any Chevron for this town. That time wey GMoU 
never start, we still dey see Chevron for this place. (Since GMoU started, we have not 
seen Chevron in this town. Before GMoU stared, we used to see Chevron in this place.)” 
Another woman said, “Before, before, Chevron people dey give us some small money to 
help us, but since the GMoU, we did not achieve anything, no money, no anything self. 
(In the past, Chevron used to give us little amount of money to assist us, but since the 
GMoU, we have not seen anything; no money, nothing.)” Yet another woman agreed 
with the previous two saying: 
 
We no dey get helper for Chevron that side. Before Chevron start 
wetin they start (GMoU), them they give job and them still dey pay 
better money, but this one wey Chevron don start so, no work, no 
money. Na suffer head the boys take commot for this community. 
(We are not assisted by Chevron. Before Chevron started what it 
started, it used to provide good employment with good pay, but 
now that Chevron has started it, there is no job and no money. It is 
the suffering that drives the boys away from the community.) 
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The oldest man living in Kolokolo also described the benefits he enjoyed from Chevron 
before the GMoU was adopted, saying: 
 
Chevron dey give food every two weeks,  the food wey dey give us, 
na dat one we go survive on, because as I dey so, I no fit work for 
here, if my pikin no give me, I no fit chop. But that time when the 
food dey come, I dey feel fine because I no dey stress dey find these 
things. (Chevron used to bring food every two weeks and we lived 
off that food. Because, as I am now, I cannot work; if my child 
does not give me money, I cannot feed. But that time when food 
was provided, I felt fine and did not undergo stress to get food.) 
 
On the other hand, the communities also made use of some strategies to communicate 
with the oil companies. One of those strategies was dialogue and it was presented earlier 
in this work. The other strategies claimed by the participants were writing and protest. 
 
Writing 
The participants identified writing as one of the major ways their communities 
communicated with the oil companies. The youth leader in Eruemukohwarien said, “If 
we need anything from the government or we want anything from the Shell, which we do 
and they neglect, there is nothing than to write.” He further explained that the letters 
were always written through the leaders in the community. In Kolokolo, one of the 
youths stated that whenever there was a spill and the water was polluted, “The executive 
would write a letter to Chevron, asking for a percentage for the fishermen in the 
community.” Also, whenever Chevron sent allocations to the community, the Trust 
usually wrote to the company to present the nominations.  
 
The Obrikom Women Association leader said that the community wrote whenever 
Agip’s attention was needed. According to her, “When you write to them, that is, Letter 
of Audience, they will give you audience date. And at times, they prove stubborn.” One of 
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the youths in Eruemukohwarien also agreed that his community wrote to book 
appointments. He said, “In this area, it is just writing; booking an appointment with them 
by writing a letter of an audience. That is how we use to relate with them.” He also 
claimed that the companies sometimes failed to respond. According to him, in case of any 
need, “We put it in writing, but still, we are not getting anything out of it.” 
 
 One of the elders in Eruemukohwarien said that the community did not only write to 
demand for things from the oil companies, they also wrote to express gratitude. 
According to him, “When we get projects, we write a letter of appreciation to them for 
what they’ve done, and this brings more because you are encouraging them.”  
 
 
Protests 
Another strategy the communities used to communicate with the oil companies was 
protest. One of the youths in Eruemukohwarien said that the community did not embrace 
violence; hence, protest was the next option available to them. He said: 
 
We talk to them (Shell), trying to call them. If the worst comes to 
the worst, what we do is to go in numbers, in large numbers, to go 
and protest with placards, to tell them that, “What you are doing is 
not good.” At that stage, we may draw their attention to come and 
discuss or they will invite us to discuss. 
 
The Obrikom women leader also agreed that sometimes the oil companies did not 
respond to mere discussions and writing. According to her:  
 
When you write to them (Agip), and they refuse, then you use force 
to go, by mobilizing people. Like women now, there are things 
we’re looking for, so, a time will come now, we will write to them 
again. When they refuse, we will mobilize ourselves and go for 
demonstration. That time, at least they will hear us. Like last week, 
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the youths had a demonstration over there, and now they’ve called 
them to make peace with them. 
 
The youth leader in Omoku said that the only way the youths displayed their displeasure 
concerning any undesirable activity of the oil companies was to protest. He emphasized 
that the community was not given to violence. The Eze-Ogba Nwadei Ogbuehi in Omoku 
also agreed that protest was one of the most effective ways to secure the community’s 
entitlements. According to him, “We cannot be tired to fight on. If a man does not say, “I 
am here!” I know for sure they would not know he is there. Unless you cry out, and when 
you cry out, you will surely be heard. So we will cry the more.”  
 
 
4.3.7 Assessment of the Effectiveness of the Oil Companies’ Community 
Relations Strategies 
 
 
Having presented the perspectives of the companies and the communities on the 
community relations strategies used by the oil companies during crises, it becomes 
pertinent to evaluate the effectiveness of those strategies also from both perspectives. 
 
Oil Companies 
When asked about the effectiveness of the strategies engaged by Shell, the company’s 
representative was positive about the results generated so far. He commented on the use 
of the GMoU, saying that while he might not be in the position to speak for other 
companies who also engaged the strategy, Shell’s version had achieved much of the 
desired impact. Nevertheless, he said that the company would still work more to improve 
its achievements, because it could not claim to have reached the mark yet. While 
explaining the indicators of the effectiveness of Shell’s GMoU strategy, he said: 
 
Before now, they could have been the same communities that 
would have come here to demand that Shell should give their 
children scholarship. But because of the way the GMoU is 
  162 
structured, they know they have to take development in their own 
hands, sit down in their communities, and think of what they want 
development to mean for them, and how they want to do it. 
 
He cited the example of a particular community that decided that instead of pressuring 
Shell for scholarship, they would use the money provided by the company for their 
development to make the scholarship available. Since each community was to decide on 
its own development focus, that particular community decided on education. 
 
On the other hand, Chevron’s representative also said that the company’s strategies had 
been effective. He said that there had been significant improvement in the company’s 
relationship with the communities since the strategies were adopted. According to him, 
“We have not had any crisis that has led to them (communities) shutting us down. When 
you (the community) are the one who is responsible for what a company does in your 
community, what do you want to fight that company for?” He emphasized that things are 
getting better between Chevron and the communities. He said, “I mean, if you pick out 
the issues of militants and criminalities, I can say that we have a very positive 
operational community.” 
 
Communities 
Considering that the communities were the recipients of all the community relations 
strategies of the oil companies, it became pertinent to examine their views of the 
companies’ efforts.  Of all the participants who took part in this study, only one person 
said that the companies’ strategies were effective. The participant, an elder in 
Eruemukohwarien, specifically commended Shell’s communication with his community. 
He said, “It’s very effective. Very, very, effective. Very, very, effective, their 
communication is very effective.” 
 
Some other participants felt that the oil companies’ strategies were just fair. For instance, 
the Obrikom women leader said that the oil companies’ activities were forced by the 
communities and were not willingly done by the companies.  One of the chiefs in 
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Eruemukohwarien also said that Shell was making fair effort to pacify the community by 
offering some assistance. He too was, however, not satisfied with the company’s overall 
performance. An elder in Obrikom also said, “We are partially satisfied, but not much, 
not 100%, really. They’ve not done enough to our own satisfaction, but we know that we 
can say they are trying to their own little power, but that is not our own satisfaction”  
 
The largest group of participants said that the community relations strategies of the oil 
companies were not effective at all. Most of them opined that the best strategy any oil 
company could adopt was to go to the grassroots. They said the companies would miss 
the point of the whole situation if they observed the communities from a distance. One of 
the men in Tisun said: 
 
Now, if really they are not wicked- and I see the reason many 
people carry guns- if they were not wicked, this is the source of 
their oil, can’t they one day, come here and talk with us and see 
things for themselves? They can’t come and discuss with us! They 
will not come here, they will send some groups of people who may, 
“may”, I’m not specific, who may not even represent the people 
well. They are not coming here, that’s the problem, because they 
don’t see for themselves. 
 
Another reason some of the participants claimed that the strategies of the oil companies 
were not effective was the oil companies’ failure to respond to their demands. The 
women in Eruemukohwarien said that whenever there was a need in the community, they 
would dance to Shell and the company’s representatives would persuade them to return 
home, promising that the company would look into it. However, the promises were 
hardly ever fulfilled. One of the women said, “It’s been one year now since we protested 
for the road. You can see the whole town today; if you walk round the whole town, you 
will see how it is that nothing is coming.” The youth leader in the community also said, 
“They (Shell) never come o, they don’t do anything on their own unless when you ask. 
They don’t hearken to our cries, they come to deceive us and go.” 
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One of the chiefs in the same community said: 
 
Since 1958, see the road in the community, see all the cracks in all 
our houses and all the zincs, see them. They have been burnt by the 
smoke from the gas which they flare into the air. There was a time 
they came, they said they wanted to assess all those things; they 
assessed, they went, but there was no response or compensation at 
all. 
 
Some participants also mentioned failed promises as their reason for claiming that the oil 
companies’ strategies were not effective. The youth leader in Eruemukohwarien said that 
even when the community dialogued with Shell and promises were made, there was 
never a result. Hence, he concluded that dialogue was not working. He went further to 
cite an incident in which Shell failed to live up to its promises. According to him: 
 
There was a time we tried to arrange a kind of seminar with them 
(Shell); they said they were going to arrange it. I think they called 
it Participatory Rural Appraisal or something like that. So, we 
really organised it and they asked us to list 30 projects that could 
make this community a nice one. We listed them. But up till now, 
since the year 2001 or so, it was only one project that was done 
and I think that was the coastal bus, ok, two coastal buses. We’ve 
been dialoguing since how long now? If somebody tells you that 
this is a place where oil has been extracted from since 45 years 
ago and the community is still like this, will you actually believe it? 
 
One of the elders in the community recalled the protest staged against Shell concerning 
the community road. He said, “They (Shell) talked all sorts of political issues here; they 
talked, talked, and talked, and then they left. So, what happened? They finished their job, 
and they left. The road is still there.” One of the youths in the community accused Shell 
of not coming to fulfil the agreements made in the MoU. According to him, “Sometimes, 
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they (Shell) don’t use to do it, like what they signed last year, it has not been implemented 
till now. They will just do something very trivial and forget about the others.” He went 
on: 
 
They (Shell) will like to deceive you. The issue is that, whenever 
they come, they will respond to your call, but after the MoU, they 
will go back, being blocked to the degradation of the community. 
And that is why they are not effective, because what makes you 
effective is when you have a Memorandum of Understanding and 
you implement it. That means you are active, you are effective, and 
there will be peace. Everybody will smile. 
 
He also stated that Shell saw the leaders as “automatic control buttons,” that once the 
company could meet with them and pacify them, everyone else in the community would 
fall in line.  He blamed the poor relationship between the company and the community on 
that method of operation. As far as he was concerned, the leaders represented the 
community and they should project the interest of the community and not theirs.  
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4.3.8 Communities’ Preference for Community Relations Strategies 
 
 
Fig. 4.12 
OIL COMPANIES’ PERCEIVED COMMUNITY PREFERENCE FOR DEALING 
WITH THEM 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.12 presents the strategies the oil companies perceived to be the preference of the 
communities. Having examined, so far, the oil companies’ perceptions of the challenges 
in the communities, the communication structures of both parties and the community 
relations strategies engaged by the oil companies, it becomes necessary to evaluate the 
companies’ perceptions of the strategies the communities actually prefer. If there is an 
affinity between what the companies think the communities prefer and what the 
communities actually prefer, the foundation would have been laid for a cordial 
relationship. Hence, the following are the communities’ preferred strategies, as perceived 
by the companies:  
 
Transparency 
The oil companies believed that the communities wanted to be informed about the 
activities of the companies taking place on their land. They were also of the opinion that 
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the communities required transparency from them in terms of the development projects 
that were embarked upon. According to Shell’s representative: 
  
For one, the community will want the company to be as 
transparent as possible. But at the same time, obviously, that 
transparency will mean that you have to give as much information 
away, and that information is commercially sensitive, so, you can’t 
just tell them everything they want to know at that particular point 
in time. 
 
This means that information would be made available to the communities excluding the 
commercially sensitive part.  
 
Consultation with the communities 
The companies were also of the opinion that the communities wanted to be consulted 
when making decisions that affect them, such as the dredging of new sites, execution of 
development projects and other related matters. According to Shell’s representative: 
 
If they(communities)  feel that you have been consulting them very 
well, or putting them in the know of what’s been going on, you are 
not hiding anything from them, or you are honest and transparent 
as it should be or can be, then that level of trust will be very high. 
 
Chevron’s representative also stated that consultation with the communities was a very 
important community relations strategy. He said, “It is also the community strategy that 
provides maximum power, that maximizes communication between company and 
community, which ensures transparency.” 
 
Community Initiative 
Another community relations strategy that the oil companies believed the communities 
preferred was community initiative. The companies were of the opinion that the 
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communities would rather draw up their own development plans, than depend on 
outsiders to do it for them; since they were more conversant with the challenges they 
were faced with. Shell’s representative explained that making decisions on behalf of the 
communities would be difficult because such a task would require asking the question, 
“What do the communities want?” and according to him, “It’s a very broad question 
because communities are different. What Community A prefers may not be what 
Community B prefers.” The representative from Chevron also agreed that the 
communities should take responsibility for their development. According to him, the 
strategy the communities would prefer is “The strategy that makes the communities the 
driver of their own development. I think it is any strategy that makes the communities 
responsible for their development.”  
 
Provision of Amenities 
The companies also identified provision of amenities as one of the strategies they 
believed the communities preferred. According to the representative from Shell, “Most 
communities have aspirations of development; they want electricity, they want water, and 
they want schools.” He said the company made the money available while the 
communities determined their own development priorities. He gave an instance, “One of 
the clusters (of communities) decided that they were not going to be building schools or 
roads, they wanted to be sending their children outside this country on full scholarship to 
go and study. And they sent 12 of them to the US.” 
 
 The representative of Chevron also agreed with Shell by identifying the provision of 
amenities as a viable strategy. According to him, it is a strategy “That upholds the rule of 
law, and that can assist the development of the community with respect to infrastructure 
and other forms of development.” 
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Fig. 4.13 
COMMUNITIES’ ACTUAL PREFERENCE OF STRATEGIES 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.13 presents the actual community relations preference of the communities. As can 
be clearly seen, the elements that constitute the actual strategic preference of the 
communities are more elaborate than those identified by the oil companies. The elements 
are the following: 
 
Withdrawal of Military Forces 
The first strategy the communities wanted the oil companies to adopt for better 
relationship was to withdraw the forces from the communities. They said it would be the 
first step that would lay the foundation for peaceful cohabitation. According to one of the 
youths in Eruemukohwarien: 
 
If they (Shell) want to work successfully, let them go back to the 
first time, that first time when they came as civilians. They should 
forget security and face the community. But now, we do not 
understand each other, the security now differentiates us; they 
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cannot hear from us, we cannot hear from them. So, to make 
cordial relationship, they should stop all those nonsense- running 
to the state governments, running to JTF. 
 
The youth leader also agreed with this: 
 
We are looking to the government to also come in, and also advice 
the oil companies, because if the government had come in and 
advised the companies, the company wouldn’t have been using the 
soldiers and some other war forces to intimidate the community. 
 
Better Employment 
The participants also said that it would be a strategic move for the oil companies to look 
into the issue of employment in the communities. They believed it would get the youths 
off the streets and make them less susceptible to restiveness. According to the leader of 
Obrikom Women Association:   
 
I will say it is a very simple thing because the oil companies know 
that the place they’re working is the people’s land. At least, they 
are supposed to provide employment, as much as possible, to help 
people from that community. I feel that if they provide employment, 
there would be fewer militants. 
 
The Eze-Ogba Nwadei Ogbuehi in Omoku also commented on the issue of 
militancy. He explained that the amnesty granted by the Federal Government 
would be pointless if employment was not provided. According to him: 
 
The young men are dropping the guns. We have been watching as 
they are dropping them. If they drop and they have no job, and the 
government does not fix them somewhere, they can decide to 
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return. Government should give them job, they should do 
something; the government should not play fun over this issue. 
 
One of the elders in Eruemukohwarien argued that it would be useless for the oil 
companies to give scholarships to students if there was no employment for them after 
their education. He then suggested that the oil companies should identify the staffing 
needs at their oil wells, and request for qualified indigenes to fill them. He stated that if 
about three indigenes were employed every year, on a rotational basis among the 
communities, the company-community relationship would be cordial. 
 
Also, the youth leader in Omoku advised the oil companies to empower the youths by 
creating employment opportunities, “So that peace can reign, not only in our domain, but 
also in Nigeria as a whole.” The women in Eruemukohwarien also appealed to the 
companies to empower women by creating women friendly jobs. They also 
recommended, “They (Shell) should place women that are from 50years upward, who 
cannot work, on salary.” 
 
One of the youths in Eruemukohwarien insisted that the companies must employ 
indigenes as community liaison officers (CLO). He said, “When you (oil companies) talk 
of Community Liaison Officer, you should employ somebody from the oil producing 
community; that person will mediate the problem. So, without all these things put in 
place, the relationship will not be there.” He also suggested a raise in the salaries of 
casual workers. Some other participants also believed that employing indigenous CLOs 
would give their communities a representation within the companies. 
 
 Company’s Physical Presence 
It was discovered in this study that the most popular strategy among the participants, 
which they believed would go a long way in resolving company-community problems, 
was the companies’ physical presence in the communities.  When crises began in the 
communities, the oil companies became recluses, surrounding their facilities with high 
fences and security men. One of the youths from Eruemukohwarien said that the oil 
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companies should leave out the military forces and come to the communities themselves. 
He said, “If they really want a good relationship, they should come down and put things 
in place.” He warned that if the situation was not attended to immediately, it might 
degenerate further and become uncontainable.  
 
One of the men from Tisun also agreed that the oil companies should go to the grass root. 
He said: 
 
They (Chevron) should come down to the community to discuss 
what we need and what we want to get, not that they negotiate with 
the people in the township, and it doesn’t affect us. Because those 
people will go and negotiate with them, and thereafter, we that are 
suffering the mosquitoes will not know anything. They have to 
come and hear our problem, to know what we are suffering. 
 
He lamented that the American manager of Chevron would go to Lagos, a non-oil 
producing state and sometimes fly straight to Escravos, which he described as a mere 
reservoir from which oil is lifted, yet the oil producing communities were neglected. He 
said, “Like here now, we have over thirty-something wells here that produce oil. They 
can fly from Warri to Escravos, and then back to Lagos where they go back to America.”  
Another man said that the oil companies should not believe all they hear about the 
communities; rather, they should visit them. He went on: 
 
We heard that the deputy president is an Ijaw man; has he gotten 
to the place where they drill the oil? The president, has he gotten 
here? But he is benefitting from this place, they carry the money 
abroad. Let the company’s representatives come here and see for 
themselves. 
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The youth leader in Omoku also agreed that the best approach was for the oil companies 
to visit the communities. He said: 
 
We have a Civic Center, they can come to that place, and stop 
calling people to come to Port Harcourt and lodging them in 
hotels and deceiving them. They should come down, we have a 
civic center, and everybody would see them. So that the people that 
the community would have chosen as their spokespersons would 
then speak and the entire community would hear whatever thing 
they are discussing. 
 
Education 
Another strategy that the participants said they would prefer was education. In Tisun, one 
of the men suggested, “The children here are supposed to have free education from 
primary to university because we don’t have much population.” One of the elders in 
Obrikom also said, “If the oil companies were able to say, “Ok, create job opportunities 
and create scholarship awards for the youths,” it will enable peace to reign in the 
community, and even in the company itself.” 
 
Some of the young girls also advocated for female education. One of the girls in 
Eruemukohwarien suggested that female education would prevent teenage pregnancy 
which was rampant in the community. According to her: 
 
They (Shell) should try, at least, to create a kind of education for 
the females. Because what’s happening nowadays is that you see 
young girls, they're nursing their babies, young girls of let me say 
fifteen, fourteen, downwards, you see them carrying babies. 
 
She also suggested sex education for the girls in the community. She said that though 
formal education might keep them off the streets and get them occupied, sex education 
would enlighten and help them to take responsibility for their lives. 
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Skill Training 
 
Some of the participants emphasized their preference for skilled training as a strategy for 
achieving crises resolution. They were of the opinion that not everyone could have the 
opportunity to go to school; hence, provision should be made for the uneducated 
members of the community. One of the youths in Eruemukohwarien said, “They say all 
fingers are not equal. For those who cannot further their education, where they can learn 
all those work should be provided.” He went on to suggest: 
 
Even some of the educated ones are still trying to make something 
out of their lives; to get one job or the other, because in Nigeria 
today, work is not easy to get after leaving school. So, at least, if 
they can establish the training institute in this community, it will 
help the younger ones who are coming up, particularly those who 
can’t afford education, to learn a trade and make a living. 
 
One of the men in Tisun was of the opinion that learning a skill in the community would 
also stem the migration of youths to the township. He said:  
 
They (Chevron) should bring skill acquisition here, because a few 
days ago, we had some of our brothers, when they got tired here, 
they just went fishing. Some, to get fire wood, they would say “No, 
I no fit again, I wan go learn scaffolding,” “I wan go learn 
rigging.” They all ran to town to learn. But if such a thing is here, 
we will know that an oil company is working around us. 
 
Some of the participants also suggested that the oil companies should train youths in the 
technical areas the companies would need, so that they could be gainfully employed. One 
of the youths in Eruemukohwarien also suggested the adoption of school-on-wheels that 
would provide mobile training for several communities. He cited the example of the one 
organized for the community girls earlier, saying: 
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 At the end of the exercise, they gave our young girls some sewing 
machines, hair dressing materials and other things. So, they can 
reorganize it. There are so many of them (youths) who cannot 
further their education because they came from very poor families, 
and because of the poverty of their parents, they cannot go to 
school. 
 
One of the elders in Eruemukohwarien further suggested a technical school or a skill 
acquisition centre since the community is an industrial area. He also supported the idea of 
the school-on-wheels, explaining his role in organizing the previous one in the 
community. According to him: 
 
When I was in government (as the president of CDC), I brought the 
school-on-wheels into this community, and about four other 
communities- tailoring, welding, electrical, e.t.c.- for six good 
months. Many of those children are now working in NEPA, doing 
their own self help, and some doing business. So, if we build that 
skill acquisition centre, people like us, who have retired home now, 
can go there and give a touch. Give a touch and give our 
knowledge without even taking a kobo. This is our contribution; 
teach them so that they can acquire skills. This guy will go down 
and look for his own job and do things on his own. 
 
Company-Government Partnership 
Some of the participants stated that they would appreciate the strategy that would involve 
a partnership between the oil companies and the government. They believed that the joint 
venture would help to develop the communities better. This partnership would also 
terminate the regime of trading blames between the two parties. 
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Company-Community Partnership 
The participants also suggested that there should be cooperation between the companies 
and the communities. The women leader in Eruemukohwarien pleaded for the community 
and Shell to work together. She said it would make receiving things easier, and the 
women in the community would be happy with that. One of the elders in Kolokolo said, 
“Our people say hand wash hand makes hands clean, that’s the most important 
watchword for the community and the oil company. So, let us parley, we have to be our 
brother’s keeper, we have to hold them and they hold us.” He also said that peace should 
be the watchword in the relationship between the two parties. The women leader in 
Obrikom gave the following advice to the communities where militants operate: 
 
I would say that they have to put their heads together to stop 
violence because it would give them bad names, and they would 
not actually get what they’re looking for. If they continue to drive 
away all the workers and the white men, it would be hard for them 
to get what they’re looking for; everybody would be afraid of 
living in that place. And if there is nobody in those offices in the oil 
company, I don’t know if they will go and talk to the guards. 
 
Effective Communication 
The participants considered effective communication indispensable if there would be 
peaceful cohabitation between the oil companies and communities. The youth leader in 
Eruemukohwarien advised: 
 
 Whenever they (Shell) come for a Memorandum of Understanding 
with the traditional rulers, with the CDC, and the youths, whatever 
has been agreed on must be implemented. By so doing, there would 
be effective results for the people in question. The company should 
be sincere with the host community.  
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One of the youths in Eruemukohwarien advised that if the oil companies communicated 
with the communities through the proper channels, they would enjoy a cordial 
relationship with the communities. According to him: 
 
We listen to our elders, we do not kill our leaders, we respect them. 
So, they (oil companies) can easily meet our leaders and say, 
“Look o, look o,” and our leaders will call general meeting, saying 
“Look o, Shell came o, this is what they said o.” At the end of the 
day, we must reach an agreement; instead of them intimidating us 
with the state governments and forces and all those things. 
 
Provision of Infrastructure 
The last strategy that was stated as the preference of the communities was the provision 
of infrastructure. One of the men in Tisun said that the community suffered without 
electricity while Chevron’s facility always had power supply. He said, “If these people 
could extend their light to us, if they could extend their water to us, at least they would 
have done something better for the community.” The women leader in Eruemukohwarien 
said that the roads in the community were bad and they inconvenience commuters. She 
appealed to Shell to help repair the roads.  
 
The oldest man in Kolokolo also said that infrastructure was very important. He dwelt 
particularly on the issue of transportation. According to him: 
 
This jetty now wey we dey walk so, we need concrete jetty, not this 
wood because the wood no dey last, na every year we dey put am, 
this wood is not good. Because if water dry, all the water-side dey 
dry dey go, so, without that jetty now, we cannot move forward like 
that. Even if stranger dey come for the community now, if water 
dry, your boat go stop for a far distance, then you go come dey 
enter water dey trek to where you dey come, before you go come 
enter town. (We need concrete jetty because this wooden one does 
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not last; it has to be replaced annually. During the dry season, the 
water dries up, thereby hindering easy movement. If a stranger 
comes to the community, and the water has dried up, the boat will 
stop a long distance from here, and the stranger will have to walk 
the distance.) 
 
In conclusion, the participants in this study agreed that there could be a better relationship 
between the oil companies and their communities. They expressed their readiness to get 
along with the companies provided the companies demonstrated a sense of responsibility 
in executing their businesses. They also insisted that all middle men must be excluded 
while both parties foster a direct mutual relationship. 
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4.4 DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
4.4.1 Introduction 
This section synthesizes and simultaneously interprets both the quantitative and 
qualitative data that are presented in the preceding section of this section. Not only is the 
discussion based on the data presented, it is also based on existing literature on the 
subject. Furthermore, the discussion is carefully guided by the adopted theories for an 
insightful understanding of the complexities that characterise the relationship between oil 
companies and their host communities. 
 
4.4.2 Discussion 
The data generated in this study are discussed according to the research questions that 
precipitated them. Hence, the research questions are presented first and then the data are 
engaged in answering them. 
 
1) How often have conflicts occurred in the Niger Delta involving Shell, Agip 
and Chevron and what are the causes? 
Conflict is a complex phenomenon arising from human interactions. Sociologists, social 
psychologist and scholars in other related fields have noted in their studies of human 
interactions that conflict is inevitable in human societies (Otite, 2001; Zartman, 1991; 
Folarin, 1998). Some scholars have even contended that conflict is a normal process of 
development in the society (Park & Buress, 1921). Hence, that there is conflict in the 
Niger Delta is not abnormal. The abnormality, however, arises because the situation 
defers solutions because every effort made to resolve the conflicts has failed to yield 
positive result.  Also, the conflicts in the Niger Delta have further underdeveloped the 
region, thereby contesting the assertion that it is a normal process of development.  
 
The society is perceived by conflict theorists as an arena where groups contend for power 
or benefits (Wallace & Wolf, 2006). Members of the society may or may not be fully 
aware of this contention, depending on their level of involvement. The findings of this 
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study show that people of Eruemukohwarien, Obrikom, Omoku and Kolokolo 
communities were more aware of conflict situations than those in Tisun community. 
Table 4.7 shows this clearly. It is ironic that residents of Eruemukohwarien who were the 
most aware of conflicts in their area also said conflicts rarely occurred in the community. 
This seeming contradiction arose from the respondents’ misinterpretation of conflict to 
mean crisis. They explained that though they had experienced some conflicts in the 
community, violence was rare.  
 
Hence, considering that a crisis is a situation that degenerates into a critical stage in 
which extraordinary intervention is needed to remedy, it becomes understandable that 
majority of the respondents claimed its rarity. Therefore, while the communities were 
familiar with conflicts, they rarely experienced crises. The results also reveal that Shell 
was more involved in conflicts in the communities than Agip and Chevron. This may be 
due to Shell having the largest operations in the Niger Delta.  
 
From the foregoing discussion, it has been established that conflicts occurred in four of 
the five selected communities at varying frequencies, while Tisun claimed that it had not 
witnessed conflicts. It becomes pertinent, therefore, to explore the reasons behind the two 
positions and their implications for the oil companies.  The qualitative data provide us 
with insight into the conflict prone and conflict free communities. Fig. 4.9 illustrates the 
reasons provided by the two parties; those who acknowledged conflicts and those who 
denied them.  
 
One of the reasons given by the participants who acknowledged the occurrence of 
conflicts in their communities was that the oil companies represented the government. 
They insisted that the government and the companies conspired to rob them of their dues. 
They also observed that the oil companies ran to the government when there were 
conflicts in the communities, which further proved the governmental support they 
enjoyed. This situation is explained by the conflict theory which posits that individuals or 
groups struggle to maximize their benefit in a society, which inevitably contributes to 
social change. The government and the communities struggled over the natural resources 
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in the Niger Delta because the economy of Nigeria depended on the oil and the 
communities believed that they were not well compensated. This struggle, therefore, led 
to social strain in form of conflicts and a not cordial relationship between the two parties.  
 
By aligning with the government, the oil companies earned themselves an enemy in the 
communities. The implication of this for them was that for as long as the government 
continued to fail in its responsibilities in those communities, the oil companies would 
continue to be victims of transferred aggressions. It would be risky, therefore, for the 
companies to push the blames of underdevelopment to the government and hide behind it, 
because whichever way, they would serve as the “body-shield” for the government by 
taking most of the attacks. 
 
In any society, the government has the sole responsibility of ensuring development. 
Political campaigns are focused on proposed development agenda and electorates vote 
based on their judgement of the candidate with the best development plan. Though there 
have been arguments back and forth on the roles of businesses in the development 
process, the concept of social responsibility has come to be generally accepted. In fact, 
companies that fail to be socially responsible are liable to conflicts.  
 
The participants of this study complained about the state of infrastructure in their 
communities. While they were aware that the government had the main responsibility of 
improving their infrastructure, they also said that it was the oil companies, and not the 
government, that undertook oil exploration in their communities. Hence, the companies 
were expected to stand up to the challenge. The situation became more complex when 
they observed that the facilities in the oil companies residing in their communities were 
modern and well maintained, while the communities were left without such amenities.  
 
Some scholars also noted the affluence exhibited by many oil workers as well as political 
office holders in sharp contrast to the social deprivation of most residents of the Niger 
Delta (Ibaba, 2005; Obi, 2004; Esparza & Wilson, 1999). Akinola (2009) observes that 
among the major infrastructural challenges in the communities are poor roads. For 
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instance, the only transportation in island communities in the Niger Delta was by water 
ways through the aid of in-board and out-board engine boats, flying boats, and canoes. 
 
Also, it was noted in this study that some of the communities engaged in conflicts so as to 
attract the attention of both the oil companies and the government. They claimed that the 
duo paid more attention to communities that posed threats to them while they abandoned 
the ones that were relatively peaceful. Though the participants insisted that their 
communities did not condone militancy, they expressed the possibility of adopting 
violence if it would guarantee them the same attention that the restive communities 
enjoyed. The stakeholder theory supports this finding by explaining that diffused publics 
may become functional publics when there is conflict (Dougherty, 1992; Ray, 1999; 
Stephens, Malone & Bailey, 2005). This means that the relatively peaceful communities 
may be considered inconsequential by the oil companies until they become actively 
involved in conflict, thereby winning the full attention of the companies.  
 
Another important cause of conflicts that was identified by the participant was politics. It 
was revealed that during electioneering periods in the past, some politicians engaged 
some youths as political thugs. Those youths were given arms, which were not retrieved 
after the elections. Since the politicians did not have any use for the thugs afterwards, 
they resort to violence.  
 
A different dimension of the politics that was identified was the one used by influential 
members of the communities. It was discovered from the FGDs sessions that some 
leaders used the youths in the communities to demonstrate against the oil companies to 
achieve their ends. That was a betrayal of trust because the demonstrators were led to 
believe that they were demonstrating for public good, whereas, they were only being used 
to win contracts. The case would be more pathetic if some of them lost their lives in the 
process, while fighting another man’s war.  
 
One of the complexities of the situation was that the oil companies would give the 
contracts to those leaders, and the people would continue to demonstrate; while the 
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companies would not be able to comprehend what else the people wanted, the people 
would be frustrated with the companies’ “lack of response.” Hence, both the oil 
companies and the masses were victims of the plot by the elite in the community 
(Edafejirhaye & Edafejirhaye, 2008). This further underscores the complex nature of the 
Niger Delta conflicts.  
 
The Gramcian Marxist perspective of conflict theory states that one of the ways the ruling 
class gets its subordinates to consent to its domination is by linking its interests to those 
of the subordinate class (Pease, 2003). This means that the influential members of those 
Niger Delta communities made the people believe that they were aiming at the same goal, 
thereby allowing themselves through their own consent, to be used against the oil 
companies. 
 
The last cause of conflicts that was identified by the participants was the oil companies’ 
failure to keep agreements. The companies were accused of either selectively 
implementing, or not implementing at all, the agreements reached with the communities. 
In a bid to force them to keep the agreements, therefore, the communities resorted to 
conflicts. The implication of this for the oil companies is bifurcated; firstly, the 
companies would lose their credibility among the people, and secondly, the violence 
against them might continue. Folarin (1998), while identifying sources of conflict, says 
that communication breakdown can result in conflict and it can be engendered by failed 
promises. 
 
 According to Wallace & Wolf (2006), for conflict to be controlled, one group must be 
able to, at least temporarily, suppress its rivals. If this assertion is true, we can also argue 
that one group may deliberately submit to its rivals to control or avoid conflict. Fig 4.9 
reveals that some of the participants denied the occurrence of conflicts in their 
communities. Though they were exposed to similar conditions as the conflicting 
communities, they presented some interesting reasons for deliberately avoiding conflicts. 
Among the reasons was the peaceful heritage of their communities. The participants 
claimed that their forefathers had instructed them to maintain peace in the communities. 
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Hence, from one generation to another, they had made efforts to keep to that instruction. 
They also claimed that it was the insensitive attitude of both the oil companies and the 
government that forced them into uncharacteristic demonstrations and protests.   
 
Another major reason given for the lack of conflicts in the communities was the fear of 
military invasion. It was discovered in the course of this study that this was one of the 
strongest reasons for peace in some of the communities. Some participants admitted that 
they would have engaged in violence to force the oil companies and the government to 
respond to their requests but for the safety of their families. They stated that jeopardizing 
the security of the communities was too much a price to pay for any benefit. Omoweh 
(2010, p. 5) also acknowledges this finding when he states, “…the state deploys its 
military to oppress and dominate the people to foster its ruthless exploitation of the 
region.” 
 
While some of the participants condemned militancy, others identified with the militants 
saying that they were fighting for the entire Niger Delta. A major concern that comes to 
the fore at this point is that, though the selected communities for this study claimed they 
did not condone militancy, they might still find other violent means of expressing 
themselves in the future. This is because they have the motive and the intense emotion to 
become violent; all they lack is the will, and this may change if, according to them, the 
communities remain neglected.  Hence, there is the tendency for them to shift from being 
passive communities to active ones. This may also result in a shift in the balance of 
power as it has been witnessed in the communities where militants use terror to subdue 
the oil companies and the government. 
 
Some of the participants also identified the youths’ respect for the elders in the 
communities as one of the reasons for the lack of conflicts in their communities. This 
displays the role played by the cultural setups of the communities. While the youths were 
more vibrant, the elders were considered wiser. Hence, the youths claimed that whenever 
they felt like reacting with violence against the oil companies, the elders would call for 
restraint, and they would listen. This may be a major sphere to explore while seeking a 
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lasting solution to restiveness in the Niger Delta. The oil companies and the government 
can sincerely explore the cultural setup to foster a better relationship with the 
communities. 
 
It was also interesting to discover that the fear of God was mentioned as one of the 
reasons for the lack of conflicts in some communities. Some respondents claimed that 
they could have attacked the installations of the oil companies “If not for God.” While a 
comment such as this could have been ignored as just a matter of speaking, it was 
observed that the respondents made a lot of references to God during the FGDs and KIIs. 
There were also side comments about the communities depending on divine intervention 
for solutions to their problems and the people praying to God for peace. Also, during the 
interview session with the women leader in Obrikom, she mentioned that a special prayer 
session was organized to pray for the community. Considering all the above, therefore, it 
becomes clear that religion plays an important role in the lives of the people in the 
selected communities; hence, this channel can be explored for the sake of peace in the 
Niger Delta.  
 
Lastly, the participants in this study mentioned that their respect for the law also helped 
to prevent conflicts in their communities. They insisted that they would follow the legal 
process to express their displeasure with the oil companies. As far as they were 
concerned, the law, though slow, was better than violence. 
 
All the responses provided here show that the selected communities for this study were 
active publics (Baskin, Aronoff & Lattimore, 1997). The situational theory identifies 
active publics as those who recognise the problem, recognise the constraints and are 
actively involved in the situation. As can be seen, the respondents recognised their major 
problem to be lack of development in the communities, they considered the oil companies 
and the government as their constraint, and they believed that the problem was a threat to 
their well being. 
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2) What are the consequences of the conflicts on host communities and oil 
companies? 
Functionalists consider societies and social institutions as systems in which equilibrium is 
created through the interdependence of all parts. While they do not deny the existence of 
conflicts, they believe the society naturally evolves means of controlling it. Sandole 
(1993) bases his argument on this when he identifies the stages of conflict as initiation, 
escalation, controlled maintenance, abatement, and termination, and claims that peace is 
the ultimate target of conflicts.  
 
In the Niger Delta, conflicts have not resulted in peace; therefore, the functionalist 
approach is not applicable. Though the conflict theory focuses on the shifting balance of 
power among rivals rather than the creation of equilibrium, the theory still falls short of 
addressing some peculiar situations in the Niger Delta. For instance, both oil companies 
and host communities have incurred losses in the course of the conflicts. In this context, 
therefore, the stakeholder theory is more applicable. The theory posits that the 
interrelationship between an organization and its stakeholders engenders a kind of 
connectivity that makes any situation, whether positive or negative, bear consequences 
for both parties. 
  
In agreement with the foregoing, the findings in this study reveal that conflict is like a 
double edged sword that cuts on every side. Both the oil companies and the communities 
were affected by the conflicts. While reflecting on the consequences of conflicts on the 
communities, some participants said that there had been loss of lives and properties. As 
much as violence might have seemed a practical way of attracting the attention of the 
government and oil companies, the participants claimed that it also destroyed, in just a 
moment, what had been built over time. The conflicts left behind bitter memories that 
those who experienced them would rather forget. The participants in Tisun and Kolokolo 
explained how their communities were razed to the ground, leaving the survivors to begin 
their lives all over again. They also noted that the population of their communities had 
been drastically reduced, either by death during the crises, or unwillingness of some 
survivors to return to the communities afterwards. 
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The participants observed that their communities suffered neglect from the oil companies 
whenever there was a conflict. As could be expected, the oil companies usually withdrew 
from the communities during conflicts. The participants stated that at such times, they did 
not get anything from the oil companies. It was observed that whenever there was an 
inter-communal conflict, the oil companies would refuse to get involved, insisting that 
the communities settle their differences before coming to make requests.  
 
It was even suggested that the oil companies appreciated inter-communal conflicts 
because it made the communities turn against one another, thereby paying less attention 
to the companies, and making less demands. Hence, having become aware of this, the 
communities tried to maintain peace with one another so as to forge a formidable front 
against the oil companies and the government. Aaron & Patrick (2008) agree with this 
notion by stating in their report on a study carried out in the Niger Delta that host 
communities to oil companies, particularly Shell, are usually divided due largely to the 
companies’ notoriety for playing off one group against another.  
 
This creates the impression that while the oil companies claim that the communities are 
their stakeholders, they actually place the interests of the shareholders above that of the 
communities by seeking to make profit at all cost. It is also noteworthy that had the 
conflicts been between the oil companies and their shareholders, withdrawal would not 
have been an option. But then, the shareholders would not have resorted to vandalism 
because of their investments.  Nevertheless, Freeman, Wicks & Parmar (2004) argue that 
the competition between shareholders and stakeholders does not arise because values are 
created for shareholders when they are created for stakeholders. Hence, the oil companies 
should not sacrifice one for another. 
 
Another major consequence of conflicts in the communities was the invasion by military 
forces. The oil companies engaged the services of security agents to forestall vandalism 
and abductions. The participants, however, complained that the forces interfered with the 
normal flow of communal activities by restricting movements and harassing commuters. 
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They even mentioned that the force members extorted money from commercial drivers at 
their various check points. The participants were particularly disturbed because they felt 
that the oil companies brought in the armed forces so as to make them untouchable while 
they syphon the communities’ wealth. While the companies considered themselves safe 
due to military presence, the communities considered themselves unsafe for the same 
reason. 
 
It is an understatement that conflict underdevelops. If there was anything that all the 
selected communities had in common, it was the lack of development. Though this was 
considered by the participants to be the outcome of the conflicts, it was also noted that 
there was no remarkable development before the conflict. The participants identified 
education and infrastructure as some of the areas in which their communities lacked 
development. The vicious cycle was such that the communities resorted to conflicts so as 
to address the lack of development, but the conflicts ended up underdeveloping them 
further. Hence, whichever way, the communities always had developmental challenges to 
contend with. Watts (2009) agrees with this finding by observing that there was no 
running water, electricity, roads and functioning primary schools in the oil producing 
communities in the Niger Delta.  
 
The participants also identified the fear of future attacks as another consequence of 
conflicts. They admitted that there was always the fear, whether active or latent, that the 
conflicts might recur, hence, their inability to be at rest. Consequently, members of the 
communities migrated to the cities, thereby depopulating the communities and over 
populating the cities. This also has its implication for development because some of the 
communities now lack the formidable number that can make them a force to reckon with. 
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report in 2006 says, “People fear 
attacks by hijackers, oil bunkerers, hostage takers, youth gangs, …and the crossfire 
between militants groups, and between them and the government law enforcement 
officials,” (UNDP, 2006: 306-311). 
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On the other hand, the participants also identified the consequences of conflicts for the oil 
companies. One of the consequences that were identified was insecurity. The participants 
said that the oil companies felt insecure in the communities as a result of the conflicts. A 
tell tale sign of it was the engagement of military security operatives and their 
inaccessibility to the communities. The participants recalled that before the conflicts in 
their communities, staff of oil companies visited the communities frequently without fear. 
In recent times, however, the companies have kept their distance. It was so bad that the 
companies even kept their indigenous staff members at arm’s length. The companies 
probably feared that those staff would be used to work against them from inside. Watts 
(2009) quoted the International Herald Tribune of April 22nd, 2007 as follows: 
 
Companies now confine employees to heavily fortified compounds, 
allowing them to travel only by armored car or helicopter…One 
company has outfitted bathrooms with steel bolts to turn them into 
“panic” rooms, if needed. Another has coated the pylons of a giant 
oil-production platform 130 kilometers, or 80 miles, offshore with 
waterproof grease to prevent attackers from climbing the rig… Some 
foreign operators have abandoned oil fields or left the country 
altogether. (p. 37) 
 
Low productivity was the second consequence of conflicts for the oil companies, as 
suggested by the participants. They explained that anytime there were conflicts, the 
production of the oil companies would reduce because there would not be a conducive 
environment for business. The several protests and demonstrations that led to the closure 
of the companies’ facilities for some days also disrupted the anticipated volume of 
production. As much as the oil companies avoided questions on the effects of the crises 
on their operations, there was a consensus among them that losses incurred due to 
spillages during vandalisms and shut-ins during protests and demonstrations run into 
billions of dollars. 
 
 
 
 
  190 
3) What are the community relations strategies employed by oil companies to 
avoid/resolve conflicts with host communities? 
 
Though some scholars have argued that the community was fast disintegrating in the face 
of globalization as engendered by increase in mobility and communication, others have 
countered the argument that the community was a reality that could not be ignored 
(Baskin, Aronoff & Lattimore, 1997). In recent times, individuals and agencies have 
begun to pay special attention to the reality of the community. They emphasized that 
though organizations might be preoccupied by regional, national, and international 
community relations programmes, they ought not to forget their immediate communities, 
i.e. their host communities. This, therefore, necessitates the adoption of viable 
community relations strategies by the oil companies.  
 
As illustrated in Fig. 4.10, one of Shell’s community relations strategies during conflicts 
was dialogue. The company’s representative stated that the company discussed a lot with 
the communities. He explained that dialogue was part of the company’s efforts to 
understand the communities. During the process, the company usually attempted to view 
issues from the perspectives of the communities so as to understand their challenges. The 
Independent Monitor of May 10, 2010 reported that Shell organized a workshop in which 
it engaged the members of Degema Local Government Area (DELGA) Cluster I, in 
Rivers State, on developmental issues, particularly as related to the GMOU execution. 
 
Another strategy that Shell’s representative stated that the company used during conflicts 
was the involvement of the government. Shell insisted that it was not in its place, but the 
government’s, to lead the process of development. Hence, the company involved the 
government so as to encourage it to take responsibility for its people. He stated that the 
conflicts the company endured in the communities were as a result of the communities’ 
displeasure towards the government. He explained that if the government would take 
responsibility for the development of the communities, the challenges would reduce, and 
the violence against the company would stop.  
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Shell’s representative also pointed out that but for the presence of the company in the 
communities, some of them would have still been without basic amenities such as water, 
power supply and good road. He stated that some governors and local government 
officials had not even been to some of the communities; hence, much of the development 
so far was owed to Shell. This claim, however, may be misleading because some of the 
Niger Delta communities did not have those said amenities. In some communities where 
they were available, they were mostly not functional.  
 
Nevertheless, personal observation during this study revealed that in the communities 
where the amenities were available, oil companies’ presence was felt more than that of 
the government. Hence, the situation might have been responsible for the perceived 
attitude of the oil companies that the communities did not have a choice but to settle for 
whatever was provided. 
 
Shell also made use of the situational approach to deal with conflicts in the communities. 
The strategy was reactive in nature rather than proactive, because it was the issue 
encountered that determined the strategy that was adopted. Shell’s representative 
explained that the company had been exposed to different issues, and sometimes 
conflicts, in the communities that required different techniques to resolve. He insisted 
that there were no hard and fast rules as far as conflicts were concerned because the 
technique that worked for one might not work for another.  
 
For instance, since Shell had to pull out of Ogoni, there had not been any need to repeat 
the action elsewhere. He stated that another characteristic of the situational approach was 
its dynamic nature. It changed with time while drawing from past experiences. He saw 
community relations as a process which required its strategies to be adapted to situations 
constantly. It can be observed from the above, therefore, that the situational approach 
determined the application of the other strategies used by Shell during conflicts. Whether 
or not Shell would pull out, dialogue, or involve the government would depend on the 
situation being encountered. 
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Community initiative was identified as another strategy that Shell made use of during 
conflicts. The strategy involved pushing the development decisions to the communities so 
that they could take responsibility for themselves. Shell’s representative said the strategy 
had the potential of satisfying the communities and eventually resolving conflicts, since 
the development plans would be initiated by them.    
 
Shell also pulled out of the concerned community during conflict. Shell only reserved the 
strategy for extreme cases, which had not occurred since the Ogoni crisis. The company’s 
representative explained that Shell decided to pull out of the community to keep the 
conflict from escalating. He also insisted that the company had not regretted the action 
because it gave the people the opportunity to sit and critically think on what ought to be 
done, and it also helped the company to reassess its relationships. The strategy involved 
the company shutting down its operations completely in the community and evacuating 
its equipment so as to discontinue productions. This result agrees with the conflict theory 
which says that for conflict to be controlled, a group must be able to suppress its rival, 
even if it is temporarily. The Ogoni community was able to win both national and 
international support to pressurise Shell into withdrawing from the community before the 
crisis could be controlled.   
 
Here, Shell’s claim raises the question as to whether the company vacated Ogoni 
community voluntarily or not. Media reports at the time showed that after the execution 
of Ken Saro-Wiwa, the company came under much pressure from Ogoni community, the 
entire Niger Delta region, human right organizations, international communities and 
sections of its shareholders (AM News, 1995). In view of that, the pull out can hardly be 
referred to as voluntary. Nevertheless, the company also admitted that pulling out was 
only an option when there was none other. 
 
 
In the case of Chevron, community initiative was the only community relations strategy 
that was mentioned. While Shell believed that the situational approach comprised the 
other strategies, Chevron claimed that whatever strategy it would adopt for any conflict 
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would be based on community initiative. Chevron’s conception of community initiative 
was similar to that of Shell because it involved allowing the communities to chart their 
own path for development. Chevron considered its use of the strategy as being preventive 
rather than curative. The logic was that a full-fledged conflict could be prevented by 
allowing the communities to adopt their own developmental approach. The communities 
would not have to fight the company if they were the determiners of their own fate.  
 
Jones (2004), while explaining the stakeholder theory, states that the existence of an 
organization depends on its ability to create value and acceptable outcomes for its 
different stakeholders. The community relations strategies adopted by the oil companies 
show their realization that their existence in the Niger Delta depends on their ability to 
create value for their host communities. From the above, it can be seen that the 
companies are making deliberate effort to court the communities, which is a clear 
indication that they have identified the communities as a fundamental part of their 
stakeholders.  
 
Bronn (2006) also comments on the need to adapt strategies to communities. He explains 
that multinational companies operate in different countries; hence, they must note that the 
acceptance of initiative in one country does not necessarily mean its acceptance in 
another. By implication, the oil companies must always take the communities into 
consideration before designing strategies. In order to keep existing in the Niger Delta, the 
oil companies are making efforts to build profitable relationships with the communities. 
The question now is whether the outcomes are acceptable to the communities or not.  
 
Since community relations is premised on the principles of communication, and 
communication is bidirectional at least, it stands to reason that community relations 
strategies cannot be assessed without considering the views of the recipients. Hence, the 
participants in this study shared their views on the community relations strategies they 
identified with the oil companies during conflicts. One of such strategies was that the oil 
companies never communicated with the communities during conflicts. Some of the 
participants claimed that the companies usually withdrew from the communities, thereby 
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becoming inaccessible to the people. They said that the companies would fence off their 
facilities and cease to communicate with the communities during conflicts.  
 
Considering the strategies claimed by the oil companies, it can easily be seen that 
withdrawal from the communities was not one of them. This, therefore, shows that there 
is a contradiction between the active participations claimed by the oil companies and the 
withdrawal identified by the communities. 
 
Some other participants identified that the oil companies made use of dialogue during 
conflict. They said that the oil companies sometimes called the leaders of the 
communities for dialogue. They also said that some other times, the companies would 
require some pressure before agreeing to a dialogue. Some participants in 
Eruemukohwarien explained that whenever Shell wanted to dialogue with their 
community, the community’s liaison officer (CLO) would be sent to discuss with them, 
who would then report to the company. It can be observed in this case that there is 
congruence between the strategy claimed by the companies and the one identified by the 
participants. 
 
Provision of amenities was also identified as one of the community relations strategies 
used by the oil companies during conflicts. The participants said that the oil companies 
provided some amenities so as to placate the communities. While some claimed that the 
projects were either shabbily executed or not completed, like the uncompleted and 
dilapidated school in Tisun and the nonfunctional water projects in Eruemukohwarien, 
some others said that their efforts were commendable, like in the case of the Health 
Centre in Obrikom. When we compare the strategy identified here and the ones claimed 
by the oil companies, it will be noticed that the companies did not mention the provision 
of amenities as one of their strategies. In fact, according to the companies, the 
communities were responsible for their own development.  
 
The participants also identified military intervention as another strategy used by the oil 
companies during conflicts. According to them, the companies engaged the military for 
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protection from the communities. They observed that the companies did not come with 
securities during their initial incursion into the communities and could not understand 
why the new development was necessary.  
 
Since the selected communities for this study considered themselves relatively peaceful, 
they insisted that they were being misjudged by the oil companies and the government. 
Some participants insisted that bringing in the military was not in good faith; it was done 
to protect the oil companies from having to compensate the communities. Some 
participants also observed that the military personnel mounted road blocks in the 
communities from which they extorted money from the people.  
 
The traditional Marxist perspective of the conflict theory explains the oil companies’ use 
of forces by stating that one of multinational companies’ modes of domination is the use 
of military force (Pease, 2003). In the Niger Delta scenario, the oil companies’ initial 
domination was economic, but consequent on the evolution of conflicts, military 
intervention was introduced as a protective measure. Notwithstanding other purposes for 
introducing military forces into the communities, it also seemed to have served as a 
means of subduing the communities.  
 
Comparing the communities’ responses here with the companies’ claims of strategies 
used during conflicts, it can be observed that there was no single mention of military 
engagement by the companies. While the companies claimed that they concentrated on 
working with the communities to resolve conflicts, the communities insisted that the 
companies’ military protection made them inaccessible. Considering the rate of 
kidnapping and vandalism in the Niger Delta, it is only logical to expect the oil 
companies to take precaution by engaging military protection. This, however, does not 
explain why the oil companies did not mention military engagement as part of their 
strategies for dealing with conflicts in the communities. It also does not excuse the 
alleged excesses of the military personnel as reported by the participants. 
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The participants also agreed that the oil companies involved the government in their 
community relations during conflicts.  But unlike the claims of the companies, the 
participants saw the companies and the government as partners in business- looking out 
for each other. The oil companies were accused of running to the government during 
conflicts, while the government in turn made promises that were never kept. They were 
also accused of blaming the government for the undeveloped state of the communities, 
thereby absolving themselves of responsibilities.  
 
Omoweh (2010) also notes that there is a joint venture between the oil companies and the 
government, in which the companies are the junior partners; therefore, the companies 
expect the government to shoulder the development responsibilities in the communities. 
This may explain why the oil companies frequently refer the communities to the 
government in cases of conflicts.    
 
The participants also claimed that the oil companies gave gifts to community leaders 
during conflicts, though this was not reported by the companies. While some participants 
were favourably disposed towards the idea, some others were not. Those who favoured 
the idea claimed that contracts were given to their leaders and even sometimes the 
youths. It can be seen in this situation that the benefits from the companies were not 
limited to the leaders, which explains why those participants favoured the idea.  
 
On the other hand, those who did not favour the idea claimed that the benefits were 
targeted at corrupting their leaders. They explained that some of those gifts were given to 
their leaders to help manage protests in the communities. Not only would such gifts 
prevent the leaders from representing their people effectively, they would also cause 
strife within the communities. It can be observed in this case that the oil companies 
appeared to be selective in their generosity; some individual were identified and they 
were given special treatments due to their abilities to influence other people.  
 
The global memorandum of understanding (GMoU) was another strategy that the 
participants identified with the oil companies during conflicts. Though the companies did 
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not list the GMoU as one of the community relations strategies they used during 
conflicts, it was mentioned among the unique strategies to both Chevron and Shell. As 
conceived by the oil companies, the strategy was meant to reduce the number of MoUs 
signed between them and the communities by making a single arrangement that covered 
several communities at a time. The strategy was designed so that the communities could 
determine their own development. The communities were grouped into clusters and each 
cluster selected its development projects while the companies provided the funding. In 
the case of Chevron, the clusters were administered by Itsekiri Rural Development 
Council (IRDC), while Shell had Cluster Development Boards (CDB).  
 
The findings in this study reveal that though the respondents were familiar with the 
acronym “GMoU,” most of them could not tell what it meant. Notwithstanding, there was 
a consensus among most of the respondents that their communities felt less impact of the 
oil companies after the GMoU than before it. They were of the opinion that the 
companies became inaccessible after the advent of the strategy. Before the agreement, the 
communities had direct contacts with representatives from the companies, but afterwards, 
only the IRDC and CDB made the contacts on behalf of the communities.  
 
The participants complained that they had not seen any tangible impact of the oil 
companies since the GMoU strategy was adopted. This finding agrees with Faleti (nd, p. 
23) who discovered in his study that most of the communities that signed the agreement 
regretted it soon afterwards because they lost access to benefits they enjoyed previously 
by the virtue of their host community status. He claims that the benefits included 
“Unemployment allowance, payment for ‘ghost workers,’ compensation for 
environmental disruption, Christmas and New Year gifts, etc.” He also notes that 
environmental issues pertaining to degradation due to dredging and spills, among others, 
were not reflected in the agreement. 
 
It was observed in this study that most of the participants, particularly in Tisun and 
Kolokolo, felt that the strategy was not achieving whatever it was meant to achieve. 
There was, however, a different view from the secretary of a council the participants 
  198 
referred to as Trustees; the council representing each Itsekiri community. He claimed that 
the communities had felt the impact of Chevron more in the last three years than they had 
felt in thirty-three earlier years. He stated that the primary aim of the strategy was to 
address issues relating to development and employment. Of all the participants in this 
study, he displayed the clearest understanding of the origin, purpose, and nature of 
GMoU.  
 
From the above, it becomes obvious, therefore, that there was information gap between 
the Trustees (or IRDC) and the rest of the communities. It is also a paradox that the 
secretary of the council claimed that the communities felt the impact of Chevron more 
after the GMoU was adopted, while the rest of the communities claimed the opposite. 
From the claims of the communities and the observations made during this study, it could 
be seen that the communities lacked schools, portable water, power supply, and a good 
road network, among other things. It was also obvious that poverty was a reality in those 
communities.  
 
The GMoU, as conceived by the oil companies, is no doubt a laudable strategy due to its 
people centered philosophy. It may, however, be faulty in its execution. The strategy may 
have succeeded in solving the problem of multiple MoUs signed by the oil companies, 
reducing the seemingly unending demands made by several groups within the same 
community, and making the communities take responsibility for their development, 
thereby lacking reasons to blame the companies. But it has also succeeded in creating an 
opportunity for a few people to determine the fate of several communities.  
 
Considering that the Trustees representing Tisun and Kolokolo, for instance, did not even 
reside in the communities, how would they make developmental decisions that would 
affect the people? Since the oil companies claimed that they would no longer determine 
the development of the people because they did not experience their peculiar challenges, 
it is arguable, therefore, that the Trustees are neither qualified for the same reason.  
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If indeed Shell’s CDBs and Chevron’s IRDCs were effective, they would have served as 
extensions of the companies, bringing their benefits closer to the people. Consequent on 
the foregoing discussions, it is arguable that the councils or boards may continue to 
present the oil companies with development plans and the companies may continue to 
support same while the communities continue to lack development.  
 
The oil companies may not be bothered by the politics between the CDBs/IRDCs and the 
communities if all they care about is the positive publicity generated by the GMoU; but if 
they are actually interested in the development of the communities, the strategic 
execution of the GMoU must include a grass root monitoring scheme. This will ensure 
that the communities are actually benefiting from the arrangement. The failure to ensure 
that the grass roots benefit from the GMoU may return the companies to the era when the 
communities felt that their leaders were benefiting from the oil companies at their 
expense. 
 
From the participants’ evaluation of the oil companies’ community relations strategies, 
we see that the oil companies have not created acceptable outcomes for the communities. 
Though they have made efforts to create values, those values have not been considered 
satisfactory by the communities. This explains why their existence in the Niger Delta is 
threatened. Also going by Broom & Dozier’s (1990) suggestion that the level of 
agreement and accuracy between an organization and its publics can be used as an 
indicator of the quality of their relationship, we see that both parties differ on the 
strategies used by the oil companies. This, therefore, indicates a poor relationship 
between the companies and their publics.  
 
   
4) What structural differences are inherent in the community relations 
strategies adopted by the selected oil companies in the Niger Delta? 
 
Some scholars have observed that the twentieth century brought with it a better 
understanding, among organizations, of the need to be more organized and proactive in 
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respect to community relations activities (Baskin, Aronoff & Lattimore, 1997). They 
insisted that organizations must, at all cost, guard against negative acts and also work to 
preserve existing relationships through proactive and positive actions. Hence, oil 
companies also engage specific community relations strategies to create and maintain 
profitable relationships with their host communities.  
 
Also, considering that the companies differ, it is to be expected that some differences 
would be inherent in their strategies.  The oil companies under study also claimed some 
uniqueness in their strategic approach to community relations. Fig. 4.7 shows the unique 
community relations strategies adopted by Chevron and Shell. Agip declined all 
interview requests; hence, its strategies were not reflected the discussion.  
 
According to the Fig.4.7, one of Chevron’s unique strategies was its corporate social 
responsibility (CSR). No doubt, other companies also practised CSR; nevertheless, 
Chevron claimed that its design was unique because it focused, not only on the 
immediate communities, but also on the broader community being Nigeria. Chevron’s 
representative stated that the company donated computers and other facilities to 
universities, as well as encouraged staff members to contribute to knowledge by teaching 
in universities. The strategy was designed to create a cross-fertilization of ideas between 
the industry and the academia.  
 
Another community relations strategy that Chevron made use of was the GMoU. The 
strategy could be considered unique to the company mainly because Chevron originated 
it in 2005. Though the strategy had since been adopted by Shell and some other oil 
companies, it still remained unique in that no two organizations could engage it the same 
way. The strategy was a redefinition of Chevron’s community engagement method by 
making the communities responsible for their own development. The company allowed 
communities to originate development ideas and they were made to work with non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) to draw up their own plans to achieve the ideas. The 
secretary of the Trustees in Kolokolo also explained Chevron’s GMoU design by stating 
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that it catered for 23 oil producing communities in five oil fields. He explained that the 
communities were represented by the Itsekiri Rural Development Council (IRDC). 
 
According to its design, the strategy allowed the communities to draw from the fund 
provided by Chevron to address any developmental challenge of their choice without 
waiting for the company’s direct intervention. It also empowered the communities and 
promoted sound decision making, since they must evaluate all their needs before 
choosing the most important one to address. 
 
As earlier stated, Shell also made use of the GMoU. The strategy was adopted by Shell in 
2006 and became fully functional in 2007. Shell’s representative explained that the 
strategy was adopted to avoid the challenges created by the signing of several MoUs in 
the same and several other communities. GMoU made the agreements easy to manage 
because they were all contained in a single document that was applicable to several 
communities at the same time.  
 
According to Shell’s GMoU design, the 1,500 communities in which the company 
operated were divided into 67 groups, either by their local government areas or their 
ethnic affinities. Each group was called a cluster and had an overall governing body 
known as the Cluster Development Board (CDB). The communities in each cluster met to 
decide on their development plans while counting on Shell’s financial support for the 
execution. The fund provided by Shell was for a fixed period of five years after which it 
was renewable. Shell also made allowance for the communities to seek funding 
elsewhere whenever such was necessary. 
 
Another of Shell’s unique community relations strategies was the company’s business 
ethics. Shell’s representative claimed that the company exhibited good neighbourliness 
and was mindful of its host communities. He defined being mindful as doing things that 
were beneficial to the communities and minimizing negative impact on them. He claimed 
that it also meant being ready to apologise to the communities when they were offended. 
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Shell again identified openness as another unique community relations strategy. The 
company’s representative expressed Shell’s readiness to make information available to 
the communities. He claimed that the company always put the communities in the picture 
of whatever related to them. Not only were the people given information about the 
activities of the company in their communities, they were also allowed to express 
themselves. He was of the opinion that the level of trust between the company and the 
communities would be very high if the communities were consulted and nothing was 
hidden for them. 
 
Shell also claimed that its business principles were part of its unique community relations 
strategies. The company’s representative referred to the set of principles as the Statement 
of General Business Principles and said that it served as the guideline for all the activities 
of Shell in a different way from what was obtainable in other companies. He explained 
that the principles served as the frame work that determined the way the company would 
relate with the communities. From the above, it can be said that Shell’s community 
relations was ingrained into the companies’ business principles.   
 
The responses of the oil companies revealed the uniqueness of their strategies. Those 
strategies were products of the companies’ policies; therefore, they represented their 
corporate characters. The decision at the management level to adopt the strategies 
showed that community relations was a management function. This reveals the link 
between our findings and the stakeholder theory, since Freeman, Winks & Parmar (2004) 
claim that the stakeholder theory is managerial in nature. They say it reflects and directs 
how managers operate in respect to their stakeholders, who in this case are the Niger 
Delta communities. It also provides assistance to managers through the promotion of 
analysis of how the communities fit into their larger environment. 
 
While the oil companies presented the uniqueness of their community relations strategies 
from an organizational point of view, the respondents assessed the strategies from the 
recipients’ point of view.  One of the areas in which the oil companies were assessed was 
the perceived direction of their relationship with the communities. Table 4.11 shows that 
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of the three oil companies selected for this study, most of Agip’s respondents said that its 
relationship with their communities was cordial. This percentage is relatively high 
compared to that of Chevron and Shell. On the other hand, more than three-quarters of 
the respondents claimed that Shell’s relationship with their communities was not cordial, 
and exactly three-quarters also claimed the same for Chevron.  
 
A comparison of the respondents’ views above with the preceding responses of Chevron 
and Shell reveals a contradiction in the claims of both parties. While the oil companies 
reported their unique community relations strategies, which were obviously people 
centered, the respondents claimed that the relationships of the duo with their communities 
were largely not cordial. Considering that the oil companies’ community relations 
strategies were meant to help establish a mutual relationship between them and the 
communities, it raises some concern that a very high percentage of the respondents felt 
that their communities were not favourably disposed towards Shell and Chevron. There 
is, no doubt, a missing link between the oil companies’ design of their well articulated 
strategies and their delivery to the communities.  
 
Also, the respondents assessed the oil companies on the perceived frequency of their 
communication with the communities. Of the three oil companies, most of the 
respondents claimed that Chevron never communicated with their communities, four out 
of every five said that Shell communicated once in a while and Agip was considered to 
have communicated often. Although Agip had its highest percentage among the 
respondents who said it communicated once in a while, compared to Shell and Chevron, 
more respondents said Agip communicated often.  
 
As presented earlier, Chevron’s unique community relations strategies included the 
company’s CSR and the GMoU. Considering the nature of the strategies, it should have 
been taken for granted that communication with the communities would be the driving 
force of the process. This, however, did not appear to be the case since this study shows 
that almost three-quarter of the respondents claimed that Chevron never communicated 
with their communities. A possible explanation for this paradox may be found in the 
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structure of the GMoU strategy. Since, Chevron no longer communicated directly with 
the communities, the tendency was there for the respondents to see less of the company 
and thereby believe that communication was not taking place. Also, considering that the 
representatives of the communities who related with Chevron did not reside in the 
communities, it is plausible that whatever communication they had with the company 
might be unknown to the people.  
 
Also in the case of Shell, most of the respondents said that it only communicated once in 
a while with their communities. Looking at the combination of strategies adopted by the 
company, one would have expected an assessment better than this. For instance, how 
could the company have practised openness if there was no constant communication? 
Shell also made use of the GMoU; hence, the same situation described for Chevron might 
apply to a certain extent. In Shell’s case, however, the host communities did not make 
any claim about their leaders not being residential. This means that the communities were 
likely to be aware of whatever communication that went on between their leaders and the 
company. This might account for the “once in a while” assessment given to Shell’s 
communication with their communities. 
 
Again, the respondents expressed their views on the oil companies’ contributions to 
development in their communities. The findings reveal that of the three oil companies, 
Agip had the highest rating among the respondents who agreed that it contributed to the 
development in their communities. Three-quarters of the respondents said Shell 
sometimes contributed to their development while most of the respondents said Chevron 
did not contribute at all.  
 
Talking about contributions to development, it can be observed that Chevron, while 
presenting its unique CSR strategy, focused more on the general community (Nigeria) 
rather than the immediate communities. This might have determined the amount of 
attention that was given to the immediate communities. On the other hand, it is 
noteworthy that though Chevron had the highest claim of not contributing to the 
development of the communities at all, 43.1% still claimed that it did once in a while. 
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The close call between the two categories, therefore, shows that rather than conclude that 
Chevron did not contribute at all, it can be said that the contribution was minimal.  
 
Shell was rated highest by respondents who said that it contributed to community 
development once in a while. This also corresponded with the company’s previous 
assessment of communicating with the communities once in a while. Notwithstanding the 
strategies adopted by Shell, this finding suggests that the communities have not seen 
enough of the company’s efforts. This may raise the question as to whether or not the 
communities can ever see enough of the oil companies’ efforts. The Agip situation may 
provide an answer to this, since the perception of the respondents of the company has 
been mostly positive. Unfortunately, Agip’s rating cannot be explored further in light of 
its strategies because the information was not provided by the company. 
 
As far as consultation with the communities was concerned, most of the respondents said 
Chevron never consulted with their communities and Shell consulted once in a while. On 
the other hand, Agip was considered to have consulted often. Going by Shell and 
Chevron’s GMoU strategies, one could say that the oil companies were no longer directly 
involved in planning and executing development projects in the communities, therefore, 
the need for consultation might not arise.  
 
Considering how old the strategies were as at the time this study was conducted, the host 
communities of Shell and Chevron would have done without direct consultation for three 
to four years respectively. If in spite of this arrangement, Shell was still considered to 
have consulted with the communities once in a while, then the company must have found 
a way of sustaining partial contact with the communities which Chevron had not. 
Nevertheless, more than partial contact would be required to foster favourable 
relationship with the communities. 
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5) How do the host communities perceive oil companies’ community relations 
strategies?  
 
Over the year, several scholars have emphasized the role of perception in human 
relationships. According to Perreault & McCarthy (2005), perception is how we gather 
and interpret information from the world around us. Considering how valuable the 
perceptions of the relevant publics are to an organization, this study also examines the 
host communities’ overall assessment of the community relations strategies of the oil 
companies.  
 
The finding in this study shows the respondents’ views of the oil companies’ influence on 
their communities. Agip was considered to have had a positive influence on the 
communities while opposing views were held of Shell and Chevron. Without any doubt, 
perception is one of the determinants of the success or failure of any organization and the 
oil companies are no exception. The companies require the goodwill of their significant 
publics to function effectively.  
 
Moon (2001) notes that community perceptions mostly form the basis for community 
choice to either support or disrupt corporate activities. As can be seen from the discussion 
so far, a large percentage of the respondents said that Shell failed to positively influence 
their communities. The qualitative data, however, show that some of the participants in 
the interview sessions were of the opinion that Shell did not completely fail; it only did 
not measure up to the expectations of the communities. An elder in Eruemukohwarien 
said that Shell made some efforts to pacify the community by providing some facilities, 
but it could do more.  
 
Chevron too was adjudged not to have influenced the communities positively. Agip, on 
the other hand, was perceived by the respondents as having positively influenced their 
communities. The qualitative data show that the women leader in Obrikom stated that 
Agip had to be pressurized before it contributed to the community.  This might suggest 
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that the positive influence the company had on the communities would not have been the 
case if pressure was not applied.  
 
A good relationship is built on effective communication. As can be seen from the 
explanation above, the respondents were of the opinion that Chevron and Shell did not 
communicate effectively with their communities. Not only can this situation complicate 
existing conflicts, it can also engender fresh ones. The oil companies should endeavour to 
establish a communication system that will extend to the grassroots. This is necessary 
because the people at the grassroots are the ones that are actually affected by the 
challenges in the communities.  
 
The respondents also expressed their satisfaction with Agip’s conflict resolution 
strategies while they were dissatisfied with those of Shell. Chevron returned the worst 
assessment, however. A possible explanation for this was provided during the men’s 
FGD session held in Tisun. They were of the opinion that Chevron lacked the grassroots 
approach since the GMoU was introduced. They claimed that they could not be sure 
whether or not their leaders were representing them well with Chevron.  
 
Hence, it was a failure on the part of the company not to have gone to the grassroots 
where the actual problems were. Chevron’s representative, however, was of the 
impression that the company had made significant improvement in its relationship with 
the communities since the strategy was adopted. He said that the company had never 
been shut down on the account of any conflict; rather, it had enjoyed a positive 
operational community.   
 
Conflict is undesirable in any community; hence, decisive actions must be taken to either 
forestall or resolve it as soon as possible. It is interesting to note that in the explanation 
above, Chevron had the highest rate of respondents’ dissatisfaction with its conflict 
resolution, while it was also reported as having the least conflict acknowledgement of the 
three oil companies. It is also a paradox that in the above explanation, more respondents 
were satisfied with Agip’s conflict resolution, yet, more than three-quarters of the 
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respondents also acknowledged its involvement in conflicts. Shell was the only company 
that the respondents’ dissatisfaction with its conflict resolution corresponded with the 
acknowledgement of conflict occurrence.  
 
In order to rule out coincidence, it can be observed (see Table 4.8) that majority of the 
respondents from the five communities under study claimed that conflicts rarely occurred 
in their communities. However, a further observation reveals that Omoku and Obrikom, 
where Agip operates, had the highest percentages among respondents who claimed 
“often” and “very often” conflict occurrence in their communities. This means that more 
conflicts were reported for Agip than any of the other two companies.  If indeed 
Chevron’s conflict resolution was not satisfactory, it would have been expected that there 
would be more conflicts associated with the company, and the opposite would also have 
been expected for Agip.  
 
Again, most of the respondents said Agip was usually ready to negotiate during conflicts, 
followed by Shell and with Chevron coming last. This corresponds with the claim made 
by the Secretary of the Trustees that Chevron never gave room for negotiation. By 
implication, even the councils administering the GMoU clusters were denied the 
opportunity to negotiate with the Company.  
 
Also, most of the respondents said that Agip’s communication reduced the frequency of 
conflicts in their communities, followed by Shell. On the other hand, more than three-
quarters of the respondents said that Chevron’s communication did not reduce conflicts.  
This is understandable, since earlier results had shown that most of the company’s 
respondents claimed that its communication was not effective. While the responses on 
Chevron and Agip correspond with earlier result, that of Shell is contradictory. Here, 
more of Shell’s respondents claimed that its communication reduced the frequency of 
conflict, while earlier, the respondents had claimed that its communication was not 
effective.  Considering that the respondents also acknowledged that Shell was ready to 
negotiate, it is not farfetched that conflicts were reduced through its communication with 
host communities. 
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Respondents also assessed oil companies based on their abilities to keep promises. The 
entire process of conflict resolution is based on the ability of both parties to keep to the 
terms of their agreement. This should be more so for the oil companies because they tend 
to be the dominant party in the agreement. For Chevron, more than three-quarters of the 
respondents said the company did not usually keep its promises. Also, more than half of 
the respondents said Shell never kept to its promises.  
 
During the FGD session in Eruemukohwarien, the women also agreed with this finding. 
They explained that the company would not go to the community unless by invitation, 
and after the visit, nothing would be done. Recalling the protest that was staged in 2008, 
they claimed that Shell made promises (which could not have been covered by the GMoU 
since negotiation with individual communities had been stopped), but had not fulfilled 
them. However, Shell’s representative claimed that the GMoU had achieved much of the 
desired impact. He explained that the communities made less demands and more 
decisions. This means that the company did not have any development promise to fulfil 
since development decisions had been left to the clusters. As for Agip, more than half of 
the respondents claimed that it usually kept to its promises, which was the highest 
percentage among the three companies. Generally, it can be concluded that most of the 
respondents perceived Agip to be far better in keeping promises than Chevron and Shell.  
 
From the responses of the communities, it can be seen that they had strong opinions of 
the oil companies. Those opinions were formed in the process of seeking and processing 
information concerning the companies and their activities in the communities. Hence, the 
communities can be referred to as active publics (Baskin, Aronoff & Lattimore, 1997), 
thereby establishing a link between them and the behaviour described in the situational 
theory.  
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6) What community relations strategies would host communities prefer in their 
relationship with oil companies? 
 
The question of the community relations preference of the host communities is one of the 
most important questions that must be answered if a cordial relationship will be 
developed between them and the oil companies. This is because the oil companies can 
keep making efforts without their being appreciated by the communities, because they are 
not desired. The companies are the sources of community relations efforts and the 
communities are the recipients. Fig 4.12 reveals that the oil companies identified 
transparency, consultation, community initiatives and the provision of amenities as the 
perceived preference of the communities. While it is important to know what the 
companies think those preferences were, it is more important to find out what the 
communities identified as their own preferences.  
 
Fig 4.13 shows that the first strategic preference of the communities was the withdrawal 
of the forces by the oil companies. They claimed that it would foster a better relationship 
that would be void of suspicions and threats. The participants were also of the opinion 
that the companies enjoyed better relationships with the communities at their initial 
incursion, when the military forces were not involved.  
 
The oil companies, however, did not identify the withdrawal of armed forces as one of 
the preferences of the communities, since they did not even admit that they used the 
forces in the first place. The companies, probably, did not want to create the impression 
that any situation was beyond control, thereby warranting the involvement of armed 
forces. Or, the companies may see the involvement of the armed forces as a protective 
measure rather than a strategy for relating with the communities. Whatever be the case, 
the communities were of the opinion that any medium of communication or compulsion 
used by the companies was their strategy. 
 
The participants also identified better employment as another strategy that would help 
ensure company-community peaceful cohabitation. They said that the provision of 
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employment would keep the youths occupied and make them less susceptible to 
restiveness. Employment was recommended as a potent remedy for militancy. It was also 
suggested that the government should make proper employment provision an integral part 
of the amnesty program it was running. This is to avoid the undesirable possibility of the 
ex-militants returning to the creeks if they are not properly engaged. They acknowledged 
the oil companies’ contributions in terms of scholarships, but they also pointed out that 
scholarships would be useless if there were no job opportunities after graduation.  
 
One of the major complaints of the participants as far as job was concerned was the 
employment of other ethnic groups such as Yoruba and Hausa into key positions, while 
Niger Delta indigenes were given casual appointments. They insisted that they had 
educated and qualified individuals who could fill such positions.  
 
Another strategic preference indicated by the respondents during the FGD and KII 
sessions was the physical presence of the oil companies. This strategy was stressed by all 
the participants in this study.  They insisted that if the oil companies were really 
interested in building a good relationship with their communities, they would go down to 
the grassroots. Some participants said that if the oil companies failed to go to the 
grassroots, they would only be negotiating with the people in the townships who could 
not be affected by any of the challenges in the communities. It was also advised that the 
oil companies should stop inviting community leaders to the townships where they would 
be pampered with hotel accommodations and other benefits, thereby corrupting their 
sense of judgement. 
 
It is necessary, at this juncture, to recall that the GMoU strategy adopted by Chevron and 
Shell, as explained by the companies’ representatives, did not make provision for the 
physical presence of the companies. Since the communities now make and execute their 
own development plans, there is little or no need for the oil companies to visit the 
communities, unless probably to commission projects. Though Agip did not seem to have 
adopted the GMoU, the participants still complained of the lack of its physical presence 
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in the communities. Consequently, it is important for the oil companies to stay connected 
with the grassroots to ensure the effectiveness of their strategies. 
 
The communities also suggested that the oil companies should adopt education as part of 
their community relations strategies. No doubt that scholarships and school buildings 
were part of the benefits enjoyed from the oil companies in the past, there could be more. 
In Tisun for instance, a school was built for the community and was never used until the 
building became dilapidated. One of the reasons for the non-usage of the school was the 
lack of teachers. Considering that the community is located in the creeks and is far from 
any major town, it may be unrealistic to expect teachers from the city to be deployed 
there. A better arrangement would be to train indigenes as teachers so that they can teach 
in their own communities. Female and sex education were also suggested so as to reduce 
the rate of teenage pregnancy in the communities. 
 
Another popular strategic preference of the communities was the focus on skill training. 
It may not be realistic to expect an entire community to be educated. Hence, proper 
provision should be made to cater for those who do not have the opportunity to attend 
school. It was also suggested that skill training in the communities would prevent urban 
migration and develop the potentials in the communities. The communities also said that 
the oil companies should help train the youths in the companies’ needed areas of 
technicalities so as to guarantee their employment after training them. School on wheels 
was also suggested to serve as a mobile training centre for several communities at a time. 
 
The participants in this study also suggested company-government partnership as another 
community relations strategy that would help to resolve the conflicts. They were of the 
opinion that there would be progress if the two parties could stop trading blames and they 
cooperate to develop the Niger Delta. Company-community partnership was also 
suggested to ensure peaceful cohabitation between the oil companies and the 
communities. Except an extreme case like that of Ogoni reoccurs, the communities and 
the companies would continue to interact closely; therefore, efforts must be made to 
achieve mutual understanding. 
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Also, the communities identified effective communication as another of their preferred 
strategies. They considered it a compulsory ingredient in building a mutually profitable 
relationship. This strategy corresponds with two of the ones identified by the oil 
companies; transparency and consultation with the communities. In terms of 
transparency, the companies believed that the communities wanted to be updated on 
every activity of the company that concerns them and their land. Shell’s representative 
claimed that the company usually kept the communities informed except for 
commercially sensitive information. The companies also believed that consulting with the 
communities would boost their sense of relevance and also help to build mutual trust. 
 
The final strategy that was identified by the communities was the provision of 
infrastructure. They noted that a clear difference existed between the communities and 
the oil companies’ facilities; while the companies had electricity, portable water and good 
roads, the opposite was usually the case in the communities. They insisted that one of the 
ways the companies could demonstrate their commitment to development of the 
communities was to extend the amenities.  
 
The companies also identified the provision of amenities as one of the preferred strategies 
of the communities. Shell’s representative explained that the company was aware that 
various communities had their aspirations as far as amenities were concerned. Hence, the 
company made money available to the clusters, under the auspices of GMoU, so that they 
could determine their own development. Chevron’s representative also agreed that the 
provision of amenities assisted the development of communities. 
 
One strategy that the oil companies felt the communities would prefer, but which was not 
mentioned in any of the communities was community initiative. The companies, 
particularly Shell and Chevron, believed that the communities would rather draw up their 
own development plans than depend on the companies to do for them. Since development 
preference differed from community to community, it was better for those communities 
to drive their own development plans. From the perspective of the oil companies, that 
singular strategy subsumed most of the others as might be mentioned by the 
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communities, since they did not need the companies anymore to develop their 
communities.  
 
Community initiative was one of the driving principles of the GMoU. One major 
argument in favour of the strategy was that, as at the time the companies attempted to 
develop the communities, they could not put the entire challenges and needs of the people 
into perspective. As currently practised, the GMoU allowed them to simply provide the 
fund and technical assistance while the communities made the decisions. By design, the 
strategy was foolproof, but in reality, there were some missing links. The major challenge 
that was expressed in the findings of this work was the gap between what the companies 
claimed and what the communities experienced. The companies ought to have a system 
for making sure that development reaches all the communities in each cluster, and that it 
reaches the grassroots in particular.  
 
The findings above are supported by the situational theory because they portray the 
characteristics of active publics. First, the communities recognised that there was a 
problem, conflict, which was why they expressed their views. Second, they recognised 
some of the constraints or obstacles in the way of finding a solution and among them 
were military intervention, unemployment, lack of companies’ physical presence, and 
lack of provision for skill training. Third, they did not stop at the point of recognition; 
rather, they went on to make suggestions as to how the obstacles could be removed, 
which clearly demonstrated their level of involvement. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The major aim of this study is to investigate the community relations strategies used by 
oil companies to manage the company-community conflicts in the Niger Delta. Chapter 
one is the introductory aspect of the study, which provides background information on 
the oil exploration process in the Niger Delta, as well as the attendant challenges that 
have led to the company-community conflicts witnessed in the region. The problem 
stems from the environmental degradation engendered by the exploration process and the 
depravation in the communities (Naanen, 1995; Akinola, 2009; Watts, 2009; Nafzinger, 
2009).  
 
The Niger Delta communities are undeveloped and the people blame this on both the oil 
companies and the government. The community relations perspective of the company-
community conflicts is also examined. Considering how valuable the communities are to 
the oil companies, they cannot afford not to maintain a mutual relationship with them, or 
they will continue to encounter threats, not only to their operations, but also to the lives 
of their staff. Therefore, this study aims at examining the community relations strategies 
used by oil companies in managing the conflicts in the Niger Delta. 
 
Chapter two focuses mainly on the review of relevant literature for this study. The 
chapter begins with the conceptualization of the term “conflict” by examining various 
definitions of the word, as well as arguments on what it is and what it is not. Sources and 
nature of conflicts are also discussed in the chapter. Furthermore, there is a review of 
materials on the Niger Delta conflicts, their oil dimension, as well as the involvement of 
multinational oil companies. Conflict is also examined with focus on the role of public 
relations, and specifically community relations, in managing and resolving it. The chapter 
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concludes with an explanation of the theories that are adopted to help impose a structure 
on the study, and these include Conflict theory, Situational theory and the Stakeholder 
theory. 
 
In Chapter Three, the methods adopted for this study is presented. The study makes use 
of survey, focus group discussion (FGD) and key informant interview (KII) designs to 
gather the data. The study population comprises the community relations units of oil 
companies in the Niger Delta (among which Shell, Chevron and Agip are selected) and 
the indigenes of Omoku and Obrikom communities in Rivers State, and 
Eruemukohwarien, Tisun and Kolokolo communities in Delta State. The sample size is 
made up of 595 respondents for the survey, 58 FGD participants and 13 KII participants. 
The instruments used for data gathering include questionnaire, interview guide and 
question guide. The data were analysed and then presented using tables and figures.  
 
Chapter Four presents the results from the survey, FGDs and KIIs. The results are 
discussed and the research questions raised earlier in this study are answered. Chapter 
Five provides a summary of the entire thesis and the conclusion, as well as the 
recommendations drawn from the findings. 
 
 
5.2 SUMMARY 
After investigating the questions raised in this study, it was discovered that: 
1. Majority of the respondents were aware of company-community conflicts in four 
of the five selected communities (Eruemukohwarien, Kolokolo, Omoku and 
Obrikom), while those in the remaining community (Tisun) claimed that they had 
not witnessed any conflict. It was also discovered that the four communities 
reportedly experienced conflicts rarely, though Omoku and Obrikom reported 
more frequent occurrence than Eruemukohwarien and Kolokolo.  
In respect to the oil companies’ involvement in the community conflicts, Shell 
had the highest percentage of perceived involvement overall and particularly 
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among respondents from Eruemukohwarien. Next was Agip, with specific 
acknowledgement from Omoku and Obrikom. Chevron had the least overall 
acknowledgement of conflict involvement, which included both 
acknowledgement and denial from Kolokolo and Tisun respectively.  
The study further reveals that the communities that claimed the occurrence of 
conflicts identified the following as the causes: oil companies representing the 
government, poor state of infrastructure, need to attract companies’ and 
government’s attention, politics and the oil companies’ failure to keep to 
agreements. On the other hand, those who claimed the absence of conflicts also 
attributed it to the following: the communities’ peaceful heritage, fear of military 
invasion, the youths’ respect for elders, the fear of God and respect for the law. 
2. The conflicts between the oil companies and the communities had serious 
implications for the two parties. The communities were affected because they 
were neglected by the companies during conflicts, military forces invaded them, 
there was lack of development and there was a lingering fear of future attacks on 
the communities, which kept some of the indigenes away. The oil companies, on 
the other hand, were affected because they constantly felt insecure and they 
experienced low productivity. 
3. The oil companies adopted several community relations strategies for conflict 
resolution in the Niger Delta. Shell identified pulling out of the community as an 
option in extreme cases. It also made use of dialogue, the government, situational 
approach and community initiatives to resolve conflicts with the communities. 
Chevron also made use of community initiative to resolve conflicts. On the other 
hand, the communities, which were the receivers of the community relations 
efforts of the companies, identified the following strategies with the companies: 
withdrawal of any form of assistance from the communities, dialogue, provision 
of amenities, military intervention, government involvement, the Global 
Memorandum of Understanding and giving gifts to the leaders in the 
communities. 
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4. The oil companies claimed that they had some unique community relations 
strategies. Chevron claimed that its strategies comprised a unique style of 
corporate social responsibility and the Global Memorandum of Understanding 
(GMoU), which it originated in 2005. Shell also adopted the GMoU in 2006. The 
Company still had some other unique strategies such as its business ethics, 
business principles and openness with the communities. The communities 
expressed their opinions about the companies’ strategies by assessing different 
aspects of their relationships. The communities claimed that they had cordial 
relationship with Agip, while their relationships were not cordial with Shell and 
Chevron. Also, as far as effective communication, contribution to community 
development and consultation with the communities were concerned, Chevron 
was given a negative appraisal, Shell performed the above once in a while, while 
Agip was positively appraised. 
5. The communities shared their perceptions about the oil companies. As far as the 
companies’ positive influence on the communities, satisfaction with their conflict 
resolution and their keeping of promises were concerned, the communities rated 
Chevron and Shell poorly, while Agip was highly rated. Also, the communities 
were favourably disposed towards Agip and Shell on effective communication, 
readiness to negotiate during conflicts and the reduction of conflicts through 
communication, while they were unfavourably disposed towards Chevron. 
6.  The oil companies expressed their opinions of the community relations strategies 
preferred by the communities as the following: transparency on the part of the 
companies, consultation with the communities, provision of amenities and 
community initiatives. The communities, however, had a longer list of preferred 
strategies which included: withdrawal of military forces, better employment, 
companies’ physical presence, proper education, skill training, company-
government partnership, company-community partnership, effective 
communication, and the provision of infrastructure. 
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5.3 CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, therefore, the conclusion of this study is that the community 
relations strategies adopted by the selected oil companies are not adequate in preventing 
and resolving company-community conflicts in the Niger Delta. The most important 
reason for this is the lacuna that exists between the strategies the oil companies believed 
host communities preferred for conflict resolution and the ones actually preferred by 
those communities. The gulf seemed to have consumed efforts made by the companies, 
thereby leaving little proof of their responsibilities to their hosts. The lack of grassroots 
approach also reduced the effectiveness of the strategies, since oil companies quoted 
large sums of money being spent on development and host communities said they got 
none of it. The communities’ representatives appropriated the fund earmarked for 
development while the companies believed that since they represented the communities, 
they were delivering the benefits. Hence, a grassroot approach would serve as a check for 
the excessiveness of community representatives.   
 
5.4 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The study has shown that good community relations strategies are indispensible if 
conflicts between oil companies and host communities would be resolved. Having 
examined the relationship between the selected oil companies and communities, the 
following recommendations are made: 
i. The oil companies should pay specific attention to the factors identified by the 
communities as being responsible for the occurrence of conflicts. For instance, 
the companies should be mindful that the performance of the government in the 
state or country in which they operate would have immense implications on the 
perception they enjoy from their host communities. Hence, they should use their 
strategic economic position to encourage or pressurise the government into 
being responsible. Also, the oil companies should make efforts to spread their 
contributions to all the communities in the Niger Delta rather than paying too 
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much attention to the restive ones. This is because some of the conflicts that 
occurred were due to the need for attention by some of the communities. 
ii. The community members should be properly enlightened by NGOs, which are 
more readily accepted than the government, on their rights as individuals and 
their roles in national development. This will prevent them from being used by 
deceptive politicians as tools for winning elections. It would also protect them 
from some influential community leaders who may incite the people to protest 
for their own ends. This is because the people would seek out information and 
facts for themselves before they act, rather than depending on the instructions of 
some privileged class. 
iii. The oil companies should note that some of the communities in which there 
were little or no conflict occurrences did not attribute their seemingly peaceful 
disposition to the oil companies’ community relations strategies. Rather, they 
attributed it to their respect for their elders, peaceful heritage, fear of God and 
respect for the law. This, therefore, challenges the oil companies to work harder 
on their strategies. It also gives an insight into the areas the companies can 
explore to maintain a good relationship with the communities. 
iv. Both the oil companies and the communities should constantly bear in mind the 
double edged consequences of conflicts; hence, they must be avoided at all cost. 
The companies must not be seen to be covertly instigating communal conflicts 
so as to make more profits while the communities are busy warring.   
v. Considering that majority of the respondents were not satisfied with the 
community relations strategies of the oil companies, more efforts should be 
made by the companies to improve on their strategies. Since the communities 
are the recipients of such efforts, it would be risky for the companies to ignore 
their feelings. 
vi. The oil companies using the Global Memorandum of Understanding (GMoU) 
should improve the strategy by including a grassroot scheme that will help 
  221 
ensure the desired result. Considering that majority of the respondents 
complained of not feeling the impact of the companies since the GMoU was 
introduced, and that the councils and boards constituted to represent the 
communities sometimes did not deliver the benefits to the people, the oil 
companies cannot afford to withdraw completely from the communities. The 
model below is suggested for a more effective execution of the GMoU: 
Fig 5.1: GMoU Monitoring Scheme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
What is currently obtainable is the communities relating with the Cluster Development 
Boards (CDB)/Itsekiri Rural Development Councils (IRDC), while they in turn relate 
with the oil companies, government and other development agents such as NGOs.  
Hence, the only addition to the process is the inclusion of a grass root monitoring scheme 
that will perform three important functions: restore the oil companies’ contacts with the 
communities, monitor the productivity of the CDB/IRDC and ensure the even distribution 
of benefits. 
 
Oil Companies 
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vii. The oil companies should work harder to improve the communities’ perception of 
their positive influence on the communities, effective communication, conflict 
resolution, readiness to negotiate during conflicts and keeping of promises. 
viii. The companies should try as much as possible to reduce the presence of 
military forces in the communities. If they are really interested in building a good 
relationship with the people, they should not treat them as enemies. Military 
involvement should be limited to the protection of the companies and their staff, 
rather than giving them the unbridled access to subdue the communities and extort 
money from them. 
ix. Skill training should be encouraged so as to cater for members of the communities 
who are not educated. The fact that they are uneducated does not mean that they 
are useless. Training can be provided in the technical areas that the oil companies 
would need their services. 
x. The government should implement the policies that regulate the activities of oil 
companies. This will help to curb the excesses of the companies and reduce as 
well as make them take responsibility for environmental degradations and other 
poor business practices. 
xi.  The government should co-operate with the oil companies to develop the Niger 
Delta communities, rather than trading blames. It will be difficult to achieve 
development if the communities do not know who to turn to for their various 
needs. The government and the oil companies should clearly define their 
individual and joint responsibilities so that the communities can rightly channel 
their requests. 
 
 5.5 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDIES 
The findings of this study have revealed other areas that could be explored in further 
studies. One of such areas is the implication of the amnesty programme for peace 
building efforts in the Niger Delta. While the present study focuses on the strategies used 
by the oil companies to build a favourable relationship with the communities, further 
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studies can evaluate the objectives of the amnesty programme and its ability to restore 
peace in the Niger Delta. 
 
Further studies could also examine the nature of partnership that exists between the oil 
companies and the Nigerian government, and the implication of this for community 
development. Since the two parties are in joint venture, it is necessary to investigate the 
extent to which they protect each other’s interests and at what expense? The study could 
also find out the degree of influence that one party enjoys over the other and the effect of 
this on the Niger Delta communities. 
 
Another important area that could be explored is the role of the Niger Delta leaders in the 
development or the underdevelopment of the region. This becomes necessary as a result 
of the findings of the current study that some leaders prosper at the expense of their 
communities.  
 
5.6 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 
This study has expanded the frontier of knowledge in the field of public relations, 
particularly community relations. It is an exploratory study of the community relations 
strategies used by the oil companies for conflict resolution in the Niger Delta. The study 
is unique because, unlike several other studies that focused either on the communities or 
the oil companies, it presents reports from both the oil companies and the communities’ 
perspectives. This enables us to evaluate the positions of both parties, find common 
grounds and identify areas of divergence.  
 
The study reveals the community relations strategies used by the oil companies for 
conflict resolution. It also presents the peculiarities of the strategies adopted by each of 
the oil companies. This serves as a backdrop against which we can place the diversity in 
the communities’ perception of each company. The study also identifies the strategic 
preferences of the communities, thereby helping us to determine whether or not the 
companies are able to meet up with those expectations. We are also able to compare what 
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the oil companies consider to be the preferences of the communities and what the 
communities actually prefer. 
 
This study offers an addition to the process of the GMoU so as to ensure the achievement 
of its purpose. This is based on an examination of the oil companies’ conception of the 
GMoU and the communities’ understanding and perception of it. A Grassroot monitoring 
scheme is suggested to help to maintain the contact between the oil companies and the 
communities. This is the only way the companies can be in touch with the realities in the 
communities and monitor their development. 
 
The study also establishes that there is indeed a gap in communication between the oil 
companies and the communities. This results in the companies claiming that they invest a 
lot into community development while the communities insist that the companies do not 
do enough to justify their presence. The study raises a possibility that the middlemen 
selected to represent the communities with the oil companies may be receiving the 
benefits without passing them on to the people. 
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APPENDIX 1 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
Covenant University, Ota 
College of Human Development                  
Department of Mass Communication 
Ota, Ogun State 
 
Dear Respondent,  
 
I am a doctoral student of the above institution currently carrying out a study on 
“Community Relations Strategies and Conflict Resolution in the Niger Delta: A Study of Three Major Oil Companies”. Please respond to the questions in this questionnaire as sincerely as you can. Your responses will be treated as confidential and the information provided will be used purely for academic purpose.   Thank you  Yours Faithfully, Amodu, Lanre Olaolu 
 
SECTION A DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS 
 
1 Gender Male Female 
2 Age 20-35 36-50 51-65 66 and above 
3 Education SSCE 
or less 
HND/Degree MSc/MA Ph.D 
4 Name of Community  5 Are you aware of the existence of oil companies in your community? Yes No Not sure 6 Which of these oil companies reside in your community? Shell Agip Chevron  7 For how long has the company (ies) been in your community? 0-10years 11-20 years 21 years or more 
 
 
SECTION B  Kindly tick the appropriate answers to the questions in this section. 
8) How will you describe the relationship between your community and oil company 
(ies) in your community? A) Cordial [  ]  B) Neutral [  ]  C) Not Cordial [  ] 
9) How does the oil company (ies) relate with your community? Through 
    a) Royal fathers only  [   ]     b) Elders only  [   ]      c) Family heads only  [   ] 
    d) The youths only   [   ]     e) All levels mentioned above  [   ]     f) No level at all   [   ]  
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10) How often does the oil company (ies) in your community relate with the community? 
    a) Never [   ]  b) Once in a while [   ]  c) Often [   ]  d) Very often [   ] 
 
11) Does the oil company in your community contribute to the development of the 
community? 
    a) Yes [   ]  b) Sometimes [   ]  c) No [   ] 
 
12) If yes, does the oil company (ies) consult the community before such contributions? 
   a) Never [   ]  b) Once in a while [   ]  c) Often [   ]  d) Very often [   ] 
 
13) Has there ever been any conflict with the oil company (ies) in your area? 
    a) Yes [   ]  b) No [   ] 
 
14) If yes, how often? a) Rarely [   ]  b) Often [   ]  c) Very often [   ] 
 
15) Do you resolve the conflict? a) Yes [   ]  b) Sometimes [   ]  c) No [   ] 
 
16) By what means do you resolve these conflict? Through 
   a) Meetings between the oil companies and the elders [   ] 
   b) Meetings between the oil companies and the youths [   ] 
   c) Government intervention [   ]   d) Consultants [   ] 
   e) Others, specify………………………………………………….. 
 
SECTION C: Respond to the statements below using the following rating scale: 
Strongly Agree (SA), Agree (A), Undecided (U), Disagree (D) and Strongly Disagree 
(SD).  
 Items  SA A U D SD 
17 The oil company in my community influences the 
community positively 
     
18 I believe the oil company communicates effectively 
with my community 
     
19 I am satisfied with the way the oil company resolves 
crises 
     
20 During conflicts, the oil company (ies) is usually more 
ready to negotiate with my community. 
     
21 The way the oil company (ies) relates with my 
community helps to reduce the frequency of crises. 
     
22 I believe the oil company(ies) always keeps to the 
agreements made with my community. 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
COVENANT UNIVERSITY 
COLLEGE OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
MASS COMMUNICATION DEPARTMENT 
 
INDEPTH INTERVIEW GUIDE 
Name of Interviewer------------------------------------ 
Date------------------------------------------------------- 
Name of Interviewee----------------------------------- 
Staff Position-------------------------------------------- 
Interview with the Public Relations Officer 
Good morning. I am ________ (introduce self). 
This interview is being conducted as a part of my doctoral research. The aim of this 
session is to find out your organization’s relationship with its host communities. I believe 
you are in a position to provide the necessary information because you represent your 
organization on such issues. I am particularly interested in the strategies the organization 
adopts to manage crises. 
 
If it is okay with you, our conversation will be tape recorded so that I can capture all the 
details and yet carry on an attentive conversation with you. I also guarantee the 
confidentiality of your comments so please answer the following questions to the best of 
your knowledge. 
1) Can you briefly describe your responsibilities in your organization? 
 
2) Please give a brief background into your organization’s activities in its host 
community. 
 
3) What internal structure(s) does the organization use in relating with the 
community? 
 
4) Does the organization make use of any external assistance (e.g. consultants) in 
relating with the communities? 
5) What community structure does the organization relate with? 
 
6) What are the specific community relations strategies used by your company to 
manage crises? 
7) How would you rate the effectiveness of those strategies? 
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8) To what extent are those strategies unique to your organization? 
 
9) Has there ever been a joint effort among oil companies to manage crises? 
 
 
10) In your own opinion, what community relations techniques do the communities 
prefer? 
 
11) Would you say the unique community relations strategies of your organization 
have reduced the level of exposure to conflict? 
 
12) Please explain why this is so. 
 
13) Is there any other information about the community relations strategies of your 
organization that you think would be useful for me to know? 
 
Thank you very much for your time. 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
COVENANT UNIVERSITY 
COLLEGE OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
MASS COMMUNICATION DEPARTMENT 
 
INDEPTH INTERVIEW GUIDE 
Name of Interviewer------------------------------------ 
Date------------------------------------------------------- 
Name of Interviewee----------------------------------- 
Position in the community----------------------------- 
Interview with prominent community members 
Good morning. I am ________ (introduce self). 
This interview is being conducted as a part of my doctoral research. The aim of this 
session is to find out your relationship with the oil companies in your community. I 
believe you are in a position to provide the necessary information because you represent 
your community in a variety of issues.  
 
If it is okay with you, our conversation will be tape recorded so that I can capture all the 
details and yet carry on an attentive conversation with you. I also guarantee the 
confidentiality of your comments so please answer the following questions to the best 
your knowledge. 
1) Can you briefly describe your responsibilities in your community? 
 
2) Please give a brief background into the oil companies’ activities in your 
community. 
 
3) What internal structure(s) does the community use in relating with the oil 
companies? 
 
4) Does the community make use of any external assistance (e.g. consultants) in 
relating with the oil companies? 
5) Who do you relate with within the company(ies)?  
 
6) What are the specific community relations strategies used by the oil company(ies) 
to manage crises? 
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7) How would you rate the effectiveness of those strategies? 
 
8) Is there any difference in the way the different oil companies go about their 
community relations? 
 
 
9) In your own opinion, which style of relating with your community is most 
effective? 
 
 
10) What strategies will you advise the oil companies to adopt in resolving crises? 
 
11) Is there any other information that you think would be useful for me to know? 
 
Thank you very much for your time. 
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APPENDIX 4 
 
COVENANT UNIVERSITY 
COLLEGE OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
MASS COMMUNICATION DEPARTMENT 
 
FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDE 
 
SECTION A: FACE SHEET  
 
Name of Moderator------------------------------------------------------ 
Name of Assistant---------------------------------------    Date------------------------------------- 
Time------------------------------------ 
Place of Discussion------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Participants Information 
Name Age Sex 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
SECTION B: DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 
 
Introduction 
Good afternoon. My name is _______ and my colleague here is ______.  
Thank you for coming. This focus group is a relaxed discussion session in which 
you share your opinion about our topic. There is no right or wrong answer to the 
questions we will be asking so please feel free to say exactly what is on your  
mind. 
Purpose 
We are from Covenant University, Ota, and we are here to talk about the way 
your community and the oil companies are managing the conflicts. The purpose is 
to get your opinion on the efforts that have been made so far and how well they 
are working. I am not here to give my opinion or share any information, your 
opinion is what matters. Please feel comfortable to express yourself freely. You 
can disagree with any point raised and you can change your mind. 
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Procedure 
My colleague here will be taking notes and recording the session so that I can pay 
attention to everything you say. The session is confidential, so no one will know 
what your contributions are. For us to have a relaxed discussion, you are free to 
respond without waiting to be called upon. I will however appreciate it if only one 
person talks at a time for easy documentation. This discussion will last about one 
hour. Thank you for coming. 
  
Participant introduction  
Let’s begin with a brief introduction. Tell us your name and give any other 
information you want us to have. 
 Discussion Questions 
1) How would you describe the relationship between the oil companies and your 
community? 
2) In what ways has the conflict affected your community? 
3) In what ways has the conflict affected ---------------, ----------------- and -------------
----- oil companies? 
 
4) How do the oil companies communicate with your community during crises? 
 
5) What are the efforts of the oil companies to resolve crises? 
 
6) How successful do you think those efforts have been? 
 
7) Do you think there is any difference in the way ------------------------, ----------------
----- and ------------------------------- oil companies respond to your community 
during crises? 
 
a) Please explain why you think so. 
 
b) Which do you prefer? (if applicable). 
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8) How satisfied are you with the way the oil companies communicate with your 
community? 
 
9) If you could advise the oil companies, how would you suggest they can improve 
their relationship with the community? 
 
10) Kindly suggest ways in which they can help to resolve crises? 
 
 
Thank you very much for coming to this session. Your time is very much appreciated and 
your comments have been very helpful. 
 
 
SECTION C: POST-INTERVIEW COMMENT SHEET 
 
 General impression about the session: 
 
 
 
 
 
Interpretation of important words and gestures displayed during the session: 
 
 
  
 
 
Other comments: 
 
